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ABSTRACT
Economic theory is subject to continual analysis. While theories themselves are
sometimes widely accepted, nuances of theory are persistently scrutinized. Researchers
have not isolated this debate from a simply theoretic standpoint. Empirical methods in
microeconomics also provide a forum for disagreement. This dissertation studies two
topics of microeconomic theory that are constantly in debate: integration and cost
function estimation. From the standpoint of theoretical integration models in
international trade theory, the concept of foreign direct investment is studied in both a
horizontal and vertical setting. With respect to horizontal integration, this dissertation
modifies the Brander-Krugman reciprocal dumping model to evaluate the effects on
production and profit in an international duopoly under settings of non-controlling
interest and managerial control. Counterintuitive results abound with managerial control,
in that the acquiring firm will increase its exports abroad, despite the presence of
transportation costs. Additionally, a discussion of antitrust and nationalist considerations
that drive integration decisions is presented. This presents an introduction to a branch of
theoretical literature that has seen constant conjecture: vertical integration. Various
models of vertical integration are discussed, with the Ordover, Saloner, and Salop model
in the foreground. The vertical integration model in this dissertation uses internal transfer
pricing to describe the effects of input sales between the downstream and upstream
divisions of a merged firm. With price leadership in the input market, foreclosure of
downstream firms will occur, and these firms move toward a collusive equilibrium in the
absence of tacit collusion among the downstream competitors. The dissertation
concludes with a discussion of a debate among empirical researchers concerning the
estimation of cost functions. There has been considerable discussion regarding the
imposition of regularity conditions on cost functions. These conditions are imposed on
the translog, and it seen that forecasting results are improved as a result. This leads to an
important conclusion: economic theory matters in empirical work. While the constant
scrutiny of theory will never conclude, this dissertation attempts to improve upon existing
integration theory, and uses widely accepted economic theory to improve the means in
which cost functions are estimated in empirical research.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION TO THE DISSERTATION
This dissertation comprises essays on both theoretical and empirical issues in
applied microeconomics. The first three essays of the dissertation focus on current
integration issues in international trade, adding to recent literature. Integration, or the
merging of two firms, remains a widely researched topic in the economics literature. The
interest is motivated, in part, by the tremendous growth in mergers and acquisitions in the
United States in the latter half of the 1990s. The fourth essay deals with empirical issues
in analyzing cost, in particular, analyzing the forecasting accuracy of a flexible functional
form under the imposition of constraints. This study uses data from the electricity
generating industry, an industry with significant policy interest. Electricity deregulation
is currently a much-debated topic in several states. The winter of 2000-01 was riddled
with “rolling blackouts” in the state of California, fueling additional discussion of the
question of deregulation and consequently, re-regulation.
This introduction offers a brief overview of the essays that follow in this
dissertation. A comprehensive review of the integration literature in international trade
immediately follows this introduction to the dissertation. This literature review presents
the setting for the next three chapters dealing with horizontal and vertical mergers. The
relevant literature for the cost analysis is more recent (and hence limited in scope).
Therefore, the literature review for that topic is included in the empirical essay itself.
Integration typically takes one of two forms, horizontal and vertical. The first two
essays in this dissertation deal with horizontal integration, a merging between two firms
in the same level of the production process. The third essay deals with vertical
integration, a merging between two firms at different levels of the production process.
The Brander-Krugman reciprocal dumping model is extended to analyze
horizontal integration in the context of international trade. This widely accepted model is
convenient given its simplicity (in adhering to Occam’s razor). The basic framework
envisions a world duopoly, with one firm in each of the two countries. Horizontal
integration entails the firm in the domestic country acquiring partial or complete
ownership of the firm in the foreign country. In the context of non-controlling interest
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and output decisions, assuming only two firms does not lose the generality of the overall
results.
The third chapter presents the model and its initial extension, assuming that the
degree of ownership that the domestic firm acquires is exogenous. The two firms begin
as a symmetric duopoly (which is a key assumption of the Brander-Krugman model), in
which the ownership interest of the domestic firm in the foreign firm is zero. The
question is, how does the acquisition of a competitor affect the production, profit, and
trade patterns of the initial duopoly? There will be some level of interest in which the
domestic firm acquires managerial control of the foreign firm, clearly allowing the
domestic firm to exercise decision-making over the foreign firm. Any interest below that
level however, leaves the acquiring firm with a non-controlling interest (hence a share of
the profits), but no managerial control. While this essay describes the effects of
ownership, it is not concerned with the optimal level of ownership of the foreign firm.
The fourth chapter addresses this question.
In the absence of further analysis, it stands to reason that with no exogenous
impediments to ownership, the domestic firm would continue to acquire the foreign firm
until full ownership is achieved. This is because the degree of ownership variable not
only reflects ownership, but the fraction of foreign firm profit accruing to the domestic
firm. With managerial control, the industry goes from a symmetric duopoly to that of a
multiplant monopoly.
Given this fact, an interesting question remains. Why do we see firms acquiring a
non-controlling interest when the model predicts that it is better to obtain total
ownership? Very simply, the answer lies in the presence of exogenous constraints. In
the United States for example, the federal government will likely prevent any horizontal
merger that yields over seventy-five percent market share to the merged firm. Horizontal
restraints that would significantly hinder competition are deemed “illegal per se” by the
federal government. The formations of monopolies or similar conspiracies to monopolize
are illegal as described under antitrust laws such as the Sherman and Clayton acts.
There may also, however, be other restraints on the acquisition of a controlling
interest. For example, China has pursued a highly nationalist economic development
strategy. Foreign firms are sometimes prohibited from acquiring managerial control of
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enterprises in China, despite its “open door” policy. The fourth chapter presents a KuhnTucker optimal ownership model to deal with situations of antitrust and external
ownership constraints.
The essay in the fifth chapter shifts attention from horizontal integration to
vertical integration in international trade. Specifically, the essay pursues backward
vertical integration, the form of vertical integration in which a firm merges with an input
supplier. The model assumes that there are two upstream (supplier) firms, both located in
the home market. Additionally, there are three downstream (final product) firms. One is
located in the home market, and the other two are located in two foreign countries. These
downstream firms are all rivals in the home market.
This essay assumes trade protection as a precondition. One of the foreign firms
increases its volume of exports to the home country, which induces the home government
to impose tariffs on all imports, including those of the other foreign competitor. After the
tariff is imposed, the firm that flooded the home market with exports vertically integrates
with one of the two upstream firms in that market, establishing a presence. The literature
details this process “protection-building trade” (PBT).
If this newly integrated firm assumes a price leadership role in the input market,
then this could forestall potential counterintegration by one of the downstream rivals.
Thus, the integrated firm enjoys profits from both a downstream division and an upstream
division. One interesting result found in this essay is that the prevention of
counterintegration causes all downstream firms to move toward a collusive equilibrium,
in the absence of even tacit collusion in the downstream market. When the vertically
integrated firm assumes the role of input price leader, it forecloses itself as well as its
downstream rivals. As long as counterintegration is prevented, the downstream rivals
move toward the collusive equilibrium as they reduce production in the presence of
higher input prices.
The aforementioned essays all deal with interrelated cases concerning integration
in the context of international trade. The sixth chapter presents an essay that is distinct
from the previous ones in terms of area of study. The final essay of this dissertation uses
the Bayesian cost frontier and the translog flexible functional form to evaluate cost
forecasting accuracy with and without the imposition of regularity conditions. In
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empirical studies of estimating cost functions, sometimes economists try to find a model
that fits data too perfectly, thereby “overfitting” a regression to the data. In such
applications, overfitting sometimes violates the relationships and parametric restrictions
that are implied by cost theory.
This problem has led some economists to suggest imposing regularity conditions
locally or “regionally,” retreating from restricting globally or not at all. Regularity
conditions of cost functions are monotonicity, concavity, and homogeneity of degree one.
With respect to monotonicity, this implies that cost must rise if input prices increase.
Similarly, cost must rise if output increases. Concavity of a cost function implies
downward-sloping (i.e., well-behaved) input demand functions. Homogeneity of degree
one implies that as input prices increase by some factor t , total cost must rise by the
same factor. In the literature, it turns out that concavity is violated much more often than
monotonicity. These violations of economic theory will yield inaccurate and biased
parameter estimates.
The final essay uses the Bayesian cost frontier and the translog form to estimate a
cost function that is both constrained (with regulations imposed regionally) and
unconstrained. The estimation uses data from electricity generating plants using natural
gas as the primary fuel. In order to determine whether forecasting is improved when
imposing regularity conditions, the mean square error, the mean absolute error, and the
mean standard deviation are all calculated. If forecasting is improved with the imposition
of regularity conditions, this implies that economic theory matters in empirical analysis.
Interestingly, each measure of forecasting accuracy shows that the functional form with
the constraints imposed performs better than the unconstrained model. This is an
important finding that may influence the way economists perform economic analyses in
the future.
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
Dissertation Focus: The following dissertation is an analysis of issues in theoretical and
applied microeconomics. The first three essays concern a study of horizontal and vertical
mergers in international trade. Specifically, the first two of these essays deal with
horizontal integration among international competitors. An analysis of changes in firm
output, exports, and profit is pursued in these chapters. The third essay is an analysis of
vertical integration. Given a world with three downstream firms and two upstream firms,
this essay illustrates the effects of vertical integration between two firms in a situation
where all downstream firms compete for the home market. A study of the effects on
downstream firm profitability is pursued in the presence of vertical integration between a
home upstream firm and a foreign downstream firm when there is price leadership in the
input market.
It is necessary to describe a comprehensive review of the literature prior to the
presentation of these essays. In each of the integration chapters, a certain extension is
mentioned prior to the description of the model that is to be used. In order to better
understand the extensions, a thorough review of the literature is therefore necessary. An
understanding of prior research assists in finding the proper placement of this work in the
literature.
The final essay of the dissertation is an analysis of the forecasting accuracy of a
flexible functional form (the translog) with and without the imposition of regularity
conditions in estimating a cost function. There has been a back-and-forth debate among
economists as to the validity of imposing such conditions on various functional forms.
Regularity conditions in cost theory are monotonicity, concavity, and homogeneity of
degree one in input prices. Much empirical research produces results which violate basic
economic theory. As a result, estimates of elasticities tend to be biased. The issue of
whether or not conditions should be imposed concerns the loss of flexibility of these
forms upon the imposition of those conditions. Flexibility is how well a regression fits
the data upon which it is based. Some economists argue that regressions tend to “overfit”
the data, and as a result, theory is violated. Hence this is the rationale for imposing
regularity conditions. Given the ongoing debate and recent contributions concerning cost
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estimation, a review of the background literature is presented at the beginning of the final
essay.
Given the length of this review, this chapter is organized into several sections and
subsections for the sake of clarity.
2.1. Horizontal Integration:
2.1.A. Horizontal Integration and Reciprocal Dumping:
The beginning of this literature review addresses the theory of reciprocal
dumping. This theory is presented due to the fact that the first two essays utilize an
extension of the reciprocal dumping model. This widely-accepted model in international
trade theory is a useful benchmark given its simplicity. An underlying assumption of this
model is the existence of an international duopoly. Given that the first two essays
concern international horizontal mergers, the use of this model seems ideal.
Firms wishing to increase their presence in other markets abroad have two
primary avenues with which to do so. The first of these, exporting, is undoubtedly the
most common method firms utilize for tapping into foreign markets. (The second is
foreign direct investment, discussed below.) In past years, it was common for the United
States to export automobiles and other capital-intensive goods to other countries. At the
same time the United States, as well as other countries, would import similar goods from
abroad. This notion of intraindustry trade was originally thought to be due to slight
product differentiation. This concept is typical in market environments such as oligopoly
and most certainly monopolistic competition. James A. Brander (1981) noted that
initially when we see trade in slightly differentiated products, it is due to consumers’
desire for variety. Presumably, with two-way trade in a commodity such as ham,
Americans may prefer Danish ham, while the United States exports ham to Denmark for
the same reason.
Brander goes further in that trade between two nations may be in identical goods.
This type of trade is described as cross-hauling. Brander pursues this model in a Cournot
setting, assuming that countries involved in trade (A--home and B--foreign) are identical.
There exists one firm in each country, with the firms being symmetric, producing output
at an identical marginal cost. The assumption of constant marginal cost is a key
supposition in that it allows Brander to separate domestic and foreign markets. Firms can
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then maximize profit with respect to both the domestic and the export markets.
Increasing returns and transport costs are assumed. Transport costs are of the “iceberg”
form; when output x is exported to another country, the quantity gx arrives in that
country, where 0 ≤ g ≤ 1 . Lastly, firms play Cournot, in that each firm assumes that the
other’s output in each market remains the same. Firms remain in the industry only in the
absence of economic losses.
Given the assumed symmetry, as transportation costs fall (i.e., as iceberg g
approaches one), the solution approaches a standard Cournot equilibrium. Intuitively, a
greater volume of foreign goods will enter the domestic market when the costs of
transportation fall. With symmetry, this market share is split evenly between the two
firms. Brander also claims that as world income rises, cross-hauling would also rise, a
standard result with well-behaved demand functions. As income rises, total consumption
rises, and some of this consumption is in the form of imported goods. The key result is
that there exists a level of the iceberg transport cost parameter g in which markets will
be invaded by the other firm. This is the cross-hauling that Brander wishes to explain.
Brander’s framework is incomplete, however, in that while he models the
conditions in which two-way trade develops, he does not provide reasons for exactly why
such trade arises. He simply notes mathematically how trade arises. In fact, a referee
points out that trade develops from dumping.
This insight leads Brander along with co-author Paul Krugman (1983) to expand
and improve upon his previous work. Using the same model and assumptions as before
(with the exception that one nation is now “domestic” while the other is “foreign”),
Brander and Krugman show that this dumping situation that develops in the market for
identical goods is in fact reciprocal. In other words, when the two firms compete
Cournot, each firm is dumping its output in the other firm’s market. Brander and
Krugman call this phenomenon reciprocal dumping.
Dumping in its most innocent form is the activity of a firm selling its output in a
foreign market at a price that is less than the foreign firms are charging. For example, if
Mexico were selling steel to the United States at a price that is less than U.S. firms
charge, American steel firms would likely claim that Mexico was dumping steel into the
U.S. market. Dumping is actually a form of third-degree price discrimination. From a
7

firm’s standpoint, it sells output both in its home market and to a foreign market. It is
assumed that the foreign demand for home output is highly elastic at the home firm’s
foreign market price. Using the steel example above, U.S. steel consumers are highly
price responsive to Mexican steel. A slight increase in the price of Mexican steel in the
U.S. could cause a rather large shift away from Mexican steel purchases and toward
American steel. The entire basis for third-degree price discrimination is that two separate
groups have different elasticities of demand. The more elastic group will be faced with
the lower price, due to that group’s high responsiveness. Given this, Mexican steel will
be priced below American steel in U.S. markets.
Another form of dumping is the far more anticompetitive predatory dumping. In
this instance, foreign goods are sold in domestic markets at not only a lower price, but
below the marginal cost of production of the foreign firm. The motive for predatory
dumping is clearly to drive out competition. The firm engaging in dumping is willing to
incur an economic loss in the short run in exchange for driving out foreign competitors,
after which it assumes a monopoly position in the targeted market. While dumping as
described above will most certainly draw the ire of domestic firms, predatory dumping
will undoubtedly be deemed as anticompetitive. Guilty parties in the U.S., for example,
would be faced with antidumping duties as a result of their actions.
Brander and Krugman show that in the presence of positive transportation costs,
each firm has a larger market share in its own market than in the other market. This is
not surprising since the two firms are symmetric. Transportation costs add to the
marginal cost of exporting, meaning that the firm exports less abroad than it produces
domestically. Given this fact, the marginal revenue in each firm’s export market is
higher than in its own. This is coupled with the fact that the marginal cost of exporting is
also higher than the marginal cost of production for indigenous consumption for each
firm. Therefore, the marginal revenue of exporting can equal the marginal cost of
exporting at positive output levels in both markets. Since this is true for both firms,
cross-hauling develops. The question remains if whether or not the two-way trade is
actually dumping. Given the high elasticity of exports that each firm faces (due to
symmetry), each firm has a smaller markup over marginal cost on its exports than on the
output for its own market. Thus, the export price is less than the domestic price in both
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markets. This is reciprocal dumping. It stems from firm symmetry and oligopolistic
rivalry.
Brander and Krugman also explore the welfare effects of positive transportation
costs. If there is reciprocal dumping, then it appears on the surface that trade is rather
inefficient and welfare decaying. Both firms are incurring transportation costs with
exporting, and both firms are exporting identical goods into each other’s markets.
Brander and Krugman find that at initial prohibitive transportation costs, there is no trade,
and a slight reduction in transportation costs from this level leads to lower welfare. The
intuition is that the decrease in the marginal cost of exporting is a gain for firms.
Secondly, increased trade leads to increased consumption, which is also a gain. But these
gains are negligible when compared with the loss that a firm faces from a higher level of
imports entering that firm’s native market. This increased level of imports results in lost
domestic production. Therefore at high transportation costs, there is a net welfare loss.
David Weinstein (1992) pursues the dumping issue further. He extends the
Brander-Krugman reciprocal dumping model by allowing for the existence of markets
with different degrees of competitiveness. Weinstein answers the question posed above
with respect to differing numbers of firms in the two markets.
Brander and Krugman showed reciprocal dumping occurring between two firms
due to transportation costs, oligopolistic rivalry, and identical inverse demand functions
in both markets. Allowing n to represent the number of domestic firms and n * to be the
number of foreign firms, Brander and Krugman showed reciprocal dumping in a situation
where n = n * = 1 . Weinstein uses the Brander-Krugman reciprocal dumping model and
all of its assumptions to show that intra-industry trade still occurs for all values of n and
n * . Thus, reciprocal dumping continues to hold as long as production and transport costs
to the other market are less than the price in that market. This is simply rent-seeking
behavior that takes place among all firms with some degree of market power.
Notice that dumping in actuality is nothing more than rent-seeking behavior. The
reason firms price discriminate is to capture additional surplus that would not be
recognized by charging the same price in both markets. If a domestic firm wishes to
increase production to try to increase sales and profit, the flooding of goods into the home
market will lower the price of output. However, if the firm increases its exports to a
9

foreign market, the price is depressed in the foreign market and not in the domestic
country. But in the absence of trade barriers, this action can happen both ways. The
foreign firm can pursue the same type of rent-seeking behavior.
Weinstein’s additional contribution to the literature is that he moves away from
the assumption of an identical number of firms in each market. He alters the model by
assuming that more firms exist in the domestic nation than in the foreign country, making
the domestic nation more competitive. The foreign market, being less competitive, will
have relatively high prices for output. This allows the domestic firms to export and dump
goods into the foreign market. However, the higher degree of competition in the
domestic market results in domestic prices of output that are too low, and consequently
foreign firms do not find it profitable to export goods to the domestic market. Therefore,
the dumping is only one-way, or what Weinstein refers to as unilateral dumping.
2.1.B. Horizontal Integration as Foreign Direct Investment:
While this practice of intraindustry trade continues to a large degree, there has
also been a significant increase in foreign presence in the United States. This increased
presence is not so much through imports, but through multinational firms. Similarly, the
United States invests capital in other nations. This foreign direct investment (FDI)
provides a nation with an alternative to exporting. A multinational is a situation in which
the investing firm, for example a firm in the United States, opens or buys a firm in
another nation. The investing firm in the United States would best be described as a
“planning firm,” while the firm in the foreign country serves to produce locally for
residents of that nation. The obvious advantage of a firm becoming a multinational is
that it avoids transportation costs by not exporting. The firm captures some of the foreign
market through the operation of its plant abroad.
Fumio Dei (1990) extends the Brander-Krugman model of reciprocal dumping by
allowing for the presence of such multinational corporations (MNCs), allowing the
formation of MNCs as an alternative to exporting.
The model and initial assumptions Dei uses are the same as those first presented
by Brander and Krugman in their first work on reciprocal dumping. Dei’s approach to
the operations of the MNC are the same as those noted above. The headquarter firm
incurs only fixed costs, such as management and marketing costs, while production costs
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(i.e., variable costs) are incurred by plants abroad. Plants can be relocated abroad, but the
headquarter “planning” firm remains in the country of origin.
The firms (home and foreign) can only pursue one strategy at a time. That is, they
must choose to export only (production from plants abroad equals zero) or become a
multinational. If a firm decides to become a multinational, it ceases all exporting to
avoid transportation costs and simply supplies the foreign market locally through its plant
in that country.
When one firm opts to become a multinational, its marginal cost of supply to the
foreign market will be less than its marginal cost of exporting to that market. This is of
course due to the avoidance of transportation costs which are involved in exporting. If
the other firm chooses not to multinationalize, then its marginal cost of supplying the
other market does not change. This reduction in marginal cost raises profits in Cournot
duopoly. Because both firms can become MNCs, both will do so. Hence, positive
transportation costs and Cournot behavior lead to mutual penetration by MNCs.
Dei next turns to the issue of market size and MNC profitability. The MNC has
two areas of revenue net of variable costs: some level R , which is the home firm’s
revenue net of variable costs in the home market, and R * , which is the home firm’s
revenue net of variable costs in the foreign market. Allowing F to be fixed costs, home
firm profit would then be π = R + R * − F . A large domestic market leads to a large
decrease in R , while at the same time a relatively small foreign market yields a small
increase in R * . The rationale is as follows: if a foreign firm penetrates the large
domestic market, that firm will lose market share to the foreign firm’s plant (which recall
is producing in the domestic market, avoiding transportation costs). Thus the large
domestic market is being invaded by the rent-seeking foreign firm. Alternatively, the
domestic multinational benefits from increased presence in the foreign market, producing
in that market to similarly avoid transportation costs. But if the size of the foreign market
is relatively small, the gains to the domestic multinational will be small as well. Dei
finds unsurprisingly that total welfare rises with the mutual penetration of MNCs, largely
because both firms as MNCs can escape wasteful transportation costs, which in turn leads
to an increase in global welfare.
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If a firm decides to become a multinational, it must decide which is better: to
open a new plant or buy out a competitor. Of course, both options may not be available
to a firm wishing to become a multinational. If a firm decides to open a new plant
abroad, this is called greenfield investment. This would most likely be the popular choice
for this firm with respect to the residents of the nation in which a new plant is to be
opened. A firm that opens a new plant will most likely hire local workers at the
production level, hence providing new jobs in that nation.
This is not always embraced by foreign residents however. In Japan for example,
outsiders are not always welcomed, and are labeled gaijin, which literally means
“foreigner.”1 Russia has seen significant difficulties in luring foreign capital into its
country. Upon perestroika economic reforms in 1985, joint ventures and foreign direct
investment were highly sought after by reformers such as Premier Mikhail Gorbachev.
To be sure, skepticism of Western firms and the inefficiencies of Soviet and Russian
capital kept foreign investment at bay. But the hard-line Communists took the same
point of view as some of the Japanese. The Soviet government did not want their
country’s assets to be purchased by outsiders from the West. In other cases however, the
firm is seen as it is: a provider of jobs for local residents, thus earning the goodwill of the
local government.
On the other hand, a firm may be seen as an enemy to competition. If a firm
merges with a foreign competitor, this type of horizontal integration inhibits competition.
As competition diminishes, the monopoly power (perhaps measured by market share) of
existing firms likely increases, and there is a high probability of restricted output and
higher prices. This would of course be significantly unpopular among that nation’s
citizens. There are significant issues in this case with respect to the Sherman Antitrust
Act of 1890 and the Clayton Act of 1914.2
Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro (1990) analyze the effects of one firm acquiring
another firm’s assets in a concentrated industry. Specifically, they show the effects on
individual firm profit and price with the change in asset ownership. Farrell and Shapiro
1

Edith Hill Updike and Keith Naughton, “Ford Has a Long Haul at Mazda,” Business Week, 7 October
1996, 112.
2
Information concerning these two pieces of antitrust legislation can be found in any business law
textbook, such as Smith, Mann, and Roberts, Business Law and the Regulation of Business, 4th ed., (West
Publishing Company, 1993), 1005-1023.
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examine this transfer of ownership in terms of stock purchases, and wish to observe the
effects of such share purchases. They present their model with two firms, Firm 1 as the
acquirer and Firm 2 as the seller, and an unidentified number of j other firms. Farrell
and Shapiro shows Firm 1’s profit function as π 1 + απ 2 , where α is Firm 1’s ownership
stake in Firm 2. Farrell and Shapiro also state a precondition in that this level of
ownership is assumed to be small, in that Firm 1 cannot influence Firm 2’s decision
making with respect to managerial control. Firm 1 chooses output level x1 to maximize
this profit function, whereas all other firms choose x j to maximize π j for all j > 2 .
Farrell and Shapiro correctly state that Firm 2’s objective function is not clear without
introducing other conditions. If shareholders of Firm 2 own zero stock in Firm 1, then
these shareholders will only want to maximize π 2 with respect to x 2 . Conversely,
shareholders of Firm 1 will want to set x 2 such that it maximizes Firm 1’s profit function
above. But the central point remains in Farrell and Shapiro’s precondition. If Firm 1
does not purchase enough of Firm 2 as to exercise managerial control, then Firm 2 will
likely maximize π 2 in terms of x 2 . Shareholder interest in Firm 1 would have to be
formally modeled. Lastly, all firms behave Cournot in that they do not collude, and each
firm takes all other firms’ output as given.
Farrell and Shapiro hypothesize that as the ownership stake increases, then Firm 1
will lower its output in favor of Firm 2 to increase its financial stake in Firm 2. As a
response, all other firms (including Firm 2) will increase output. Farrell and Shapiro
build on Reynolds and Snapp (1986) by stating that an increase in α lowers total
equilibrium output, raising price as a result. This would mean that Firm 1’s reduction in
output outweighs all other j firms’ increases in output. Farrell and Shapiro use total
differentiation to prove this result. Firm 1’s behavior may then be seen as
anticompetitive, since it results in output contraction and higher prices.
The effects on firm profit are not surprising. Firm 1 will see reductions in profit
since it is reducing its output. However, Firm 1 is reducing its output in order to augment
Firm 2’s profits, which will in turn benefit Firm 1. This provides for ambiguity in terms
of total shareholder profit. In other words, π 1 + απ 2 may rise or fall. In addition, Farrell
and Shapiro call on findings by Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983) by stating that
13

mergers in Cournot oligopolies may not be profitable due to all other firms increasing
output as the merging parties act to restrict it. This also leads to the ambiguity of Firm 1
shareholder profit. Conversely, the profits for all firms j > 1 will rise with increases in
α . This is again due to output expansion by all firms other than Firm 1.
There is a caveat provided for assured Firm 1 profitability however. Firm 1 will
find it profitable to purchase shares of Firm 2 if and only if Firm 1 is relatively small.
The authors admit that in reality, the opposite is often seen. They proceed further in
stating that if Firm 1 were larger than Firm 2, any stock purchase would only be
profitable if Firm 1 gained managerial control over Firm 2. They predict that Firm 2
would lower output in this case, which will benefit Firm 1. Farrell and Shapiro do not
formally pursue this hypothesis further.
Notice that one method of forming a multinational will increase competition,
while the other may actually hamper it. When a firm tries to engage in horizontal
integration, which is merging with a similar firm at the same stage of the production
process, it may raise antitrust concerns. A firm that enjoys market power has the ability
to charge a significant markup over marginal cost. The Antitrust Division of the United
States Department of Justice analyzes potential mergers and acquisitions. When a firm
obtains seventy-five percent market share, this raises tremendous anticompetitive
concerns. The firms involved could possibly be in violation of the Clayton Act, which
makes certain mergers illegal due to the harmful effects they would have on competition.
Therefore, even if a firm would like to merge with another, it could perhaps never take
place due to government concerns of violation of antitrust legislation.
2.1.C. The Literature and Chapters Three and Four:
The literature addressed above motivates the next two chapters of this
dissertation. The third chapter presents horizontal integration taking ownership
exogenously. This essay is pursued in spite of the antitrust concerns previously
mentioned. However, the fourth chapter illustrates ownership in an international duopoly
taking real world concerns such as antitrust legislation into account. This endogenous
treatment of ownership in the horizontal integration model utilizes Kuhn-Tucker
programming given certain constraints to ownership.
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2.2. Vertical Integration:
2.2.A. Description:
Firms can obtain a presence in another nation not only through exports, greenfield
investment, or horizontal integration. Firms can also significantly influence their
competitor’s behavior as well as increase profits through vertical integration, merging
with a firm at a different stage of the production process. For example, suppose an
automobile manufacturer wishes to merge with a firm that produces steel. Steel is an
important input in the production process for automobiles. In terms of notation, the
automobile manufacturer would be called the “downstream” firm, while the steel
manufacturer would be the “upstream” firm. This type of vertical integration is called
backward vertical integration.
There are several reasons why a firm would want to engage in this type of
integration. First of all, it provides an avenue for the aforementioned presence in a
foreign market. For example, a downstream firm in the United States may wish to
integrate with a supplier in Mexico. This action would allow the U.S. firm to have a
presence in Mexico and indirectly influence competition in both the upstream and
downstream markets. Secondly, supply disruptions can cause instability in the
downstream firm’s long-range planning. By merging with a supplier, the downstream
firm may not be able to eliminate supply disruptions, but may at the very least reduce
their impact. This is due to the fact that with one integrated firm doing production
planning, rather than two separate individual firms, supply disruptions could be
forecasted in advance for the downstream division of the integrated firm and it could
react accordingly. A third reason for backward vertical integration is that the two
divisions of a vertically-integrated firm tend to have conflicting profit maximization
goals. An input supplier prefers high prices for its output. An upstream division’s output
is of course the downstream division’s input. The downstream division does not want
high prices for its inputs, as this leads to high production costs. Thus by integrating,
some type of joint profit function could be maximized, which would benefit the
vertically-integrated firm as a whole.
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2.2.B. Foreclosure Issues:
Janusz Ordover, Garth Saloner, and Steven Salop (1990) present a seminal paper
concerning vertical integration. They first address the common fallacy associated with
vertical integration. It has past been accepted that vertical integration is anticompetitive
by its very nature. If a firm merges with an upstream supplier, the newly-integrated firm
will choose not to supply the input to the competitors of the downstream division. This
reduction in available supply will increase the price of inputs to the unintegrated
downstream firms, due to less competition faced by the remaining unintegrated suppliers.
The downstream competitors are hence foreclosed from the market. The restriction in
downstream output increases the price of the final product. Of course, the profits of the
vertically-integrated firm have the potential to rise, given that the integrated firm has a
source of input supply. The integrated firm captures a greater market share with the
foreclosure of downstream rivals.
The fallacy lies in the assumption that once a firm integrates with a supplier, the
upstream division will choose not to supply the input to competitors. Additionally,
vertical mergers do not necessarily imply anticompetitive behavior. Robert Bork (1978)
states that “…in the absence of a most unlikely proved predatory power and purpose,
antitrust should never object to the verticality of any merger…. Properly drawn and
applied horizontal rules are all that we need.”3
Ordover, Saloner, and Salop (hereafter OSS) also note six common objections to
foreclosure theory.:
1. Vertical mergers do not necessarily mean lower input supply to competitors.
Reason: The integrated firm will reduce its demand for inputs produced by unintegrated
suppliers. The act of the downstream firm obtaining the input from its upstream division
does not mean that the downstream firm will produce more than before. Hence its share
of the upstream demand may be no different after integration. The supply relationship in
the production process has changed.
2. Foreclosure of downstream competitors may not be profitable.
Reason: If the upstream division does not sell the input to competitors, then that division
loses sales revenue. This loss may exceed the increase in downstream division profits
3

Robert Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, (New York: Basic Books, 1978), 245.
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from integration. Given this, it may not be in the best interest of the integrated firm to
foreclose downstream competitors from input supply.
3. It may not be true that unintegrated input suppliers raise input prices if the
integrated firm does not sell on the open market.
Reason: Lack of competition does not necessarily result in higher input prices. This is
due to the fear the unintegrated input suppliers have in that downstream firms will begin
to produce the input on their own. This is a primary reason why the oil cartel OPEC does
not keep the price of oil high for long periods of time. If it were to do so, then buyers of
oil would seek to increase their own supply through increased exploratory drilling, or
finding alternative energy sources. Even if a downstream firm cannot produce the input
on its own, higher input prices would cause them to reduce their demand for these inputs.
Input suppliers may see their product as being rather elastic to downstream buyers.
4. Integration may cause counterintegration.
Reason: If initial integration by two firms yields cost advantages for the new merger,
then other downstream firms will have the desire to integrate with other remaining
suppliers. This would take away the cost advantage of the initial integration.
5. Initial attempts at vertical integration may fail, and no merger may take place.
Reason: If upstream firms know that they will have increased market power upon
integration occurring, then each upstream firm may hold out. A downstream firm may
not be able to provide a bid attractive enough to compensate an upstream firm from
forgoing this chance at increased market power. If all upstream firms feel this way, each
one will continue to hold out for a higher bid. In fact, this behavior could lead to the
possibility that no merger takes place to begin with.
6. Anticipated foreclosure may lead other downstream firms to bid initially for
the upstream firm.
Reason: If a downstream firm anticipates the danger and consequences of being
foreclosed, it may choose to enter the bidding for the upstream firm in question. This
would yield the benefits of integration to this firm, and not the initial bidder. With these
objections and open questions in vertical integration theory, OSS develop a theory of
equilibrium vertical foreclosure.
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OSS model a two upstream-two downstream successive duopoly. The upstream
firms provide equal shares of the homogeneous input to the downstream firms. These
downstream competitors produce differentiated products in Bertrand competition, and
have equal market shares. With respect to Bertrand competition, OSS remark that
increases in a rival’s input cost will increase both the equilibrium prices and the firm’s
profits around stable Bertrand-Nash equilibria. They also state that an industry-wide cost
increase would be more likely to increase firms’ profits rather than a unilateral increase.
This is due to the notion that there will be a larger change in equilibrium prices as
opposed to what occurs unilaterally.
OSS denote the two upstream firms as U1 and U2, and the two downstream firms
as D1 and D2. Suppose D1 merges with U1, and forecloses D2 from the input market.
U2 now has monopoly power in the input market. It will increase the input price to that
level which maximizes monopoly profits. If D1’s profits increase with an increase in its
rival’s costs, then the integrated D1 observes higher profits. D2 on the other hand will
have lower profits due to the increase in input price. If there are no efficiency gains from
vertical integration, societal welfare will fall, and D1’s initial integration is deemed
anticompetitive.
OSS approach the vertical integration problem in a four-stage Bertrand game,
which is solved through backward induction. In the first stage, the two downstream firms
have the opportunity to merge with one of the upstream suppliers. In the second stage,
the input prices are determined. If downstream firm D1 merges with upstream U1, this
vertically integrated firm is now expressed as F1. With the integration of D1 and U1, D1
will now be able to obtain the input to production at marginal cost, and not be subject to a
markup. With respect to downstream firm D2, OSS illustrate three different cases of
input pricing. In case i), F1 and U2 will simultaneously set the input prices they will
charge in supplying the input to U2. With case ii), F1 chooses not to supply D2 at all. In
the absence of inferior inputs, U2 will have monopoly input pricing power over U2.
Lastly, in case iii), F1 acts as a first-mover in input pricing. Specifically, it announces a
price to D2 before U2 specifies its input price. Notice that in moving from case i) to case
iii), F1 has increasing control over the input price faced by D2.
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With respect to Stage 3, D2 has the opportunity to bid for the unintegrated
supplier, U2. D2 makes its countermerger decision based on the input price it faces from
Stage 2. In Stage 4, the downstream prices are chosen, given input prices.
One of the key questions of this model is whether or not D2 will counterintegrate.
In solving the model, OSS analyze the stand-alone profits. In other words, the
summation of profits earned by an unintegrated U2 and D2 are compared to the profits
they would make as a vertically-integrated firm. If the profits from remaining separated
are higher than profits from integrating, U2 and D2 will logically remain apart. Allowing
c 2 to denote the input price charged by U2, and m to be the marginal cost of the input,
the stand-alone profits are expressed as π s (c 2 ) = π D 2 (c 2 ) + π U 2 (c 2 , m) . In differentiating
these stand-alone profits with respect to input price c 2 , and evaluating around c 2 = m ,
OSS state in Proposition 1 that if the initial equilibrium is stable, a small increase in input
price above marginal cost to D2 increases the stand-alone profits. Thus, there is a range
where D2 will not be able to make an acceptable offer to U2 and counterintegrate.
Eventually however, as the markup over marginal cost increases, D2 will have lower
profits, and this will cause stand-alone profits to fall. U2 profits will not be large enough
to counter lost profit from D2 due to the higher input price.
In detailing Stage 2, OSS identify each case in turn. With case i), given that F1
and U2 set input prices simultaneously, Bertrand competition will force each firm to
undercut the other, meaning that the input price will be set at marginal cost. For case ii),
U2 will charge the monopoly input price to D2 in the absence of an alternative inferior
input. If there is an inferior input available, then D2 will get an input price below this
monopoly level.
Case iii) is the interesting scenario presented by OSS. F1 acts to attempt to
contain U2’s input pricing power. F1 commits to an input price that makes the standalone profits (denoted above as π s ) equal to a “benchmark” level of profits. At this
benchmark level of profits, no integration takes place between D2 and U2. F1 obtains the
input at marginal cost, whereas D2 must pay some markup above marginal cost. The
unintegrated downstream firm, D2, is worse off after the D1-U1 merger. D2 is faced
with a higher input cost.
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However, D1, the downstream division of F1, is also worse off after the merger.
While gross profits from the merger increase due to the cost advantage, D1 had to bid to
purchase U1. Consequently, both downstream firms are worse off after the D1-U1
merger. The fear of being foreclosed causes both firms to try and capture U1. As a
result, the rents earned through foreclosure are essentially lost in the bidding process.
The winners in this model are the upstream firms, specifically U1. First of all, U1
receives the winning bid of D1. The profits from F1 will be greater than the stand-alone
profits that U2 represents, due to the pricing strategy imposed upon D2. Recall, the entire
basis of F1’s input pricing strategy is to prevent D2 and U2 from counterintegrating.
With respect to quantity competition, OSS find that U2 and D2 will always merge
in the face of a U1-D1 merger. This is due to the fact that stand-alone profits
unambiguously fall with increases in the input price. Recall that the input price is the
basis of whether or not counterintegration will take place. Thus Proposition 2 notes that
if the downstream firms compete in quantities, then no vertical merger is the only
equilibrium that prevails. If there will always be counterintegration upon vertical
integration by U1 and D1, firms waste resources through their bids for each upstream
firm.
Even though the work on vertical integration by OSS represents a seminal paper
in the field, it is not without certain problems regarding the input prices faced by F1 and
D2. With respect to the input pricing strategy by F1, David Reiffen (1992) offers
comments on the effects of vertical integration on downstream prices. Specifically,
Reiffen claims that if a firm is able to commit to an input price, vertical integration is not
necessary to ensure higher downstream prices. For example, in the OSS equilibrium,
Reiffen states that it would be profitable for U1 to undercut U2’s input price to D2, since
U2’s input price is above marginal cost after U1-D1’s integration. OSS stipulate that F1
would not undercut U2’s input price. Reiffen’s problem with the work of OSS is their
use of statics and not dynamics. In the OSS static framework, firms cannot necessarily
react if they do not observe the actions of the other player (which is not an unrealistic
statement in a static model). In reference to input price competition, OSS claim that U1
would expect U2 to lower its input price if U1 were to reduce its input price. Reiffen
does not believe this intuition in a static model, regardless if the integrated firm is
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farsighted with respect to input price competition. To correct this problem, a dynamic
framework is needed. Reiffen models the problem concerning just the two downstream
firms. If the downstream firms take the actions of their rivals into account, the game is
simply a Stackelberg leader game. The sequential pricing game assumes price
commitment.
Reiffen’s comment was not without a reply from OSS (1992). OSS claim in their
reply that the results from their previous work in fact do not depend on a commitment by
F1. They state that firms which become vertically integrated will change their incentives
regarding input price-cutting in the input market. Their results are based on a concept
that vertically integrated firms will behave differently from unintegrated firms with
respect to input supply to competitors. Reiffen claimed that F1 would not be able to
commit to foreclose D2 from input supply, leaving U1 to be a monopolist in the input
market.
OSS first respond to the setting of upstream prices. OSS freely admit that their
first work did implicitly introduce dynamics in the input pricing stage. But they continue
by claiming that input prices may not be set instantaneously. If U2 quotes a price to D2,
D2 could then go to F1 and negotiate a lower input price. With this lower input price, D2
could then go back to U2 and bid the price down even further. This would continue until
one of the firms (U2 or F1) decide it is no longer profitable to continue bidding. OSS
claim that if F1 knows that this is the process in the input pricing stage, then F1 will not
undercut U2 to begin with. F1 will hence stand ready to supply D2 at an input price that
forestalls D2’s possible counterintegration.
In their reply, OSS model the input pricing stage as a descending-price auction.
F1 and U2 bid for the business of D2. They find that the unique equilibrium that results
is that F1 drops out of the bidding at the input price which forestalls counterintegration
by U2 and D2. D2 is supplied by U2 at this input price. The incentive for F1 to stay in
the market and bid for D2’s business is again based upon F1’s desire not to grant
monopoly power to U2. It is the process of F1 threatening to stand by ready to supply
which results in its success in raising rival D2’s costs. It is not F1’s ability to commit to
that price. Thus, vertical foreclosure of D2 by F1 in the input market can lead to the
increasing of input and downstream prices. These results are not robust in the case of
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many upstream firms, which Reiffen points out. But OSS argue that their results will
hold as long as input prices are negatively-correlated with the number of upstream
suppliers (which is standard). The very nature of incentives of the upstream firm change
upon integration, and these changes in incentives will allow the equilibrium result to
occur, despite the lack of commitment power by F1.
The original work by OSS and their ensuing reply to Reiffen’s comment is still
not without a fundamental flaw. OSS assumed that upon vertical integration of D1 and
U1, this firm (F1) would obtain the input to production at marginal cost. Unintegrated
downstream rivals would be faced with higher input costs. This is not accurate. When
two divisions are integrated, the upstream division usually supplies the downstream
division at a discounted input price. This input price is still marked above marginal cost
however.
James Hamilton and Ibrahim Mqasqas (1997) also pursue input pricing strategy,
but they correct for this input pricing problem mentioned above. Particularly, they
address something known as strategic internal transfer pricing, in which the downstream
division of a vertically integrated firm does not necessarily obtain the input to production
at marginal cost. Bork (1978) noted that vertically integrated firms would not receive the
input to production at marginal cost. Specifically, he states that “the firm will not, as is
frequently suggested, sell to its own retail subsidiary for less than it sells to outsiders,
unless the efficiencies of integration lower the cost of selling to its own retail unit.”4 In
other words, a vertically integrated firm must charge itself the same price for the input to
production that that input would have brought on the open market. Bork goes on to say
that “it is impossible for a firm actually to sell to itself for less than it sells to outside
firms because the real cost of any transfer from the manufacturing unit to the retailing
unit includes the return that could have been made on a sale to an outsider.”5 For
competitors to claim that their vertically integrated rivals are obtaining inputs at cost
while they are paying some markup above cost is not correct. Thus it appears that this is
a flaw in OSS. Although, it should be noted that OSS suggested that vertically integrated
firms may use some input price other than marginal cost.

4
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Bork, 228.
Bork, 228.

22

Aside from taking into account strategic internal transfer pricing, the crux of the
work of Hamilton and Mqasqas is also a model of foreclosure. They stipulate that
manipulation of the internal transfer price of the input to production may serve an
integrated firm in preventing counterintegration by its rivals. The work of Hamilton and
Mqasqas contributes much to the literature, and their work is presented in varying forms
(heterogeneous and homogeneous input assumptions). The model presentation, key
results, and conclusions follow.
With respect to integration strategy and foreclosure, Hamilton and Mqasqas
follow the model of OSS with a four-stage game. However, the integration decisions of
the firms (an i pair and a j pair) take place in different stages as opposed to the same
stage. The retailers (downstream firms) produce differentiated products. The
intermediate product (manufacturer product; upstream product; input) can be either
homogeneous or heterogeneous. In Stage 1, the i pair decide if they should vertically
integrate. If the pair decide to integrate, then an input pricing strategy is pursued in the
second stage. In Stage 3, it is the j pair that decide upon integration or remaining apart.
They base this decision on what took place between the i pair in Stage 1. If the j pair
decide to remain apart and forego integration, the j -upstream firm will set a price for the
input. Lastly, Stage 4 is a market equilibrium from the decisions in the preceding stages.
The firms pursue Bertrand competition in retail (hence downstream) prices.
In Stage 2, Hamilton and Mqasqas propose that the integrated i pair should not
set the internal transfer price to marginal cost. They deem this strategy as “direct” since
the integrated i pair is not necessarily influencing the prices of another firm. It is direct
in that the vertically integrated firm is pursuing this strategy with respect to its own
transactions between the upstream and downstream divisions. Specifically, the vertically
integrated i pair sets the transfer price to maximize overall firm profit in Stage 2. This
choice of input price is deemed strategic because the vertically integrated firm is forwardlooking. In other words, the i firm anticipates the reactions of the j pair of firms in the
setting of i ’s input price. The advantage of strategic internal transfer pricing is that i
firm profits will increase by preventing counterintegration of the j pair of firms. Even
though the j pair do not integrate, they are not foreclosed from the market.
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Hamilton and Mqasqas also present an analysis of a vertically integrated firm
trading for the input in the open market. In other words, if there is an open market for the
input to production, then the i firm may decide to sell some of the input to nonintegrated
downstream competitors. (This was also mentioned in the original work by OSS. They
mentioned that the integrated firm F1 may decide whether or not to supply the input to its
downstream rival.) In this case, the i firm strategically chooses the quantity of the input
that would maximize the integrated firm’s profits.
Upon the i firm selling the input on the open market (without strategic transfer
pricing), the increased input availability brings down the open market input price. This
price is reduced to the level in which counterintegration by the j pair of firms does not
take place. Thus, open market trading of the input can result in forestalling integration as
well. However, Hamilton and Mqasqas note that profits of the integrated firm with open
market input trading are not as high as under strategic internal transfer pricing.
Suppose the i firm can pursue a combination strategy of open market trading and
strategic internal transfer pricing. In this case, it would set a transfer price between
divisions, and trade some level of input in the open market to maximize overall firm
profit. In the case of homogeneous inputs, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is the i
pair vertically integrating, while the j pair remain unintegrated. When comparing this
combined strategy to one of simply using strategic internal transfer pricing, the i firm
achieves higher profits upon selling the input in the open market.
The basic conclusion of Hamilton and Mqasqas is that vertically integrated firms
in a linear duopoly model will set transfer prices above marginal cost and would actively
engage in trading the input to downstream competitors. These two strategies will be
more profitable than any proposed strategies by OSS.
In another work co-authored by Soo Bock Lee, Hamilton (1986) analyzes the
issue of vertical mergers, foreclosure, and economic welfare. It is thought by some that
vertical integration is undoubtedly welfare-reducing if it results in market foreclosure. If
foreclosure leads to higher prices, then from the standpoint of the consumer, welfare
would indeed be lowered. However, total welfare effects of vertical integration should be
pursued. Vertical integration may lead to increased efficiency, which actually lowers
costs, even perhaps in the presence of foreclosure. The primary motivation for Hamilton
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and Lee’s work deals with analyzing this foreclosure and welfare situation in a model of
vertical mergers.
Hamilton and Lee measure foreclosure in two ways: absolute foreclosure and
relative foreclosure. Absolute foreclosure is when a vertical merger results in a reduction
of output of a nonintegrated firm. Relative foreclosure results if a nonintegrated firm’s
market share is reduced. Notice the distinction. Either measure of foreclosure is
typically deemed harmful to competition by the Courts.
The model is as follows: there is a final product produced by two homogenous
Cournot firms. The firms produce output with a fixed proportions technology with
constant marginal costs. Each unit of output requires one unit of some key input, while
other inputs in the production of the final output are available in perfectly elastic supply.
The key input is produced by both a dominant firm and a competitive fringe. The
dominant firm produces the input at a constant marginal cost, which is less than the
marginal cost of the competitive fringe. Vertical integration is presented as the dominant
upstream firm merging with one of the downstream firms, leaving the other downstream
firm as a nonintegrated competitor. Hamilton and Lee call the newly integrated firm a
vertically integrated dominant firm (VIDF). This VIDF maximizes profits with respect to
its downstream output and key input. Foreclosure and economic welfare effects are
illustrated using linear demand and entry functions.
Upon finding the postmerger equilibrium values, Hamilton and Lee discover that
the vertical merger always increases final output. This is due to the fact that either the
VIDF or the nonintegrated downstream competitor or both obtain the key input at a lower
input price after the merger. The input price is lowered given the presence of the
competitive fringe input producers. Thus the Hamilton-Lee model presents a situation in
which vertical integration will lead to an increase in economic welfare. Input supply
from the competitive fringe is unchanged after the merger, hence no absolute foreclosure
exists. (In the short-run, fringe firm supply is fixed.) However, the fringe is relatively
foreclosed because the market share of each of the firms in the fringe falls. The reason
for this foreclosure is that the merger increases final output. The final output of the
downstream competitor is dependent upon fringe supply, and the presence of a fringe
supply determines the postmerger key input price.
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Moreover, the results of the model show that the merger reduces the
nonintegrated competitor’s final output. Additionally, this firm is also relatively
foreclosed. Interestingly enough, the VIDF purchases some of the key input from the
competitive fringe upstream suppliers. It cannot produce enough of the key input itself to
sustain its final output requirement. Recall that the output of the competitive fringe
suppliers is perfectly inelastic in the short-run. If the VIDF’s production of the input is
less than its production of the final good, it must purchase some of the input from
nonintegrated upstream suppliers. The integrated firm can purchase some of the key
input at a price which is higher than its marginal cost of input production. Doing so
would lower its final output and push upward pressure on the output price. Input supply
from the fringe is fixed, hence the VIDF must produce some of the input itself. If the
VIDF purchases some of the key input, then this is less input that is available for the
nonintegrated downstream competitor. As a result, this firm lowers its output after the
merger. The fact that the dominant upstream firm is part of the integrated firm and
produces some of the input for that firm, means that each fringe firm has a smaller share
of the total key input market after the merger. The VIDF operates in two markets at the
same time. The VIDF and the competitive fringe do not compete for the business of the
remaining unintegrated downstream producer.
The main conclusion of Hamilton and Lee is that foreclosure does not always lead
to a reduction in economic welfare if that welfare is a function of the total output of the
final good. As a result, the Courts should look more carefully for signs of
anticompetitive behavior that is deemed harmful to competition. Looking at foreclosure
alone may not be enough. Vertical mergers may lead to increased efficiency. This
increased efficiency would not be achieved if the Courts prevented the merger from
happening in the first place, for fear of possible foreclosure of nonintegrated firms.
2.2.C. Other Approaches to Vertical Integration:
Differing characteristics of vertical integration have been pursued. The situation
has been approached from different aspects with respect to the input pricing strategies
mentioned above, as well as relative competitiveness of the upstream market. Michael
Riordan (1998) deals with vertical integration by a dominant firm. Riordan’s criticism of
previous work concerns certain considerations of game theory. Additionally, Riordan
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claims that welfare effects are not easily determined if mergers have efficiency benefits
and anticompetitive characteristics.
Riordan’s model consists of a dominant firm and a competitive fringe. All firms
produce a homogeneous good. The downstream good requires a fixed input, deemed
capacity. This capacity can be thought of as a type of capital good. Production of the
downstream good requires both capacity and variable inputs. Fringe short-run variable
cost is an increasing function in output with increasing marginal cost. The dominant firm
is such because it has a cost advantage in the variable input (expressed as a fraction of per
unit final output). Notice then that Riordan’s contribution to the literature is an
alternative model of the vertical integration problem. One firm is assumed to have a cost
advantage over all others. The dominant firm maximizes profit with fringe production
activity taken as given.
The model flows accordingly: the dominant firm chooses its capacity; then the
fringe firms will enter the industry; the dominant firm chooses its output level; and lastly,
the fringe firms choose their output levels.
In solving the model, Riordan concludes that vertical integration pursued by the
dominant firm is anticompetitive. This is because both the output price and input price
are positively-correlated with the degree of vertical integration. The marginal cost of
production is lower for the dominant firm than for the fringe. Given this, the total market
production cost would be less if the dominant firm were to take on a greater share of the
market. With increased vertical integration (a larger capacity taken on by the dominant
firm), the dominant firm may be more efficient than the competitive fringe. With
increased capacity by the dominant firm, the fringe is foreclosed due to higher capacity
prices (because of lower availability). However, the dominant firm tends not to
efficiently use its capacity given its market power, which arises from its cost advantage.
Therefore, fringe foreclosure outweighs vertical integration by the dominant firm, hence
prices increase.
Y. Joseph Lin (1988) writes a brief note on oligopolies and vertical disintegration.
The motivation for his work was brought about by previous work tending to focus on
monopolistic or competitive market environments. Lin’s model is made up of two
manufacturers, named x and y who produce heterogeneous products. Lin describes two
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alternatives firms face for product distribution. In one instance, the firms can sell their
products themselves, hence acting as a vertically integrated firm. In another, the firms
can distribute their products through independent sellers, known as vertical
disintegration. Lin assumes zero marginal and distribution costs for simplicity. With
these two possible methods of distribution, there exist four possible vertical relationships:
x and y can both be integrated or disintegrated, or x can be disintegrated while y is
integrated, or vice-versa. With respect to consumer behavior, consumers buy from x or
y or not at all. Regarding choice, consumers purchase x if the difference in their
valuations of x and y is greater than the difference in the prices of x and y .
The model is solved as a two-stage Nash game, with backward induction used to
find the subgame equilibrium. In Stage 1, the optimal vertical relationship is found. In
Stage 2, x and y profits under each of the four vertical relationships are found. The
optimal vertical relationship is based upon the four profit possibilities.
Lin finds two possible Nash equilibria: both x and y disintegrating or both
integrating. However, Lin finds that the equilibrium with both firms integrating is not
stable. The payoff for both firms disintegrating is greater than the payoff for both firms
becoming integrated. As a result, either firm has an incentive to deviate from integrating.
Hence the only stable Nash equilibrium is when both firms are not integrated.
The intuition is that there is a greater inelasticity (greater nonresponsiveness) of
quantity to manufacturer (wholesale) price with respect to non-integration. If an
integrated manufacturer were to increase the retail price of its output, its sales obviously
will fall given the law of demand. If the manufacturer were unintegrated and increased
its wholesale price by the same magnitude as in the first instance, the marginal cost of the
distributor of the firm’s product would increase by the same amount. If the distributor in
turn increased the retail price, the distributor’s sales as well as sales of the manufacturer
would fall. Lin asserts that the distributor would not increase the retail price by the same
amount as the manufacturer. The distributor would increase the retail price by an amount
where the marginal revenue would increase by the same magnitude as its increase in
marginal cost. Therefore, the retail price would increase by less than the increase in the
wholesale price given a marginal revenue curve that is steeper than the demand curve.
The manufacturer’s sales still decrease with the increase in wholesale price, but by less
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than in the integration situation. What is true for one manufacturer is of course true for
the other. Hence, both firms will be unintegrated. Notice then that with an oligopolistic
market structure, Lin finds that the firms being unintegrated can lead to higher prices and
higher profits. Much vertical integration literature involves integration leading to higher
prices and higher profits of integrated firms.
Michael Salinger (1988) revisits the notion of an integrated firm selling the input
in the upstream market. He also examines how the effects on the input market affect the
output market. Salinger approaches the problem from the classic question that always
surrounds vertical integration literature: Does vertical integration lead to foreclosure?
Specifically, if a producer becomes vertically integrated, it can choose either to sell the
input on the open market or not, thereby foreclosing a competitor from a source of input
supply. This question was posed in the core work by OSS described above. In their
paper, OSS found that vertical integration in Bertrand competition in the output market
can lead to vertical foreclosure of a downstream rival. In their context of foreclosure, the
integrated firm did supply the input to its competitor, but a higher input price was
charged.
Salinger’s model consists of both homogeneous inputs and outputs. Both are
produced with constant returns to scale, and the downstream product is produced with
fixed-coefficients technology. The vertically integrated firm’s total per unit cost of
production is the marginal cost of the input plus the marginal cost of producing the
output. The unintegrated producer’s total per unit production cost is the price of the
intermediate good plus the marginal cost of producing the output. Notice that if the
marginal cost of transforming inputs into outputs is the same for both firms, the
difference in their per unit production cost is the opportunity cost of the input. Salinger
models the situation as the integrated firm charging a markup over marginal cost to the
unintegrated producer. Hence, the integrated firm has a cost advantage in production if
there is a positive markup.
Salinger hypothesizes that vertically integrated firms will not sell or purchase
inputs in the upstream market. The possible purchase of inputs in the upstream market
has been mentioned in earlier vertical integration literature, notably Hamilton and
Mqasqas (1997). A vertically integrated firm may wish to buy the input in order to limit
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the availability to its downstream rivals. The reduced availability of the input would
raise the price of the input to downstream firms, raising their costs.
The basis of Salinger’s supposition relies on a series of assumptions. First of all,
if the integrated producer sells one more unit of the input to competitors, all other
upstream producers will not change their outputs, and the downstream producer will
increase its output by one unit. Secondly, if the integrated producer buys one more unit
of the input, one unintegrated upstream supplier will increase its output by one unit to
compensate. This leaves the downstream market unchanged. Lastly, Salinger makes an
assumption with respect to marginal costs and prices. Allowing MC I to be the marginal
cost of input production, MC F to be the marginal cost of the final good, PI to be the
price of the input, and PF to be the price of the final good, Salinger assumes that
MC I < PI < PF − MC F .
If the integrated firm were to purchase inputs in the upstream market, total input
supply remains unchanged by the second assumption above. Also, if the integrated firm
buys inputs at a price which is higher than its marginal cost of producing the input (the
first inequality in the third assumption), then the integrated firm is clearly not profitmaximizing. It should produce the input for itself and not purchase anything in the
upstream market.
If the integrated firm is originally selling in the input market, suppose it decides to
reduce its sales to zero and increase production of the downstream product by the same
amount as the reduction in input supply. According to Salinger’s first assumption,
downstream producers will decrease their production by a total of the increase in
production from the integrated firm. This means there is no net change in the total output
of the final good, leaving output price unchanged. By the second inequality of the third
assumption, the gain in profit from the integrated firm producing the final product (after
reducing its input sales) outweighs the lost revenue from input sales. Hence, a profitmaximizing firm would not sell in the input market. Therefore, given all the above
assumptions, the vertically integrated firm chooses not to participate in any form in the
input market.
Although Salinger’s reasoning follows simply enough, he seems to make many
assumptions in order to achieve his desired outcome. With respect to the second
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assumption, it seems rather strange that for the integrated firm to assume that if it
increases its sales of the input, that all remaining input suppliers leave their production
the same. The effect of the action falls upon the downstream producers. Salinger
reinforces his assumptions however by claiming that the integrated firm makes a Cournot
assumption concerning its actions on either the input market or the final good market, but
not both. Therefore in line with Cournot competition, the firm makes its decision taking
the output of its rivals as constant. Reaction stems from the market in which no Cournot
assumption is made.
In determining the Cournot equilibrium at each stage of production, Salinger
assumes a successive oligopoly. In other words, there is an upstream oligopoly and a
downstream oligopoly. Final good demand is linear, and downstream output and
downstream price are both functions of the input price.
With a vertical merger, the newly integrated firm does not participate in the input
market for reasons described above. Hence, a supplier of the input is lost. This has the
effect of increasing the price for the input to production. Ceteris paribus, this leads to a
higher price for the final product. On the other hand, the merger eliminates the markup
concerning the two merging firms (again, since the integrated firm does not participate in
the input market). Therefore, final product price can seemingly increase or decrease
upon the occurrence of a vertical merger, depending on which effect dominates.
Salinger finds that a vertical merger in a successive oligopoly model has two
effects. The first is the aforementioned anticompetitive effect. A lower number of
suppliers of the input to production will cause the production costs of the downstream
producers to increase. The second effect is that the integrated firm produces more of the
downstream product than the previously unintegrated downstream firm. As a result, the
residual demand curve for the remaining unintegrated downstream firms will fall. Along
with this decrease in demand will come a decrease in the demand for the input to
production from upstream suppliers. This reduction in demand will cause the input price
to fall.
As mentioned above, the OSS definition of foreclosure (among many others) is
when there is an increase in the input price. Notice that in Salinger’s model, the input
price may actually decrease if the residual demand effect is greater than the reduced input
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supply effect. This implies that vertical integration may not be anticompetitive
(foreclosure inducing).
2.2.D. Vertical Integration and International Concerns:
Vertical integration is not a country-specific phenomenon. In other words, the
activity of vertical integration in a nation may influence the behavior of dependent firms
in another nation. Barbara Spencer and Ronald Jones (1992) present a model where a
downstream firm in a home market is somewhat dependent on a vertically integrated firm
in a foreign nation for input supply. Given this scenario, Spencer and Jones analyze
responses of the foreign vertically integrated firm to various tariff and subsidy policies.
The motivation for their paper is the notion that some countries that have an
abundance of raw materials, may restrict exports in an attempt to stimulate domestic
production of a final product. If firms do indeed increase production, then exports to a
foreign market may also increase. This nation uses strategic trade policy at the input
(intermediate) stage in stimulating downstream domestic exports.
The model consists of two countries: home and foreign. In the home country,
there exists a downstream firm that produces output using both its own and imported
inputs (homogeneous, obtained at marginal cost regardless of origin) from the foreign
nation. In the home country, the input is produced at a high marginal cost. In the foreign
country, there is a firm that controls exports of both the input and the final product. The
input is produced in the foreign country at a low marginal cost. The downstream firms
play Cournot in the final output market in the home country. As a precondition to their
model, Spencer and Jones assume an abundance of the input (natural resource) in the
foreign country to ensure a constant marginal cost.
With respect to Cournot competition, the subgame perfect equilibrium is derived
from a two-stage game. In the first stage, the vertically related firm or the upstream firm
(which controls the exports of the input) determines the export strategy for the input. In
Stage 2, firms play Cournot competition in the final product. Lastly, it is important to
note that the home country commits on its strategic trade policy (tariff, subsidy on
imported inputs, and subsidy to local production) at the beginning of the game. The
game is solved using standard backward induction.
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Spencer and Jones find that the foreign vertically integrated firm may restrict the
availability of input supply to the higher cost domestic firm under Cournot competition.
The integrated firm thus forecloses the domestic firm. A firm with a vertical relationship
finds it beneficial to increase the input price above a monopoly level (i.e., that level
which results when the upstream division controls exports of the input). Subjecting the
home firm to this higher input price will cause a reduction in the home downstream
output supply. This higher price benefits the integrated firm due to the higher output
price it receives from its final product exports (provided of course that the home country
tariff is not prohibitive). Thus, the vertical relationship is clearly anticompetitive to the
home firm.
In considering home country trade policies, Spencer and Jones find that tariffs on
downstream products will increase the input price in a situation of a foreign monopolist.
A tariff on final goods results in an increased demand for inputs by the domestic firm.
When outputs are assumed to be strategic substitutes, the foreign monopolist increases
the input price in response to the increased demand.
In a previous work concerning vertical relationships and international trade
policy, Spencer and Jones (1991) analyze the possibilities of a vertically integrated firm
either exporting inputs to a higher cost rival, or foreclosing the rival. Spencer and Jones
approach the decision as being controlled perhaps mainly by the government. In other
words, government trade policy can influence the possible exporting of the input to
production along with the final product.
The model considers two countries: Country 1 and Country 2. Firm 1 is located
in Country 1, and exports a downstream product to Country 2. Firm 2 is located in
Country 2, and this firm has the higher production costs. Thus Firm 1 is the lower cost
vertically integrated firm. The firms are assumed to have differing production costs due
to international differences in factor endowments and technologies. Firm 2 need not only
import the upstream good, but has the option of additionally producing the upstream good
on its own. Firm 1 is assumed to produce the intermediate good at a constant marginal
cost, while if Firm 2 chooses to produce the input itself, does so at a higher and
increasing marginal cost.
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The subgame perfect equilibrium is found for both two-stage Cournot
competition, as well as Bertrand price competition. In the first stage, Firm 1 sets the
price of the input that it charges to its higher cost rival. Stage 2 entails downstream
product Cournot (or Bertrand) competition. As a precondition to the game, Country 1
sets its trade policies. Specifically, the government sets a subsidy to its downstream
exports and a tax on upstream exports. The subsidy and tax may be either positive or
negative. Also prior to the game, Country 2 could possibly commit to a tariff on imports
of the downstream product from Country 1.
The main question stemming from this model is obvious: Should Firm 2 be
expressly concerned about being foreclosed from input supply given their competitive
disadvantage with Firm 1 in input production? Obviously, Firm 1 will only supply the
input to Firm 2 if a decrease in the input price (below that which would achieve
foreclosure) increases Firm 1’s total profit. For example, Spencer and Jones find that in a
situation where a) it is not efficient for Firm 2 to produce the input, and b) there is a zero
tariff rate on downstream products from Country 1, Firm 1 will foreclose Firm 2 (not
export the input to production). Firm 1 then captures the downstream market as a
monopoly. With no input to production, Firm 2 cannot enter the market. However, with
a tariff on downstream products, Firm 1 does supply the input to Firm 2, allowing Firm 2
to produce. By engaging in upstream sales to Firm 2, this will help make up for lost
profit from reduced downstream exports into Country 2. Other possibilities and
alternative tariff/subsidy sizes are presented for both Cournot and Bertrand competition.
The underlying conclusion is that the importing country (Country 2) can prevent input
foreclosure (hence cause vertical supply) if it levies a somewhat high tariff on
downstream imports from Country 1.
2.3. Other Types of Integration:
For completeness, it should be noted that there are two other types of integration
beyond the two forms mentioned above. There is a second type of vertical integration
which is called forward vertical integration, briefly mentioned in Lin’s work above. This
would entail a downstream firm merging with a distribution firm, or a wholesale firm
merging with a retail firm. The motives for forward vertical integration are essentially
the same as for backward. The only difference is where the two firms are with regards to
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the production and/or the distribution process. The final type of integration comes in the
form of conglomerate mergers. In this case, two firms which are not alike merge
together. For example, if an automobile manufacturer merges with a cosmetics company,
this would most likely be categorized as a conglomerate merger. The principle motive
for this type of activity is diversification, or the act of reducing risk. With respect to the
example, suppose that the owners of the automobile manufacturer are forecasting a rather
significant downturn in the automobile industry. In response, they may wish to use idle
assets to hedge against possible losses. The owners may decide to invest in a market
which ideally will be on an upswing during the automobile market downturn. This may
be a cosmetics or a computer firm. The owners of the automobile firm would not want to
invest in any firm that is related to the automobile industry. It stands to reason that if the
automobile industry is predicted to slow down, then related industries will likewise
suffer, defeating the entire purpose of diversification.
2.4. Foreign Direct Investment and Trade Restrictions:
Integration, whether it is horizontal or vertical, is usually described as foreign
direct investment, or FDI. Foreign direct investment has been approached from both
theoretical and empirical points of view. Jagdish Bhagwati, Elias Dinopoulos, and KarYiu Wong (1992) mention two different forms of FDI: quid pro quo and tariff-induced.
Sometimes FDI is used by a firm to prevent a levying of tariffs or other trade restrictions.
This is referred to as quid pro quo FDI. Specifically, if a firm wants to capture more of a
foreign market, increasing exports to that market will likely increase protectionist
pressure in that market. If the firm instead engages in FDI into that market, the
protectionist threat can sometimes be neutralized. In other words, the FDI is tariffdefusing. This is different from tariff-induced FDI. In this case the tariff is already
known. As a result, a firm engages in FDI to avoid the cost of the tariff. Bhagwati et al.
(1992) cited a study by the Ministry of International Trade and Investment (MITI). This
study found that Japanese firms engaging in FDI between 1980 and 1986 did so primarily
to ease national tension regarding imports. This is most likely a type of tariff-defusing
FDI to avoid trade restrictions.
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2.4.A. Endogenous Protection and Foreign Direct Investment:
Tariff imposition by a nation’s government typically does not materialize without
angering some segment of an elected official’s constituency. Ceteris paribus, trade
impediments lower the number of goods coming into the imposing nation. This lower
availability of competing goods drives the prices of those goods upward. While
restricting imports (and hence competition) will please domestic producers, higher output
prices will anger consumers. An elected official must weigh the benefits of tariff
imposition against overall consumer welfare. The key question is why do elected
officials risk angering a large constituency (consumers) while assisting a rather small one
(producers)? The answer is twofold. First of all, producers are more organized than
consumers. They can more easily lobby policymakers as a result. Secondly, producers
are more likely to contribute large sums of money to an official’s political action
committee (PAC), or to the political party itself. These campaign contributions help an
elected official run for reelection. While an elected policymaker most likely wishes
welfare for his or her constituents, he or she is also concerned a great deal about personal
welfare.
This problem is specifically modeled in a work done by Gene Grossman and
Elhanan Helpman (1994). Their work deals with political contributions specifically
influencing trade policy. In fact, the title of their paper is “Protection for Sale,” which is
essentially the problem being modeled.
The model used is a small, competitive economy that is a world price-taker.
International trade textbooks pose that what is most efficient for this economy is a system
of free trade. Grossman and Helpman posit that any deviation from free trade must result
from political motives. A good is produced using only labor, and there exist n additional
products which use labor and a sector-specific input. The owners of the sector-specific
inputs make up different lobbies. The lobby groups will give political contributions to
incumbents, who are of course responsible for setting current trade policy. Conceivably,
the lobby groups will give money to those officials who most support their cause. But
most importantly, money is given in an attempt to influence results favorable to the lobby
group. Each lobby represents one of the sector-specific input owners. The incumbent’s
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objective function is to maximize a weighted sum of these political contributions and a
measure of aggregate social welfare.
Since the world price is taken as given, the domestic price should equal the
exogenous world price for a particular good. If the domestic price is greater than the
world price, then the domestic country has imposed either a tariff on imports or a subsidy
for exports. Conversely, if the domestic price is below the world price, then this implies
either an import subsidy or an export tax. Lastly, it is assumed that the government
redistributes this net revenue from tariffs and subsidies uniformly to the country’s voters.
The equilibrium is found from a two-stage noncooperative game. In the first stage,
political lobbies simultaneously choose a contribution schedule. In the second stage, the
government sets trade policy. With respect to the contribution schedule, lobbies make
their bids knowing the government’s objective function.
Grossman and Helpman find that protection is positively-correlated with the
relative weight of political contributions with respect to voter welfare. Additionally,
protection is negatively-correlated with the fraction of voters belonging to an organized
lobby. Note the intuition of these two results. With respect to political contributions,
elected officials will be more likely to pursue lobby-favored trade policy if that elected
official weights these contributions more than voter welfare. Regarding the second
result, if a greater and greater number of voters are represented by a lobby group, then
political competition through campaign contributions results in less protection. As
mentioned above, voters prefer free trade. But if voters are in competition with other
lobby groups, the greater number of voters belonging to organized lobbies will contribute
to cause the government to pursue free trade (hence a lower level of protection).
In a notable work by Kishore Gawande and Usree Bandyopadhyay (2000)
(hereafter G-B), the protection for sale problem is put to an empirical test. G-B use data
on U.S. nontariff barriers, and wish to compare the Grossman-Helpman model to
previous empirical work on endogenous protection.
G-B specify three equations to be estimated (relating to the two stages mentioned
in the theoretical description above): trade protection (measured by nontariff barriers),
political contributions, and an import penetration ratio. In the first stage, the contribution
vector is identified. Each lobby group provides the government with its contribution
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schedule relating to possible trade policies. Secondly, the government’s objective
function is then maximized taking into account the equilibrium set of contribution
schedules. Therefore, trade protection is endogenous, and depends on the level of
contributions by lobbies. The coefficients are obtained by estimating the equations using
the two-stage least-squares estimation procedure.
G-B test several hypotheses concerning protection and intermediate goods and
protection and the degree of lobby competition. The first hypothesis is that the higher the
protection on intermediate goods used in downstream production, the higher the
protection granted to the downstream industry which relies on those inputs. The second
hypothesis states that the greater is the degree of competition among lobbies (measured
by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index), the greater is contribution spending by the lobby
groups.
G-B find that the rate of protection on intermediate goods has a positive influence
on the rate of protection of the downstream product. Additionally, they find that PAC
(political action committee) spending does respond to deadweight losses stemming from
protection. This means that the government, in its weighted objective function, wishes to
compensate for the deadweight losses of levied protection. Additionally, G-B find that
lobby competition does lead to greater lobby spending. Recall that lobbies make political
contributions in connection with the strength of its rival. Each lobby wishes for its
desired outcome to occur, hence it must make political contributions to the government
that match up to its strong rivals.
Given these last two results, it appears that contributions in connection with lobby
competition pale in comparison to contributions to compensate for the deadweight loss
from protection. Hence the government obviously weights aggregate social welfare a
great deal, and lobbyists have to contend accordingly. G-B conclude that lobbying does
influence protection; protection is indeed sold by the government.
In March 2001, the United States Senate began open floor debate on campaign
finance reform. Advocates of campaign finance reform wished to eliminate unlimited
contributions to political parties, known as “soft money.” If campaign finance reform
were to eventually succeed, then the kind of influence presented here would be reduced,
if not eliminated. It is, however, important to stress the main conclusion reached by
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Grossman and Helpman: political contributions from a political lobby results in more
favorable trade policies (protection) for the lobby group.
2.4.B. Protection-Building Trade and Foreign Direct Investment:
Keeping the above conclusion in mind is useful when discussing foreign direct
investment and endogenous protection. FDI can be used strategically by a firm upon
increasing exports and hence the level of protection imposed upon a firm and its
competitors. For example, a firm may increase its exports to a targeted market, knowing
that protection will be levied not only on itself but also on its competitors. Upon tariff
imposition, a firm may then engage in FDI (tariff jump), opening a plant in the targeted
market and establishing a presence there, whose output would be tariff-free. This would
then leave the new multinational’s competitors facing the tariff alone. This is a
procedure known as protection-building trade. Of course other factors must be taken into
account, such as the proposed multinational’s fixed costs of opening a new plant relative
to those of its competitors. After all, if one firm can do this, it stands to reason that its
competitors could as well. Secondly, as mentioned above, the targeted market’s society
may view multinationals as outsiders and shun the business.
Bruce Blonigen and Yuka Ohno (1998) present a situation of strategic FDI in an
oligopolistic environment. They introduce a two-period model, consisting of three
countries, Home, Country A, and Country B. Firm A is located in country A, while Firm
B is located in Country B. This duopoly competes for the Home market, where there is a
competitive fringe. Blonigen and Ohno assume that firms face increasing marginal cost,
regardless of production location. Firms A and B play a quantity-setting game in their
competition for the Home market. The firms play a two-period, two-stage game. In
Period 1 Stage 1, Firms A and B export to Home. In Period 1 Stage 2, a country-specific
tariff is levied as a function of the exports in Period 1 Stage 1. This is endogenous
protection in that the level of tariff depends upon export invasion. In Period 2 Stage 1,
Firms A and B observe their levied protection, and decide whether or not either to engage
in tariff-jumping FDI in Home at some fixed cost, or simply continue exporting. Lastly,
in Period 2 Stage 2, the duopoly plays Cournot. The model is solved through backward
induction.
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The crux of Blonigen and Ohno’s work lies in the concept of protection-building
trade itself, and not so much on the results that occur from stage to stage in the Cournot
game. Multiple equilibria can occur if the exporting firms (Firms A and B) have different
fixed costs of FDI. One of these equilibria is the protection-building trade result.
In their paper, Blonigen and Ohno discuss studies which have shown that,
regardless if the exporting (foreign) firms are from the same country or different
countries, future protection is a response to not only one firm’s own actions, but also on
that of its rivals (Prusa (1997), Hansen and Prusa (1996)). Accordingly, if Firm A floods
the Home market with exports, not only could Firm A face tariffs, but Firm B could as
well. Blonigen and Ohno specifically model the tariff functions in this manner. They
assume that a firm’s future protection depends both on itself and its rival, although the
firm’s tariff rate is more sensitive to its own exports than those of its rival. Allowing
“one” to denote first-period exports and τ to represent the tariff rate, mathematically,
A

B

this assumption would be expressed as τ i ≡ τ i ( x1 , x1 ) ; where:
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≥
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Herein lies the rationale for flooding the Home market with exports. Concerning
protection-building trade, if Firm A has a lower fixed cost of FDI than Firm B, then Firm
A can open a plant in Home and produce locally. Firm B will likely continue exporting
in the presence of high costs of FDI. In competition for the Home market, Firm A would
then have the advantage because of its tariff-jumping.
In deriving best-response functions, Blonigen and Ohno consider four cases: i)
both firms engage in FDI, ii) Firm A invests but Firm B does not, iii) Firm A does not
invest while Firm B does, and iv) neither firm invests. Quite obviously, if the costs of
foreign investment are close to zero, then case i) will occur. Conversely, if the costs of
FDI are large (perhaps prohibitively so), then case iv) will likely happen. Cases ii) and
iii) will depend upon the relative costs of FDI. Thus, protection-building trade is one of
the equilibria that can occur from these cases. If Firm A engages in protection-building
trade because of its relatively low cost of FDI, Firm B, with the higher cost, will likely
reduce first-period exports to Home because of a tariff threat in period 2.
Blonigen and Ohno’s work is quite interesting, but not exactly new. The model
they use is highly dependent upon the relative fixed costs of FDI. Protection-building
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trade possibilities come from this required assumption. Tariff-jumping adds nothing new
to the literature, and firms pursuing activities that provide the lowest marginal cost of
supply is nothing more than rational economic behavior. Additionally, Bhagwati et al.
(1992) claim that FDI may actually cause friction between nations, instead of goodwill
through job creation. They offer the case of Japanese FDI in the United States as one
example. Japanese FDI is seen as a threat to the U.S. and has caused a backlash. Lee
Iacocca has before recommended to add Japanese FDI production to Japanese exports.6
If exports plus Japanese FDI production exceeded Japan’s VER limits, then Japan could
be subject to duties. This could possibly cause governments to be wary in allowing
foreign investment. However, the Blonigen-Ohno work is beneficial and adds to the
literature in that protection-building trade is specifically modeled, and is only one
possibility among others (both firms tariff-jump, and both firms react accordingly to
endogenous protection by limiting exports with a tariff threat).
2.4.C. Competitiveness and Foreign Direct Investment:
As noted above, foreign direct investment could be pro-competitive when a new
plant is opened, or it could be anti-competitive when considering mergers. When one
firm invests in another firm in an oligopolistic setting, the interdependence of all the
firms in the market environment will cause changes in behavior. For example, if Firm A
merges with Firm B, the market is more concentrated. Any production or pricing
decisions undertaken by the new Firm AB will affect the output and price decisions of
Firm AB’s competitors: Firm C, Firm D, and Firm E. Thus FDI is a method for one
firm, in this case Firm A, to indirectly influence the decisions of its competitors. If Firm
A is forward-looking, then it can anticipate what its rivals’ actions will be, and act
accordingly.
Suppose further that integration is vertical and not horizontal. Assume that Firm
A merges with an input supplier, and now has a significant share of the input market.
Thus Firm A can manipulate the input price that its rivals, Firms B, C, D, and E, will
face. As noted above, if Firm A acts to increase the input price, then production costs of
the downstream firms increase, and their combined production will fall. If Firm A can
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avoid the higher input price it caused, it can then move to increase production and capture
more market share and profit. This is a procedure that is sometimes referred to as
“raising rivals’ costs.” As before, the motive is for one firm to act, then either directly or
indirectly influence its competitors’ actions.
Steven Salop and David Scheffman (1983) focus on anticompetitive behavior
from this standpoint. This cost-raising behavior is still predatory, but not from the output
price standpoint. Raising rivals’ costs is a more subtle approach to predation. If a
competitor’s costs can be raised successfully, that competitor could be forced to leave the
industry. Even if a competitor does not leave the industry, it is much simpler (and more
profitable) for a firm to compete with a relatively high-cost competitor. Also, using
predatory pricing to banish a competitor from the industry is based on uncertain future
profits, while incurring assured short-term losses (or lower profits at the very least). Note
that action such as this, despite its subtlety, would still be in violation of antitrust law. If
firms engage in exclusive dealing to raise competitors’ costs, this is in violation of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act. If low-price upstream firms agree to boycott certain
downstream firms at the behest of those firms’ competitors, this is a concerted refusal to
deal, and is also in violation of Section 1. Additionally, if firms collude to act in this
manner, this could likely be categorized as conspiracy. Each one of these possibilities are
instances of bilateral or multilateral action, and is in violation of Section 1. Lastly, Salop
and Scheffman pose the possibility of this behavior being an attempt to monopolize an
industry. If this is found to be true, this would violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
Salop and Scheffman (1987) model this behavior in terms of competition between
a predator and a competitive fringe. A section of their paper that is particularly relevant
to this dissertation deals with vertical integration. In this case, the predator is assumed to
be somewhat vertically integrated. This means that the firm produces some of its overall
input needs for itself, and purchases the remainder. The predator may decide to
overpurchase the input, even if the input cost is more than the firm’s own marginal cost
of internal input production. With the predator overpurchasing the input, this decreases
the supply of the input available to the fringe, raising their costs. The effect on the fringe
(and the reduction in output that will follow) may be greater than the higher cost of the
input to the predator on the open market.
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This activity is similar to firm behavior observed in the former Soviet Union.
Firms in the Soviet Union were subject to production quotas. Ministers were responsible
for the attaining of these targets. Sometimes firms demanded more of the input than they
needed, assuring themselves of future input supply necessary to achieve production
quotas. This input supply overpurchase caused shortages for other firms using the same
input. This led to large restrictions in output and hence goods shortages.7 If prices would
have been allowed to fluctuate freely, they would have risen to incredibly high levels.
These higher prices would then act to discourage input overpurchase, hence eliminating
the problem.
These actions by firms are not without scrutiny, however. Even if a merger is
allowed to take place by the Federal Trade Commission and the Justice Department, any
horizontal restraint to competition is usually deemed illegal per se by the Sherman Act.
Similar to horizontal integration above, a horizontal restraint is any restraint of trade at
the same level of production. For example, anticompetitive behavior between two
competing clothing manufacturers would be horizontal. By contrast, vertical restraints to
trade are restraints that occur in the same industry, but at different levels of production.
An example would of course be OPEC’s continuing oil production contractions. Oil is a
significant input to production in items such as heating oil, diesel fuel, and gasoline. The
OPEC oil cartel agrees to limit production of oil, hence raising its price on the world
market. This makes energy bills and gasoline more expensive for firms and consumers.
Since OPEC is not under U.S. antitrust jurisdiction, this behavior can go unchecked.
However, the United States would not tolerate this behavior inside its borders, because it
is a clear restraint of trade and a violation of antitrust legislation. In evaluating vertical
restraints however, they are not necessarily deemed illegal per se, but are subject on a
case-by-case basis to the rule of reason test under the Sherman Act. This approach is
motivated by the sometimes conflicting profit maximization goals of suppliers and
producers mentioned above. Increases in input prices may not necessarily be
anticompetitive by the upstream firm, but may be due to demand shifts or some other
valid economic reason.
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In the United States, explicit collusion is most certainly illegal, and easily
identified if an anticompetitive agreement exists in writing. Although implicit, or tacit,
collusion is also against U.S. law, it is not simple to prove. The most common form of
tacit collusion is price leadership. Put simply, price leadership is the act of one firm
(considered an industry leader) setting a price for output, which signals its competitors to
follow likewise and increase their prices in the very near future. The firms are acting
collusively, but there is no written agreement for them to do so. It is an “understanding.”
Despite its difficulty to prove, price leadership and price fixing are vigorously
investigated by the government. Perhaps one of the most famous standoffs between the
government and industry was in 1962 with President John F. Kennedy’s statement on the
steel crisis. United States Steel increased the price of steel by six dollars a ton, drawing
harsh criticism by President Kennedy:
Simultaneous and identical actions of United States Steel and other
leading steel corporations increasing steel prices by some $6 a ton
constitute a wholly unjustifiable and irresponsible defiance of the
public interest....
If this rise in the cost of steel is imitated by the rest of the industry,
instead of rescinded, it would increase the cost of homes, autos,
appliances, and most other items for every American family.8
Despite this and countless other investigations of price fixing, it doubtlessly
continues in the United States regardless of antitrust legislation. It is very difficult for the
government to show that price increases by themselves are anticompetitive. The price
leader’s defense for the initial price increase will most certainly be claiming a response to
changing economic conditions. Since other firms follow the leader, when they increase
prices they can claim the same defense. After all, if the price leader is responding to
“changing economic conditions,” then it stands to reason that other firms in the same
industry would have to respond to those same conditions. With changing economic
conditions coming in a multitude of possible forms, the government’s case of price
leadership is often difficult to prove.

8

John F. Kennedy, “Statement on the Steel Crisis—April 11, 1962,” 6 June 1996, <http://www.cs.umb.edu/
jfklibrary/ j041162.htm>, (16 March 2002).
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The point of all this is that even though firms have three ways of increasing their
presence into other markets (exports, FDI greenfield, and FDI mergers), their actions
upon successful integration may or may not avoid any antitrust jurisdiction. It again
depends on whether the action is horizontal or vertical in nature.
2.5. Introduction to the Theoretical Chapters:
This dissertation seeks to expand on the aforementioned literature regarding
horizontal integration and asset ownership, optimal foreign asset ownership, and vertical
integration and price leadership.
2.5.A. Description of Chapter Three:
The third chapter studies the effects of increased foreign asset ownership on the
pattern of trade, volume of trade, and firm profit. The model modifies the BranderKrugman reciprocal dumping framework to include a degree of ownership in the profit
equation of the domestic (acquiring) firm. The higher the level of ownership, the greater
fraction of foreign firm profit that accrues to the domestic firm. If the ownership level
reaches a certain point, then the domestic firm attains managerial control of its foreign
competitor.
The third chapter shows the effects of increased asset ownership on each of the
aforementioned microeconomic variables under both degrees of ownership, which I name
“non-controlling” and “majority” settings. I find that in a non-controlling interest setting
(ownership with no explicit control by the domestic firm), the domestic firm sells less in
both the home and export market, the foreign firm sells more, the volume of trade falls,
and the foreign firm sees increased profit. The total profit of the domestic firm is
ambiguous given the makeup of the domestic profit function. On the one hand, it is
sacrificing market share in favor of the foreign firm. On the other hand, anything that
benefits the foreign firm in turn benefits the domestic firm. Thus, the ultimate effect
(mathematically) on domestic firm profit is ambiguous.
In a majority ownership setting (ownership with explicit control by the domestic
firm), it is the domestic firm which sells more in both markets, while the foreign firm
sells less. Additionally, the volume of trade again falls, and the foreign firm observes
lower profit from the reduced market share. The domestic firm has essentially become a
multiplant monopoly, with the foreign firm becoming basically a subsidiary of the
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domestic firm. This movement toward a monopoly position should provide the domestic
firm with increased profits above any prior symmetric duopoly position. In both
ownership settings, total output availability falls in both nations, increasing output price
in both countries.
The results from this chapter are interesting and somewhat counterintuitive at first
blush. The Brander-Krugman reciprocal dumping model is driven by firm symmetry and
transportation costs. It is the presence of positive transportation costs that drives the
reciprocal dumping result. I find that the domestic firm will actually increase its level of
exports to the foreign country upon achieving managerial control, despite the presence of
transportation costs. This appears to be paradoxical in that transportation costs are a
waste of resources if the domestic firm has the capability of producing locally, as it will
when it achieves managerial control of the foreign firm. The fourth chapter describes
why this result is not necessarily paradoxical.
2.5.B. Description of Chapter Four:
The fourth chapter of this dissertation builds upon work done in the third chapter.
Comparative statics results from the third chapter are used in deriving the results for the
fourth chapter. The motive of the fourth chapter is to find the optimal level of ownership
that the domestic acquiring firm would pursue. In other words, is the optimal level of
ownership that in which a non-controlling interest or majority ownership is achieved? A
two-stage Cournot game is assumed. In the first stage, the optimal level of ownership in
the foreign firm is attained. In the second stage, the firms play Cournot. In finding the
optimal level of ownership, Kuhn-Tucker programming is used. Using backward
induction to find the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, it is found that the optimal level
of ownership is that in which the domestic firm acquires managerial control. This is due
to the fact that in the non-controlling interest ownership setting, the firm’s total profit was
ambiguous due to the makeup of the domestic profit function (as described above). In the
majority ownership setting, the domestic firm can exercise managerial control. It is this
managerial control that allows the domestic firm to enjoy profits which exceed the initial
symmetric duopoly profits.
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2.5.C. Description of Chapter Five:
The fifth chapter of this dissertation deals with backward vertical integration, the
concepts and reasons of which were discussed above. The chapter presents a successive
oligopoly, in that there are two upstream firms located in a home market, each of which
produce a homogeneous input. Additionally, three downstream firms are assumed. One
of these firms is located in the home market, while the other two are each located in a
respective foreign country. These downstream firms compete for the home market.
Protection-building trade is a precondition to the model. In other words, one of the
foreign downstream firms will increase its level of exports to the home country in an
attempt to have tariffs imposed upon both itself and its foreign rival. The invading firm
thus tariff-jumps into the home market by not pursuing greenfield investment, but by
acquiring one of the upstream firms.
The chapter illustrates a four-stage Cournot competition model. It is solved
through backward induction to find the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium that results.
The game follows that presented by OSS. In Stage 1, the invading foreign downstream
firm vertically merges with one of the upstream suppliers in the home market. In Stage 2,
this new vertically integrated firm makes a decision with respect to the input price. It can
decide either i) not to supply the input to its downstream competitors, or ii) to supply the
input to competitors, but act as leader in the input pricing stage. This is not an
uncommon assumption. Larger (or dominant) firms in an industry are sometimes looked
to for leadership with respect to prices. It is common behavior for one firm to increase
price, while other firms follow suit soon thereafter. Also, this leader-follower behavior
can be explained with respect to conclusions reached by Dowrick (1986). Given
downward sloping reaction functions, if one firm takes the lead, the other firm prefers to
follow. This holds true as long as the firms are not symmetric.
The equilibrium shows that the foreign downstream firm which engaged in
protection-building trade does not “raise rivals’ costs” as in the traditional sense. In fact,
the vertically integrated firm through its price leadership forces all downstream firms to a
collusive equilibrium. Thus, the integrated firm not only forecloses its rivals from the
downstream product market in the home country, it forecloses itself as well.
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The tariff imposition that the invading firm brought upon itself and its foreign
downstream rival causes their exports to the home country to fall. Upon this tariff
imposition, the downstream firm in the home market would wish to increase domestic
production (given higher prices resulting from tariffs). This firm is prevented from
gaining a stronger hold on its own market by the input price leadership assumed by the
vertically integrated firm. Upon price leadership, the input price rises above the marginal
cost of production. Thus, the domestic downstream firm is prevented from capturing
more of its own market. The farsighted activity of the integrated firm causes all
downstream firms (including the firm located in the home market) to move toward a
collusive equilibrium, despite the absence of any collusion (tacit or otherwise) among the
downstream competitors. These results hold provided the home downstream firm does
not integrate with the remaining unintegrated upstream supplier. As long as the
integrated firm supplies the input to competitors and assumes price leadership upon doing
so, counterintegration by the domestic downstream firm is forestalled.
2.6. Concluding Comments:
The purpose of this chapter has been to introduce the relevant literature, which is
the foundation for the following chapters regarding international trade theory and
integration. A thorough review of reciprocal dumping, multinational corporations,
vertical integration, and price leadership serves to provide an understanding of the
motivation of the trade theory essays included in this dissertation. The goal is to find a
place in the literature in which the material included in this dissertation will be viewed in
the proper context. The chapters that follow begin the analysis of topics in applied
microeconomics. Chapters Three, Four, and Five detail a study of integration issues in
international trade. Chapter Six is an analysis of cost theory using a Bayesian approach.
Each chapter will provide another (although brief) glimpse into the relevant literature for
that essay. Each of the essays also presents an economic model for analysis,
manipulations and/or extensions of the model, and concluding remarks.
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CHAPTER THREE
INTRA-INDUSTRY TRADE AND HORIZONTAL INTEGRATION
3.1. Introduction:
In June 1996, the Ford Motor Company increased its stake in Mazda to 33.4
percent and assumed managerial control of the troubled Japanese carmaker.9 With
respect to recent international acquisitions and mergers, this was one of the more notable
in an industry that has seen many ownership changes in the past decade. The Chrysler
Corporation merged with the German Daimler Benz in 1998, resulting in one of the
world’s largest automobile manufacturers. The Ford Motor Company, as part of its
ongoing effort to expand globally, has also acquired the Swedish Volvo. This type of
horizontal integration is continuing to be seen more and more in other industries such as
telecommunication and banking. In fact, the last few years have proven to be a period of
immense merger growth. Specifically, the third quarter of 1998 was the first one that
registered over $300 billion worth of mergers and acquisitions.10
This chapter shows that, even in the presence of transportation costs, a firm that
acquires another and assumes control will in fact export more to that nation than before.
In this modified model of reciprocal dumping, a counterintuitive result yields the exact
opposite of the traditional definition of a multinational corporation. The domestic firm
chooses paradoxically not to avoid transportation costs, but instead does the opposite. It
floods the foreign market with exports, which consequently are dumped into that market.
Prior to this result, it is shown that increased ownership in a minority sense will lead the
acquiring firm to reduce its output in favor of the firm it has acquired.
This chapter presents a world duopoly framework, in which both firms are
producing and exporting identical products. Previous notions concerning this type of
cross hauling were mainly statements explaining that intra-industry trade comes about
because of slightly differentiated products, a major characteristic of monopolisticallycompetitive markets. Given that consumers enjoy variety, it is obvious that two-way
trade in not-quite identical products may evolve. Brander (1981) first discussed the
9
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concept of intra-industry trade in identical commodities when firms play Cournot in each
output market. This separation from prior beliefs opened a new avenue of international
trade theory. Specifically, Brander and Krugman (1983) revisit the notion of firm rivalry,
and how country symmetry, basic profit maximization of two separated markets
(domestic and foreign), and transportation costs lead to a dumping of output by both
firms into each other’s markets--reciprocal dumping. Weinstein (1992) extends the work
of Brander and Krugman to show that this type of intra-industry trade in the presence of
transportation costs and multiple firms cannot occur without dumping. Weinstein
extends the literature further in stating that firms in competitive markets will have a
greater tendency to dump exports unilaterally. Firms in markets that are less competitive
will not find it as profitable to dump goods to competitive foreign markets. This is due to
the lower price that results in more competitive markets.
Dei (1990) introduces the concept of multinational corporations (MNCs) in the
reciprocal dumping model. Dei defines an MNC as a firm with headquarters in its home
country, and then one or more firms in another country. The firms located abroad are
actually plants that incur variable production costs. Notice then that this is an alternative
to exporting to that nation. In other words, foreign investment instead of exporting is a
second possible strategy. Dei concluded that it was more profitable for the headquarter
firm in each nation to coordinate production locally (meaning through the plant located in
the other nation), hence avoiding transportation costs. In other words, the use of the
reciprocal dumping model leads to MNCs arising in each country.
With respect to international asset ownership, this essay refers to conclusions
reached by Farrell and Shapiro (1990), and shows a robustness of their results in a noncontrolling interest setting using this chapter’s variation of the Brander-Krugman
reciprocal dumping model. Majority ownership is then discussed, and the
counterintuitive results that follow are investigated.
Concerning the non-controlling interest situation, Farrell and Shapiro show that,
upon a firm increasing an ownership stake into another firm (but having no explicit
control), the investing firm would lower its output in favor of all other existing firms.
The change in profits to shareholders of the investing firm is ambiguous. They
hypothesize that in a managerial control setting, increasing asset ownership would only
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be profitable if some larger firm gains control of a smaller firm. The smaller firm would
then reduce its output to augment the profit of the larger firm. Using the modified
reciprocal dumping model, it is seen that firm profitability can result under managerial
control without any preconceptions of firm size.
Section 3.2 provides the basic model setup, while Sections 3.3 and 3.4 detail the
effects on exports with changes in international asset ownership, given that the acquiring
firm has only partial ownership but no control. Section 3.5 presents an analysis of
changes in exports of the two firms when the acquiring firm obtains enough ownership to
exercise managerial control over the other. Section 3.6 discusses the effects on profits of
both firms, while Section 3.7 provides concluding remarks.
3.2. Basic Model Setup:
Assume there exist only two firms in the world. In this duopoly, one firm is
located in a domestic nation, while the other is located in a foreign country. Suppose the
acquiring (or investing) firm is located in the domestic nation, while the other firm is
located abroad. It is assumed that the two firms are each producing identical products at
a constant marginal cost so that the markets may be separated. These two firms are
initially equal in every way, with the exception that the domestic firm will eventually
begin to take an interest in the foreign firm. The profit functions in this model are
generally expressed as:

π D = π O + βπ F
and

πF
where:

D denotes the Domestic (acquiring) firm’s total profit function
O denotes the acquiring firm’s Own internal profit
F denotes the Foreign firm’s profit function.

Notice the presence of β in the profit function for the acquiring firm. As this firm
obtains increasing ownership of the foreign firm, this β term increases, taking a value in
the interval [0,1]. A value of β equal to zero implies that the acquiring firm has no
ownership in the foreign firm, while a value of one denotes absolute ownership. There
exists a value in this interval where the acquiring firm has managerial control of the
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foreign firm, and can dictate decision-making. The β term can be thought of as a degree
of ownership variable.
For the domestic firm then, the first term of the profit function is the own internal
profit of that firm’s operations. In other words, this is the profit that occurs without
domestic investment. The second term is the fraction of the foreign firm’s profit that
accrues to the acquiring firm, given the existence of some positive level of investment.
Allow the total output available in the domestic nation to be denoted by X , and it is the
sum of the domestically produced output for domestic consumption ( x ) and the exports
from the foreign firm ( y ). Similarly, X * is the total output available in the foreign
nation, with x * being domestic exports and y * being foreign-produced output for foreign
consumption. P ( X ) is the domestic price, while P * ( X * ) is the foreign price. Allow t
to be the per unit transportation cost of exporting. As is standard in reciprocal dumping
literature, assume that marginal costs, denoted c, are constant and identical for both
firms. By doing this, the domestic/foreign market and its export market can be separated.
Specifically, the profit functions of each of the firms are as follows:

π D = p( X ) x + p * ( X * ) x * − cx − cx * − tx * + β [ p * ( X * ) y * + p( X ) y − cy * − cy − ty ]
and

π F = p * ( X * ) y * + p ( X ) y − cy * − cy − ty
where:

X = x+ y
X * = x* + y * .

The reader will notice that the cost of investment does not appear in the profit function of
the domestic firm. The interest is to show what happens to the output levels and profits
of both firms when the investing firm buys a portion of the foreign firm’s assets. Given
this, the investment cost of beta is sunk, and is simply a transfer of surplus from one firm
to another of a given amount. Hence, costs of investment do not appear in the first-order
conditions. This is not an unrealistic assumption. Many foreign direct investment papers
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(FDI) present the cost of investment as some fixed cost. This is because FDI costs tend
not to vary with output.
3.3. Foreign Exports and Domestic Production (Non-controlling Interest):
The objective is to perform an analysis of the trade patterns developing between
the domestic and foreign markets in the wake of increasing domestic ownership of the
foreign firm by the domestic firm. In this section, ownership is pursued in the context of
the domestic firm acquiring shares of the foreign firm, but not enough to establish
managerial control of that firm. In Section 3.5, the ownership situation in a setting of
managerial control is presented.
In the non-controlling interest setting, to observe the effects on foreign exports,
the first-order conditions of the specific profit functions above must be differentiated with
respect to x for the acquiring firm and with respect to the exports of the foreign firm,
respectively:
∂π D
= p ' ( X ) x + p ( X ) − c + βp ' ( X ) y = 0 ,
∂x

(1)
(2)

∂π F
= p' ( X ) y + p( X ) − c − t = 0 .
∂y

Total differentiation leads to:
 dc 
 A C   dx  1 − p ' ( X ) y 0  
dβ
 D E  dy  = 1
0
1  
  

 dt 
where:
A = p ' ' ( X ) x + 2 p ' ( X ) + βp ' ' ( X ) y < 0
C = p ' ' ( X ) x + p ' ( X ) + βp' ( X ) + βp' ' ( X ) y < 0
D = p' ' ( X ) y + p' ( X ) < 0
E = p' ' ( X ) y + 2 p' ( X ) < 0 .
The demand functions have the usual property of negative slope. Additionally, allow the
demand functions to be concave. In other words, p ' ' ( X ) < 0 . In so doing, unnecessary
ambiguity is alleviated. With this condition, A, C, D, and E are all negatively signed,
which leads to the Jacobian determinant being positively signed.
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Looking at domestic production for domestic consumption:
∂x − Ep' ( X ) y
=
< 0.
∂β
|J|
Intuitively, as domestic ownership of the foreign firm increases, domestic output will fall.
This result is analogous to that which was stated by Farrell and Shapiro. The domestic
firm will lower its production in order to augment the profits of the foreign firm, and
realize positive returns from its acquisition.
Looking at the effects on foreign exports to the domestic nation:
∂y Dp' ( X ) y
=
> 0.
∂β
|J|
As domestic ownership of the foreign firm increases, exports from the foreign firm also
increase. This result is not surprising. With a non-controlling interest, the foreign firm is
still independent of the acquiring firm with respect to decision-making. The foreign firm
will increase its export production, and will therefore increase its market share in the
domestic nation, given that the acquiring firm has reduced its production. The domestic
firm benefits, given the makeup of its profit function, even though it is the foreign firm
that is increasing its presence in the domestic nation. Whether the domestic firm benefits
in the aggregate depends on the magnitude of the positive effect on domestic profit from
the investment into the foreign firm, relative to the negative effect on internal domestic
profit as a result of reduced production. This matter is revisited in Section 3.6.
These findings lead to the first proposition:
Proposition 3.1: As the acquiring firm obtains partial ownership (but no control) of the
foreign firm, exports from the foreign firm will rise, while domestic production for
domestic consumption falls.
As for the total output available in the domestic market, since X = x + y ,
differentiate with respect to β :
p' ( X ) y[ D − E ]
∂X
=
< 0.
∂β
|J|
As domestic investment increases, the level of total domestic output available falls. This
must mean that domestic production falls at a greater level than foreign exports rise with
a given increase in β , ceteris paribus. Before the domestic firm had acquired any
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ownership of the foreign firm, the two firms were independent and acted as a world
duopoly. When the acquiring firm increases its asset ownership, it appears to be moving
more toward a monopoly position. Notice that the characteristics of a monopoly begin to
arise: lower output availability and rising prices as a result.
3.4. Domestic Exports and Foreign Production (Non-controlling Interest):
In this section, a new system similar to the first must be constructed. Going back
to the specific profit functions from Section 3.2, the first-order conditions are obtained by
differentiating with respect to domestic exports ( x * ), and foreign production for foreign
consumption ( y * ):
(3)

∂π D
= p * ' ( X * ) x * + p * ( X * ) − c − t + βp * ' ( X * ) y * = 0 ,
∂x *
(4)

∂π F
= p* ' ( X * ) y* + p* ( X * ) − c = 0 .
∂y *

Allow the system to be expressed as:
 A C   dx *  1 − p * ' ( X * ) y *
D E   *  = 
0
 dy  1


 dc 
1  
 dβ .
0  
 dt 

The elements of the Jacobian are defined exactly as before, with the exception that
asterisks are attached to the price and output variables, denoting foreign terms. Knowing
this, the Jacobian determinant is signed positively. Evaluating the effect on domestic
exports:
∂x * − Ep * ' ( X * ) y *
=
< 0.
∂β
|J|
As domestic ownership of the foreign firm increases, exports from the domestic nation
will fall. As the acquiring firm reduces its volume of exports to the foreign nation, it is
giving way to increased presence in the foreign market by the foreign firm. With respect
to foreign production for indigenous consumption:
∂y * Dp * ' ( X * ) y *
=
> 0.
∂β
|J|
As the acquiring firm increases its ownership of the foreign firm, foreign production
increases. Given that exports to the foreign nation have fallen, the foreign firm increases
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its production to partially cover for this absence of output in the foreign market. If one
infers increased firm profit from increased market share, profits of the foreign firm will
unambiguously increase, which is shown in Section 3.6.
Formally stating the second proposition:
Proposition 3.2: As the acquiring firm obtains increasing ownership (but no control) of
the foreign firm, exports from the domestic firm will fall, while foreign production for
foreign consumption increases.
Notice then that the results reported by Farrell and Shapiro (1990) do continue to
hold when using the Brander-Krugman duopoly model of intra-industry trade, suggesting
a robustness of those results.
Observing the total output availability in the foreign nation, since X * = x * + y * ,
again differentiate with respect to β :
∂X * p * ' ( X * ) y * [ D − E ]
=
< 0.
∂β
|J|
Intuitively, increasing investment by the domestic firm is negatively related to total
foreign output availability. This reduction in output will raise prices in the foreign
market.
After seeing these results, it is interesting to note the changes in the total volume
of trade that take place upon given increases in asset acquisition by the domestic firm.
With a non-controlling interest, exports from abroad increase while exports from the
domestic nation fall. Quite obviously, since x * is falling in β while y is increasing, net
exports are falling in the domestic nation and rising in the foreign nation. To determine
the net change in the volume of trade however, take the absolute value of the difference
in exports of the two nations. Since X and X * both fall with increasing ownership, the
change in y is less than the change in x * . Thus, x * falls by more than y increases,
meaning that the volume of trade falls.
3.5. Total Production of Both Firms (Managerial Control):
When the acquiring firm continues to invest in the foreign firm, it was mentioned
that managerial control is obtained by the domestic firm at a certain level of β (not
necessarily one-half, but a value in which the domestic firm is the majority shareholder).
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Upon this occurring, the duopoly gives way to a world multi-plant monopoly, with the
acquiring domestic firm acting as the only independent seller. The foreign firm simply
becomes a subsidiary of the domestic firm. A caveat should be introduced here. It is
assumed that there exists no impediment toward a firm attempting to move toward a
monopoly position. In other words, the governments of both nations do not block any
attempts of foreign investment. The robustness of the Farrell and Shapiro results given a
non-controlling interest has been seen. The interest is now to investigate the same
variables with the assumption of managerial control. Given that the domestic firm is the
investor, and is the sole decision-maker, its profit function is the only one of interest. In
other words, that profit function is now maximized with respect to each output variable in
consideration ( x, x * , y, y * ).
Differentiating the acquiring firm’s profit function from Section 3.2 with respect
to domestically-produced output for domestic consumption:
∂π D
= p ' ( X ) x + p ( X ) − c + βp ' ( X ) y = 0 .
∂x

(5)

Now differentiating with respect to foreign exports:
(6)

∂π D
= p ' ( X ) x + βp ' ( X ) y + β [ p ( X ) − c − t ] = 0 .
∂y

These first-order conditions lead to the following system:
K
M


L   dx   1
=
N  dy   β

− p' ( X ) y
Q

0
β 

 dc 
dβ 
 
 dt 

where:
K = p ' ' ( X ) x + 2 p ' ( X ) + βp ' ' ( X ) y < 0
L = p' ' ( X ) x + p ' ( X ) + βp' ' ( X ) y + βp' ( X ) < 0
M = p ' ' ( X ) x + p' ( X ) + βp' ' ( X ) y + βp' ( X ) < 0
N = p ' ' ( X ) x + 2 βp ' ( X ) + βp' ' ( X ) y < 0
Q = − p' ( X ) y − p( X ) + c + t .
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It is necessary to keep the same conditions as before: that the demand functions are
negatively sloped and concave. This allows K, L, M, and N to be unambiguously signed.
No assumptions can be made regarding Q however.
With respect to signing the Jacobian determinant of this system, it is negative at
all values of β except when β = 1 . The Jacobian determinant in this case is
| J |= ( p ' ( X )) 2 [ β (2 − β ) − 1] . Notice that at a value of β equal to one, the Jacobian
determinant would be zero, leading to undefined comparative statics results. Hence in
the case of managerial control, β ∈ [0,1) . Therefore in evaluating comparative statics
results, it can only be said that β can be in the neighborhood of one.
Looking at the change in domestically-produced output for indigenous
consumption given a change in ownership, ceteris paribus:
∂x − [ Np ' ( X ) y + QL]
=
>0.
∂β
|J|
Assume that the transportation cost is not prohibitive; therefore, exports will be positive,
and p ( X ) > c + t , allowing us to sign the comparative static result above as being
positive (provided that β ≠ 1 ). As the acquiring firm (already having managerial
control) continues to increase its interest in the foreign firm (in order to capture a larger
fraction of the profit of that firm), the output produced by the acquiring firm increases.
With respect to exports of the foreign firm:
∂y KQ + p ' ( X ) yM
=
< 0.
∂β
|J|
Given that the transportation cost is not prohibitive, the result can be signed negatively
(provided that ( p ' ( X )) 2 is not sufficiently large), implying that exports from the foreign
firm will fall with increasing β .
Before continuing, it is necessary to consider exports of the acquiring firm and
foreign-produced output for foreign consumption. To do this, a new system must again
be constructed. The profit function of the acquiring firm is differentiated with respect to
x * and y * , and a new matrix results. As in the previous section, the elements of the
Jacobian will be defined in the same manner, with the exception that asterisks are
included on the output and price variables. Given this fact, the changes in x * and y * will
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be analogous to the changes in x and y above: with increasing β , exports of the
acquiring firm will increase, while foreign-produced output for foreign consumption will
fall. Therefore, observe that the total production of the acquiring firm increases, while
that of the foreign firm falls--the direct opposite of what was presented earlier with the
non-controlling interest setting.
Formally presenting Proposition 3.3:
Proposition 3.3: Upon the acquiring firm gaining managerial control of the foreign firm
(and continuing to increase its interest), the total production of the acquiring firm will
increase, while that of the foreign firm will fall.
Notice the odd results derived in this section. Recall that the acquiring firm in the
home market incurs a transportation cost in exporting abroad. The home firm upon
further acquisition of the foreign firm directs the foreign firm to decrease production.
This is rather unusual, given that the domestic firm could increase production of the
foreign firm and hence avoid transportation costs. This is not the case here in this version
of the reciprocal dumping model. The consequence of assuming homogeneous products
and the presence of transportation costs are what drive these results, because these
characteristics yield reciprocal dumping as long as each firm sells in the other’s market.
With positive transportation costs, Brander and Krugman found that marginal
revenue was higher in the export market, given that each firm in equilibrium has a
smaller market share of the export market than of its own market. This follows from the
fact that both firms were initially symmetric. Since marginal revenue is higher in the
export market, each firm imposes a smaller markup over cost in its export market than in
its own country. This is true because there is a higher elasticity in the export market than
in the firms’ indigenous market. Therefore, the export price (price for x * if discussing
the domestic firm) will be less than the foreign price (price for y * ). Thus the domestic
firm consequently dumps exports into the foreign market. In other words:
p* ( X * ) − c − t < p* ( X * ) − c .
Given than marginal costs are identical for both firms, the reciprocal dumping result
simplifies to:
p* ( X * ) − t < p* ( X * ) .
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This is the simplified conclusion of Brander and Krugman’s reciprocal dumping model.
Given a lower net export price for domestic exports (which is the transportation cost
wedge), the domestic acquiring firm will indeed not become a multinational. Dei’s work
involved the opening of a new plant, and not necessarily the purchase of an existing plant
(i.e., a competitor) when firms decide to become multinationals. Additionally, if a firm
wants to sell more output, the increase in production will lower the price in that market
due to higher output availability. With trade, a firm can sell more in its export market,
which will lower the foreign price to the detriment of the foreign firm. Thus the firm
wishing to sell more can do so without adversely affecting the market in which it enjoys
the largest market share. This is standard third-degree price discrimination, or in this
case, dumping.
In deriving the domestic export and foreign demand elasticities for comparison,
recall that in a situation of managerial control, the acquiring firm’s profit function is of
primary interest. If discussing the foreign market, then it is necessary to differentiate the
domestic profit function with respect to both x * and y * to derive the elasticities. Allow
(7) and (8) to be the following first-order conditions:
(7)

∂π D
= p * ' ( X * ) x * + p * ( X * ) − c − t + βp * ' ( X * ) y * = 0 ,
*
∂x

(8)

∂π D
= p * ' ( X * ) x * + βp * ( X * ) − βc + βp * ' ( X * ) y * = 0 .
*
∂y

Rearranging (7), and allowing

εx

*

p* ( X * )

εx

= − p * ' ( X * ) x * , notice that:

*

p* ( X * )
= * *
,
p ( X ) − c − t + βp * ' ( X * ) y *

where ε x* is the price elasticity of demand of domestic exports from the home country.
For comparison, rearrange (8), and allow

p* ( X * )

εy

= − p * ' ( X * ) y * , and accordingly find

*

that:

εy =
*

βp * ( X * )
,
β ( p * ( X * ) − c) + p * ' ( X * ) x *
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where ε y* is the price elasticity of demand of foreign output for foreign consumption.
Notice that these two elasticities cannot be compared in absolute. With respect to the
numerators, the numerator for the domestic exports is larger than for foreign output,
given that β is a term that is less than one. Additionally, in the denominator, it can
reasonably be assumed that βp * ' ( X * ) y * < p * ' ( X * ) x * , since β is less than one, and y *
falls as x * rises with increasing ownership in a majority setting. This allows us to make
the assumption of the strict inequality.11 Thus so far, ε y* < ε x* . This leaves the final
terms in the denominator, which cannot be directly compared. ( p * ( X * ) − c − t ) is in the
denominator of ε x* , and β ( p * ( X * ) − c) is in the denominator of ε y* . The presence of
transportation costs in the domestic export elasticity is the key difference between these
two expressions. If β were arbitrarily close to one, the expressions would differ only by
the magnitude of the transportation costs. But if a particular value to β is not assigned,
the above terms cannot be directly compared. Therefore, the following inequalities and
relationships are posed in three cases:
i) if ( p * ( X * ) − c − t ) > β ( p * ( X * ) − c) , then ε y* is greater than, equal to, or less
than ε x* ,
ii) if ( p * ( X * ) − c − t ) = β ( p * ( X * ) − c) , then ε y* < ε x* , and
iii) if ( p * ( X * ) − c − t ) < β ( p * ( X * ) − c) , then ε y* < ε x* .
In looking at the three different possibilities, consider i) first, as this is a rather
uninteresting possibility, given its ambiguity. If i) happens to be true, then the
denominator of ε x* tends to increase, decreasing the entire fraction. This is of course
working against the βp * ' ( X * ) y * term in the domestic exports elasticity, and vice-versa
for the foreign output elasticity. This relationship, while possible, yields no absolute
answer without imposing additional conditions.

11

It should be noted that this inequality would likely not be strict in one instance. With control, y*
decreases more than x* rises (see below), and there will be a β where the two expressions equal.
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Next, consider possibility ii). If ii) holds, then we need only concern ourselves
with the inequality βp * ' ( X * ) y * < p * ' ( X * ) x * . Since this is true, especially with a high

β , εy < εx .
*

*

Finally, consider possibility iii). If iii) is true, then both expressions in the
denominator of the foreign output elasticity will be larger than the domestic counterparts,
meaning that ε y* < ε x* , given that we already know that the numerator of the foreign
output elasticity is smaller than that of the domestic export elasticity.
What is the importance of the foreign elasticity being less than that of domestic
output? If ii) or iii) holds true, and this could also occur in i), then there will exist a
smaller markup over cost in the foreign market than in the domestic market, according to
Brander and Krugman. Thus the export price (price for x * net of transportation costs)
will be less than the price for y * . The higher price sensitivity for domestic exports
causes the domestic firm to dump exports into the foreign market. Given a high
responsiveness of its exports to the foreign nation, the home country increases its volume
of exports to that country, while the foreign firm must lower its total output to maintain
monopoly power: restricting output and increasing price.
It was shown that the acquiring firm increases both domestic output for
indigenous consumption and production of exports to the foreign nation. This fact,
coupled with the reduced total production of the foreign firm, will yield increased market
share to the domestic firm in both markets.
In looking at total output availability in the domestic nation:
∂X − p' ( X )[( p( X ) − c − t ) − β ( p( X ) − c − t )]
=
< 0.
∂β
|J|
This implies that with increasing β , the total output available to the domestic nation will
fall. For total output in the domestic nation to fall with increasing ownership, the
reductions in foreign exports ( y ) must outweigh the increase in domestically produced
output for indigenous consumption ( x ). This constriction in output is a standard
monopoly result, which will be accompanied by an increase in price.
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With respect to the foreign nation, in summary:
∂x *
∂y *
∂X *
> 0,
< 0,
< 0.
∂β
∂β
∂β
Notice that a similar result is occurring in the foreign market. The total output available
in that market also falls with increasing β , implying that the price of the foreign output
increases as well.
Notice now that net exports in the domestic nation rise, while foreign net exports
fall. With respect to the total volume of trade under managerial control, the net volume
of trade has again decreased given the directions of x * and y . Given that both X and
X * again fall with increased ownership in this case, the reduction in y outweighs the
increase in x * . This result is what one would expect. There is now a situation of a world
monopoly, where one would expect output constriction. Thus it follows that net trade
would fall also.
3.6. Domestic and Foreign Firm Profit:
3.6.A. Non-controlling Interest:
With respect to analyzing the effects on profit when the acquiring firm increases
its ownership of the foreign firm, simply differentiate the profit functions with respect to

β . For the acquiring firm:
(9)

∂π D
∂X
∂X *
∂x
= [ p' ( X ) x + βp ' ( X ) y ]
+ [ p * ' ( X * ) x * + βp * ' ( X * ) y * ]
+ [ p( X ) − c]
∂β
∂β
∂β
∂β
+ [ p* ( X * ) − c − t]

∂x *
∂y
∂y *
+ [ β ( p( X ) − c − t )]
+ [ β ( p * ( X * ) − c)]
+π F .
∂β
∂β
∂β

It is necessary to simplify this expression to evaluate its sign. Knowing that X = x + y ,
and differentiating with respect to β :
(10)

∂X ∂x ∂y
.
=
+
∂β ∂β ∂β

Substituting the right-hand side of (10) into (9), its foreign counterpart, and using the
first-order conditions (1) through (4) to simplify, (9) becomes:
(11)

*
*
∂y
∂π D
*
*
* ∂y
*
* ∂x
+π F .
− p (X )
+ p '( X )x
= p' ( X ) x
∂β
∂β
∂β
∂β
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Notice that the first two terms on the right-hand side are negative, while the latter two
terms are positive, indicating that the signing of this partial profit derivative is
ambiguous. This should not be surprising to the reader. Remember that in the situation
of partial ownership but no control, the domestic firm is sacrificing market share in favor
of augmenting the profit of the foreign firm, in which the domestic firm has an interest.
These two conflicting forces upon total domestic firm profit lead to the ambiguous result,
which was also found by Farrell and Shapiro. They discussed that the profits accruing to
the shareholders of the acquiring firm do not necessarily increase in a situation of
ownership but no explicit control.
For the partially-acquired foreign firm, differentiating with respect to β :
∂π F
∂X
∂X * *
∂y
∂y *
= p' ( X )
y + p* ' ( X * )
y + [ p( X ) − c − t ]
+ [ p * ( X * ) − c]
.
∂β
∂β
∂β
∂β
∂β

(12)

Substituting (10), its foreign counterpart, and first-order conditions (2) and (4) into (12):
(13)

∂π F
∂x
∂x *
= ( p' ( X ) y )
+ ( p* ' ( X * ) y* )
> 0.
∂β
∂β
∂β

Notice that this partial derivative can be unambiguously signed as positive, using the
previously determined signs of the comparative static results. Given that β and foreign
firm profit are positively correlated in this situation, the increased market share of the
foreign firm does indeed yield higher profit for that firm. As mentioned earlier, this will
indirectly benefit the profit of the domestic firm given the makeup of that firm’s profit
function.
Concluding Subsection 3.6.A with a formal statement of the next observation:
Proposition 3.4: As the acquiring firm increases its ownership of the foreign firm (but
has no external decision-making ability), the foreign firm sees an unambiguous increase
in profit, while changes in the profit of the domestic firm are uncertain.
3.6.B. Managerial Control:
The profit derivatives are initially the same in this situation as in subsection A,
except that now the simplification is somewhat different. With respect to the acquiring
firm, using (10) and its foreign counterpart, and the relevant first-order conditions (5),
(6), (7), and (8) into (9):
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∂π D
∂x *
= − p* ( X * )
+π F .
∂β
∂β
The first term is negative, while the second is positive. However, upon managerial
control, the domestic firm is essentially a multi-plant monopoly. With this in mind,
∂π D
> 0 to ensure that profits under managerial control (and hence a monopoly) are
∂β
greater than initially, in other words, symmetric duopoly profits.
With respect to the foreign firm, taking its profit derivative from subsection A.,
and substituting (10) and its foreign counterpart, (6), and (8) into (12) and rearranging:
*
∂π F
∂x
p * ' ( X * ) x * ∂y *
p' ( X ) x ∂y
*
*
* ∂x
= (−
)
−(
)
+ p '(X ) y
+ p' ( X ) y
< 0.
∂β
β
∂β
β
∂β
∂β
∂β

This partial is unambiguously signed as negative given the comparative static results
from Section 3.5. Intuitively then, foreign firm profit is decreasing in β . The foreign
firm loses market share in both markets since its total production has been reduced (per
the domestic firm), and hence has decreasing profit.
Concluding this subsection with the following proposition:
Proposition 3.5: With managerial control, the domestic firm (now a monopoly) sees an
increase in profit with a change in ownership, while the profit of the foreign firm is
inversely related with β .
It is surprising that ambiguity is not lost with the assumption of managerial
control. One would ordinarily expect ambiguity to disappear in a case where the
domestic firm handles all decision-making. But this is not the case, given the makeup of
the acquiring firm’s profit function, and the two opposing effects on total domestic profit
that result. However, economic profits under monopoly (or collusion) are higher than in
a duopoly setting. Therefore, this leads us to conclude a positive relationship between β
and total domestic firm profit in a setting of managerial control.
3.7. Conclusion:
This chapter has shown what happens to total production, intra-industry trade, and
profit of two firms upon changes in asset ownership in a world duopoly, specifically
when that ownership is in the form of acquisition of a trading partner. It was seen that
with partial ownership but no managerial control, exports of the acquiring nation were
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negatively related to changes in ownership, while exports from the foreign firm were
positively related. The effect on domestic firm profit was ambiguous, while the foreign
firm’s profit was found to be positively correlated with β .
Upon the assumption of managerial control, in which only the profit function of
the acquiring firm is maximized with respect to each output variable, it was found that
exports of the acquiring firm were positively related to changes in ownership.
Conversely, total production of the foreign firm fell with increases in β --the exact
opposite of what took place in the non-controlling interest situation. This result is due to
the higher elasticity of domestic exports relative to the elasticity of foreign production for
foreign consumption. Given this, the domestic firm dumps exports into the foreign
market, and does not become a textbook multinational. It was also seen that given all the
above results, intra-industry trading between the two firms was discouraged upon the
acquiring firm increasing its asset holdings of the foreign firm--irrespective to degree of
ownership. Total profit of the acquiring firm rises with β , while the relationship
between foreign firm profit and β was negative. Thus despite transportation costs and
no initial assumption of firm size, the acquiring domestic firm is profitable upon attaining
managerial control. This implies that if a firm wishes to expand by acquiring a
competitor, it should do so as long as the firm gains managerial control of the competitor.
According to U.S. antitrust law, this type of acquisition would perhaps not be
discouraged if the resulting merger yields less than seventy-five percent of the market to
the integrated firm.
It is generally accepted that acquisition is done to drive out competitors, increase
profit, and capture market share. With consideration to the non-controlling interest, the
foreign firm is not driven out of the market. In fact, it was seen that the foreign firm’s
market share actually increases with increasing β . But given the nature of the profit
function of the acquiring firm, anything that benefits the profit of the foreign firm will
indirectly benefit the acquiring firm. Given a level of β in which managerial control is
assumed however, the foreign firm becomes nothing more than a subsidiary of the
domestic firm. Upon this action, the economy has moved completely toward a world
monopoly with only one independent seller. The acquiring firm directs decisions to the
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foreign firm, and uses this monopoly advantage to increase its own profit and market
share in both markets, despite the presence of transportation costs.
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CHAPTER FOUR
OPTIMAL ASSET OWNERSHIP
4.1. Introduction:
This essay expounds upon the third chapter of this dissertation in that we strive to
find an optimal level of ownership when an acquiring firm begins to invest in a foreign
competitor. Specifically, this chapter uses the modification of the Brander-Krugman
(1983) duopoly model presented in the last chapter to illustrate this optimal level of
foreign asset ownership. In deriving the results, it is necessary to refer to the comparative
statics and intuition detailed in the third chapter. Ultimately, the optimal level of foreign
investment is a degree in which total ownership is attained. In other words, the optimal
level of ownership is when the acquiring firm not only obtains managerial control of its
foreign competitor, but absolute ownership of that firm. If this is the case, then why do
we observe some firms in the real world obtaining only non-controlling interests in other
firms? If it is optimal to own all of a foreign firm, then why do not all firms do this?
In some instances, such as with the presence of antitrust legislation or endogenous
protection, total ownership is not allowed or is not feasible. In this case, the acquiring
firm should obtain the maximum allowable ownership of its competitor. Additionally,
both foreign national welfare and domestic national welfare most likely fall upon
increased asset ownership by the domestic firm.
Recall the problem encountered in the third chapter with respect to changes in
domestic firm profit with increases in ownership. When taking the ownership parameter
exogenously, no matter if the domestic firm obtained a non-controlling share or a share in
which managerial control could be assumed, the acquiring firm faced an ambiguous
change in total firm profit with a given change in ownership. By assumption, profit must
be higher for a firm upon reaching a monopoly position. In the model presented in the
third chapter, there were only two firms. By basic economic theory, monopoly profits
(those achieved with managerial control) must be higher than duopoly profits. Total
domestic firm profit is the summation of the domestic firm’s own internal operations
from operating domestically (as well as exporting abroad) and the profits accrued from its
share in the foreign firm. The ambiguity is of no surprise, even in the managerial control
setting. With non-controlling interest, the domestic firm lowers its production in favor of
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augmenting the profits from its foreign direct investment. Therefore, profits from
domestic operation fall, while profits from the share of the foreign firm rise, given that
the foreign firm increases production to compensate. These two effects work against
each other in the makeup of the domestic firm’s total profit function. Expressing the
ownership parameter as β , this profit function is expressed as:
(1)
where:

π D = π O + βπ F ,

D denotes the Domestic (acquiring) firm’s total profit function
O denotes the acquiring firm’s Own internal profit
F denotes the Foreign firm’s profit function
β ∈ [0,1] .

As can be seen in (1), with non-controlling interest, π O is falling in β , while π F is
increasing. As mentioned above, as the domestic firm increases its ownership of the
foreign firm, it lowers production in order to augment its return from its investment. The
domestic firm yields production to the foreign firm. As the foreign firm increases its
production to compensate for the lower domestic output, the foreign firm observes an
increase in profit. Given that the domestic firm has an ownership stake in the foreign
firm, the domestic firm will recognize an increase in its profit as well. Thus the total
effect on π D would be ambiguous.
Under the managerial control situation, it is π O that increases in β , while π F
falls. Recall that with managerial control, the domestic firm increases its total output,
while dictating that the foreign firm reduces its total output. This of course adversely
affects the foreign firm’s profit. In this situation, π O and π F are again working against
each other, resulting in ambiguity of π D .
Given this, there is a need to continue with the analysis of firm profit and asset
ownership. Therefore, it is no longer assumed that β is a given exogenous variable, but
is now endogenous. The domestic firm will then maximize its total profit with respect to
β , choosing that level of ownership which maximizes its total profit. In deriving these
results, the comparative statics from Chapter Three will be called upon.
This chapter approaches the problem from a basic game theoretic standpoint.
Assume a one-shot Cournot-Nash game composed of two stages. In the first stage, the
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domestic firm chooses its optimal level of ownership, or its β . This level of ownership
takes a value in the interval [0,1]. When β = 0, the domestic firm has no investment in
the foreign firm. When β = 1 , the domestic firm has total and absolute ownership in the
~

foreign firm, hence having managerial control. There is a level of β , denoted as β , in
which the domestic firm acquires a majority ownership and thus managerial control of
the foreign firm. In the second stage, the two firms play Cournot in outputs. Backward
induction is used to solve the model and find the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium that
results. This analysis is pursued in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 presents the problem from an
antitrust perspective. In Section 4.4, the effects on country welfare are illustrated using
Brander-Krugman welfare functions. Section 4.5 provides concluding remarks.
4.2. Optimal Ownership:
In analyzing the one-shot Cournot-Nash game, backward induction is used to find
the optimal level of ownership that the domestic firm will acquire. Allow p ( X ) and
p * ( X * ) to be the domestic and foreign prices of output, respectively. The two firms
produce identical products at identical marginal costs. Both firms export to the other
country at the same transportation cost, t . Additionally, x * and y are the exports of the
domestic firm and the foreign firm, respectively. Furthermore, x is domestic output
produced for domestic consumption, while y * is foreign output produced for foreign
consumption. Lastly, X = x + y , and X * = x * + y * . X is the total output available in
the domestic market, and X * is the total output available in the foreign country. At the
outset of the game, the two firms are symmetric. Presenting the specific profit functions
of the world duopoly once again:
(2)

π D = p ( X ) x + p * ( X * ) x * − cx − cx * − tx * + β [ p * ( X * ) y * + p ( X ) y − cy * − cy − ty ]

and
(3)

π F = p * ( X * ) y * + p ( X ) y − cy * − cy − ty .

The key variable in this revision of the Brander-Krugman model is the β term in (2)--the
degree of ownership variable. As far as purchasing the additional shares of the foreign
firm, no explicit term in the profit function in (2) is presented. In the third chapter, it was
simply stated that additional firm ownership could be thought of as a fixed cost.
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Additionally, the domestic firm will not acquire a level of β which makes it worse off.
As long as the marginal revenue from additional β is greater than the marginal cost,
there is no need to make a specific notation in the profit function above for the cost of
acquiring ownership.
In the second stage, the two firms play Cournot. The results of the second stage
∧ ∧* ∧ ∧*

would simply be the argmax of (2) and (3), yielding the solution {x, x , y, y } . This
solution represents the Nash output of the domestic firm for domestic consumption,
domestic exports, foreign exports, and the foreign firm’s production for foreign
consumption, respectively.
In solving the first stage, the profit functions above must be revisited. Recall that
the objective in this stage is to find the optimal level of ownership for the domestic firm.
At this point, it is still not known whether the domestic firm will acquire up to a level of
managerial control or not. Given that β can take a value between zero and one, and the
fact that the profit function is nonlinear, Kuhn-Tucker programming is used. The
optimization problem is:
{β } Max π D subject to 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 ; {x, x * , y, y * > 0} .
Notice the constraint. Again, β must take a value between zero and one.
This optimization is not without a potential problem. It is highly likely that the
domestic profit function is discontinuous at the level of β in which managerial control of
the foreign firm is achieved. Therefore, the problem must be modified further. Thus the
optimization problem should be:
~

(4)

{β } Max π D subject to 0 ≤ β ≤ β ; {x, x * , y, y * > 0}

(5)

{β } Max π D subject to β ≤ β ≤ 1 ; {x, x * , y, y * > 0} .

and
~

4.2.A. Non-controlling Interest:
Taking this setting first, equation (4) is of concern in order to formulate the
Lagrangian. Therefore (2) is modified as follows:
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(6)

~

Λ 1 = p( X ) x + p * ( X * ) x * − cx − cx * − tx * + βπ F + λ1 ( β − β )
Λ 1 = the Lagrangian function to be maximized

where:

λ1 = the Lagrangian multiplier.
Upon differentiating, we must use the first-order conditions, the comparative
statics results from the third chapter, and β = 0 . The first-order conditions are represented:
∂π D
= p ' ( X ) x + p ( X ) − c + βp ' ( X ) y = 0 ,
∂x
∂π F
= p' ( X ) y + p( X ) − c − t = 0 ,
∂y
∂π D
= p * ' ( X * ) x * + p * ( X * ) − c − t + βp * ' ( X * ) y * = 0 ,
∂x *
∂π F
= p* ' ( X * ) y* + p* ( X * ) − c = 0 .
∂y *
Taking the first-order necessary conditions and simplifying:

(7.1)

∂Λ 1
∂y
∂y
∂y * * *
∂y *
(1 − β )
=−
p( X )(1 − β ) +
c(1 − β ) −
p ( X )(1 − β ) + c
∂β
∂β
∂β
∂β
∂β
+ t(

∂y *
∂y
) + y * ( p * ( X * ) − c) + y ( p( X ) − c − t ) − λ1 ≤ 0.
−β
∂β
∂β

(7.1) must be less than or equal to zero for a maximum. If the partial derivative were
greater than zero, the domestic profit function would be increasing in β meaning that the
function would be upward-sloping. Thus the conditions for a global maximum will not
be met with respect to the choice variable β . The remaining Kuhn-Tucker conditions
are:
∂π D
(
− λ1 ) β = 0 ,
∂β

(7.2)

β ≥ 0,

(7.3)
(8.1)
(8.2)

∂Λ 1 ~
= β− β ≥ 0,
∂λ1
~

( β − β )λ1 = 0 ,
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(8.3)

λ1 ≥ 0 .

When using Kuhn-Tucker programming, the constraint needs to be differentiable and
convex for a maximum. Since the constraint is linear, the constraint qualification is
satisfied. Thus, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are necessary and sufficient as long as the
objective function, π D , is concave and differentiable.
If the non-controlling interest problem is evaluated at β = 0 , this implies that
~

~

( β − β ) > 0 . Given (8.2), λ1 must equal zero for ( β − β )λ1 = 0 . Thus in (7.1), λ1 drops
out when evaluating at β = 0 .
With respect to the comparative statics results from Chapter Three, in a situation
of non-controlling interest,

∂X ∂X * ∂x ∂x *
∂y ∂y *
,
,
,
< 0 , and
,
> 0 . Additionally,
∂β ∂β ∂β ∂β
∂β ∂β

recall that X = x + y , and X * = x * + y * .
Rearranging the first-order conditions, and substituting into (7.1), the expression
in (7.1) simplifies to:
(9)

∂Λ 1
∂y
∂y * * *
=−
( p ( X ) − c) −
( p ( X ) − c − t) +
∂β
∂β
∂β
y * ( p * ( X * ) − c) + y ( p( X ) − c − t ) ≤ 0.

When β = 0 ,

∂Λ 1 ~
= β > 0 from (8.1). It has already been shown that λ1 must equal
∂λ1

zero when β equals zero from (8.2). Therefore, from (8.3), λ1 ≥ 0 , which satisfies the
last of the constraints. If β and λ1 both equal zero,
with respect to (7.2). But from (7.1),

∂π D
may or may not equal zero
∂β

∂Λ 1 ∂π D
− λ1 ≤ 0 . Since λ1 equals zero,
=
∂β
∂β

∂π D
≤ 0 . Thus at β = 0 , the domestic profit function is decreasing in β .
∂β

73

~

What about a level of β such that 0 < β < β ? With respect to (8.1),
~
∂Λ 1 ~
= β − β > 0 . Since ( β − β ) > 0 , λ1 must equal zero for (8.2) to hold true. Since
∂λ1

λ1 = 0, (8.3) is satisfied.
When evaluating (7.1) with a positive level of β in the non-controlling interest
∂π D
∂π D
problem, (
− λ1 ) = 0 per (7.2). Since λ1 is zero,
= 0 . Therefore, at positive
∂β
∂β
~

levels of β below β , the profit function has a local minimum. Recall that when β = 0 ,
the profit function was less than or equal to zero.
~

Lastly, evaluate (7.1) at a level of β equal to β . In this case, (8.1) equals zero,
meaning that λ1 must be greater than or equal to zero according to (8.2), which in turn
satisfies (8.3). Since β is positive, (7.2) reveals that (
this means that

∂π D
− λ1 ) = 0 . Because λ1 ≥ 0 ,
∂β

∂π D
≥ 0 . Thus, the domestic profit function may be upward sloping
∂β

~

from β . Refer to Figure 4.1 below for a graphical representation of domestic profit as a
function of β .
4.2.B. Managerial Control:
Turning next to the ownership with control setting, the optimization problem is
now described by (5) above. Formulating the Lagrangian, the optimization problem with
managerial control is:
(10)

~

Λ 2 = p ( X ) x + p * ( X * ) x * − cx − cx * − tx * + βπ F + λ 2 (1 − β ) + λ3 ( β − β ) .

It was mentioned in the last chapter that when a firm has managerial control over another,
the acquiring firm’s profit function is to be maximized with respect to all output
variables.
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Figure 4.1—Domestic Profit and Ownership
Re-presenting the first-order conditions under managerial control from the last chapter:
∂π D
= p ' ( X ) x + p ( X ) − c + βp ' ( X ) y = 0 ,
∂x
∂π D
= p ' ( X ) x + βp' ( X ) y + β ( p ( X ) − c − t ) = 0 ,
∂y
∂π D
= p * ' ( X * ) x * + p * ( X * ) − c − t + βp * ' ( X * ) y * = 0 ,
*
∂x
∂π D
= p * ' ( X * ) x * + βp * ' ( X * ) y * + β ( p * ( X * ) − c ) = 0 .
*
∂y
Thus the first-order necessary (and sufficient for reasons mentioned above) condition is:
(11.1)

∂Λ 2
2
p * ' ( X * ) x * * p' ( X ) x
=−
y −
y − p * ' ( X * ) y * − p' ( X ) y 2 − λ 2 + λ3 ≤ 0 .
∂β
β
β

For a maximum, (11.1) must be less than or equal to zero. The remaining Kuhn-Tucker
conditions are:
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(11.2) (

∂π D
− λ 2 + λ3 ) β = 0 ,
∂β

(11.3) β ≥ 0 ,
(12.1)

∂Λ 2
= 1− β ≥ 0 ,
∂λ 2

(12.2) (1 − β )λ 2 = 0 ,
(12.3) λ 2 ≥ 0 ,
(13.1)

~
∂Λ 2
= β −β ≥ 0,
∂λ3
~

(13.2) ( β − β )λ3 = 0 ,
(13.3) λ3 ≥ 0 .
~

It is necessary first to evaluate (11.1) where β = β . With respect to the two multipliers,
(12.2) requires that λ 2 = 0 , which satisfies (12.3). With respect to (13.1), it is zero when
~

β = β . This means that λ3 ≥ 0 . In (11.2), since β is positive, (
the multiplier is greater than or equal to zero,

∂π D
+ λ3 ) = 0 . Since
∂β

∂π D
≤ 0 . Looking at (11.1), all terms are
∂β

positive, which violates the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, meaning that π D increases as β
increases.
Next, evaluate

~
∂Λ 2
at some β < β < 1 . First of all, with respect to the constraint
∂β

and multipliers, β is positive, but does not equal one. Referring to (12.2), (1 − β ) > 0 ,
meaning that for (12.2) to hold, λ 2 must equal zero, which in turn satisfies (12.3).
Considering the third Lagrangian multiplier, since a level of ownership concerning
~

~

managerial control is greater than β , ( β − β ) > 0 . As a result, λ3 must equal zero in
order for (13.2) to hold true, meaning that (13.3) is satisfied. Therefore in evaluating
(11.1), the multipliers drop out of the expression. This means that
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∂π D
= 0 with respect
∂β

to (11.2). Again, this violates the Kuhn-Tucker condition, since (11.1) is known to be
positive.
Lastly, (11.1) should be evaluated where β = 1 , in other words, where the
domestic firm has acquired total ownership of the foreign firm. First of all, with respect
to the constraints and the multipliers, (12.1) will be zero whenever β equals one.
Looking at (12.2), since (12.1) equals zero, λ 2 ≥ 0 , satisfying (12.3). Additionally,
~

~

(13.1) will be (1 − β ) > 0 . This implies that (β − β ) > 0 , which means that with respect
to (13.2), λ3 must equal zero. This in turn satisfies (13.3), which states that λ3 must be
greater than or equal to zero. This now allows us to simplify the expression in (11.1).
Accordingly:
(14)

∂Λ 2
2
= − p * ' ( X * ) x * y * − p' ( X ) xy − p * ' ( X * ) y * − p ' ( X ) y 2 − λ 2 = 0 .
∂β

Notice that (14) holds with equality, since the value of β is positive and assumed to be
one here, which is the maximum value that parameter can take. Referring back to (11.2),
since λ3 = 0 and λ 2 ≥ 0 , (11.2) is reduced to (
present analysis, (11.2) becomes (
means that

∂π D
− λ 2 ) β = 0 . Since β = 1 in the
∂β

∂π D
− λ 2 ) = 0 . For (11.2) to hold when λ 2 ≥ 0 , this
∂β

∂π D
≥ 0 . Therefore, domestic profit is positively related with ownership
∂β

∂π D
> 0 at
when β equals one. Again, this violates the Kuhn-Tucker conditions. Since
∂β
~

levels of β greater than or equal to β in the managerial control setting, π D is upwardsloping to β = 1 when the multiplier is positive. This implies that π D is monotonically
~

increasing in β whenever β ≤ β ≤ 1 . Refer back to Figure 4.1 to see the remainder of
the diagram concerning managerial control.
Optimal asset ownership will be where the profit function is at its highest point, in
other words, at a point of global maximum. Since
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∂π D
≤ 0 when β = 0 , it is highly
∂β

unlikely that the global maximum is where β = 0 . Global maximums are rarely located
on a vertical intercept where the curve extending from that intercept is downward
sloping. Additionally, looking at

∂Λ 1
∂Λ 2
and
, it appears that the latter point
∂β | β =0
∂β | β =1

will be higher. In other words, profit is higher when β = 1 as opposed to when β = 0 .
Thus, there is a boundary solution. When β = 1 , this is a situation of a multiplant
monopoly on behalf of the domestic firm. When β = 0 , this is a symmetric duopoly.
Monopoly profits will be higher than duopoly profits. Thus economic theory dictates that
the profit point corresponding with β = 1 will be higher than the point corresponding
with β = 0 . Note the plotted points in Figure 4.1.
Concluding this section with the first summary proposition:
Proposition 4.1: The optimal level of ownership in the Brander-Krugman reciprocal
dumping model is a level in which the acquiring firm has total and absolute ownership
(and hence managerial control) of its foreign competitor.
4.3. Antitrust Considerations:
It is really of no surprise that the optimal level of ownership for a firm to acquire
is such that will give that firm a monopoly position. Therefore we must ask ourselves,
why do firms sometimes “settle” for a level of ownership which yields only a noncontrolling interest? In the United States, horizontal integration, as was detailed in this
essay and in a preceding chapter, is not without strict oversight and regulation from the
Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice.
Horizontal acquisitions which inhibit competition are deemed “illegal per se,” which is to
say that they are against the law because of their very nature. In a simple model such as
this presented here, any government with antitrust legislation would likely not allow a
firm in the United States to merge with a firm in another country. The results seen were
restrictions of output that would lead to higher prices in the United States. These higher
prices would harm consumers, while at the same time yielding monopoly profits to
producers. In this case, the government would most definitely intervene to prevent the
merger from ever taking place. Given antitrust concerns then, governments would not
allow monopolies to form. With this in mind, β cannot equal one.
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Alternatively, some foreign nations may wish to remain highly nationalized,
although they still try and attract international investment. The People’s Republic of
China is such a nation, despite its “open door” policy. Potential investors must be met
with government approval. In certain sectors such as advertising, transportation,
brokerage, and publishing, foreign investment is highly restricted, no matter how much
potential investment is desired. China deems certain industries as “strategic,” and
protection of national interests outweighs potential benefits from inflows of foreign
investment.12
Not only are there governmental concerns about international investment into
China, there are also concerns expressed by U.S. firms. In a survey reported by the web
site China Today, the major challenges Americans face in doing business in China is redtape and bureaucracy (see Table 4.1).13
Table 4.1
Challenges to Americans Regarding Business in China
Permission to enter market

38%

Bankruptcy

42%

Transparency

43%

Human Resources

56%

Red-tape and bureaucracy

67%

With this in mind, the model above is reconstructed, and renamed the “China
model.” In the China model, allow there to be a maximum level of ownership allowed by
the government. Denote this level of ownership as β A , which is the maximum allowable
ownership of Chinese firms by a foreign nation, such as the United States (one could also
deem this level of ownership as “antitrust” in the United States, hence the “A”). In the
China model, allow the maximum allowable ownership to be below that level of β in

12

Jon Eichelberger and Annabel Allen, “A Legal Perspective: The Impact of WTO on Foreign Investment
in China’s Internet/E-Commerce Sector,” 13 July 2001, <http://www.perkinscoie.com/resource/intldocs/
wtoimpact.htm>, Perkins Coie LLP, (16 March 2002).
13
White Paper of 2000 issued by China American Merchants Association, “The Major Challenges
Americans are Facing in Doing Business in China,” <http://www.chinatoday.com/inv/a.htm>, (16 March
2002).
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~

which managerial control is assumed, β . The spectrum of ownership now looks like the
following illustration:
•−−−−−| −−−| −−−−−•
~

βA

0

β

1

.

The Lagrangian is now also different with respect to the constraint in the KuhnTucker maximization problem. Looking at the problem from strictly a non-controlling
interest point of view, the Lagrangian is now expressed as:
(15)

{β } Max π D subject to 0 ≤ β ≤ β A .

Optimization problem (15) concerns a non-controlling interest and maximum allowable
ownership. It is necessary to diagram the profit function over this allowable region of
ownership to illustrate that level which the domestic firm would purchase. In other
words, the level of ownership that provides the highest level of profit for the domestic
firm, keeping in mind that forming a monopoly is no longer an option.
Defining (15) in more specific terms:
(16)

Λ 3 = π D + λ4 ( β A − β ) .

The first-order necessary conditions are essentially the same as group (7) above:

(17.1)

∂Λ 3
∂y
∂y *
(1 − β )( p ( X ) − c) −
(1 − β )( p * ( X * ) − c) + y * ( p * ( X * ) − c)
=−
∂β
∂β
∂β
∂y *
∂y
) − λ 4 ≤ 0,
+ y ( p( X ) − c − t ) + t (
−β
∂β
∂β
(17.2) (

∂π D
− λ4 )β = 0 ,
∂β

(17.3) β ≥ 0 ,
(18.1)

∂Λ 3
= β A − β ≥ 0,
∂λ 4

(18.2) ( β A − β )λ 4 = 0 ,
(18.3) λ 4 ≥ 0 .
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As before, first evaluate the problem at β = 0 . With zero level of ownership,
( β A − β ) > 0 , meaning that λ 4 must equal zero for (18.2) to hold, which satisfies (18.3).
Referring to (17.2),

∂π D
must then be less than or equal to zero.
∂β

Evaluating (17.1) where the level of ownership is 0 < β < β A , (18.1) will be
positive, meaning that with respect to (18.2), λ 4 must equal zero, which satisfies (18.3).
With this, (17.2) can now be solved. With a positive level of β (yet unequal to β A ),
∂π D
= λ4 = 0 .
∂β
Lastly, evaluate the problem at the level of maximum allowable ownership,
β = β A . Again, the positive β means that (18.1) is solved with an equality. With this,
∂π D
λ 4 ≥ 0 according to (18.2). Since β > 0 , (
− λ 4 ) must equal zero in (17.2). Since
∂β
λ4 ≥ 0 ,

∂π D
must be greater than or equal to zero, implying that domestic profit
∂β

increases in β (with a positive multiplier) at the maximum level of ownership allowed
by China, β A .
What is needed now is to compare the two points, β = 0 and β = β A . These are
the only two points of interest since π D declines from a zero level of ownership and may
be positively sloped at β A . However, it is not known from the above whether the profit
point associated with β = 0 is below or above the profit point associated with β = β A .
In order to better analyze this, the model must be modified somewhat.
Specifically, we will add another constraint to the model already presented.
Impose a constraint such that any investment by the domestic firm must be a level in
which the profit from that investment ( βπ F ) is greater than or equal to the lost profit
from reducing output in favor of the acquisition (π O ) (recall the non-controlling interest
argument). This will cause π D to be greater than or equal to zero, and investment by the
domestic firm will be profitable.
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The problem is now:
{β } Max π D subject to 0 ≤ β ≤ β A and subject to βπ F ≥ π O (π D ≥ 0) .
Formulating the new Lagrangian:
Λ 4 = π O + βπ F + λ5 ( β A − β ) + λ 6 ( βπ F − π O ) .
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are:
(19.1)

∂Λ 4 ∂π O
∂π F
∂π O
=
+π F + β
− λ 5 + λ 6π F − λ 6
≤ 0,
∂β
∂β
∂β
∂β

(19.2) (

∂π O
∂π F
∂π O
+π F + β
− λ 5 + λ 6π F − λ 6
)β = 0 ,
∂β
∂β
∂β
(19.3) β ≥ 0 ,
(20.1)

∂Λ 4
= β A − β ≥ 0,
∂λ5

(20.2) ( β A − β )λ5 = 0 ,
(20.3) λ5 ≥ 0 ,
(21.1)

∂Λ 4
= βπ F − π O ≥ 0 ,
∂λ 6

(21.2) ( βπ F − π O )λ 6 = 0 ,
(21.3) λ 6 ≥ 0 .
It is necessary to evaluate these conditions just as before. Starting first with β = 0 , and
looking at the first multiplier, if there is zero ownership, (20.1) is positive. This means
that for (20.2) to hold, λ5 must equal zero. With respect to the second multiplier, if
β = 0 , then (21.1) reduces to − π O , which is negative, violating the second constraint.
Quite obviously with the constraint of ownership yielding nonnegative total domestic
profit, β cannot be zero. Therefore, β > 0 , and (19.1) is solved with an equality.
The constraint of ownership yielding nonnegative total domestic profit is not an
unfeasible one. Recall that the domestic firm is reducing its total output in order to
augment the profits of its investment into the foreign firm (which is increasing its total
output). Total domestic profit will fall with an incremental level of ownership, but total
domestic profit will eventually increase due to the increased profitability of the foreign
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firm as ownership increases. This higher foreign profit will eventually outweigh the lost
domestic profit from reduced domestic production. The second constraint is imposed to
simply narrow the choice of β . In other words, to ignore those levels of ownership that
are not profitable for the domestic firm.
Evaluating this maximization problem where 0 < β < β A , it is seen that (20.1) is
greater than zero, meaning that λ5 must equal zero. With respect to (21.1), a positive
level of β helps to satisfy this constraint by the precondition described above, in regard
to only profitable levels of ownership. This will require that λ 6 = 0 for (21.2) to hold.
∂Λ 4 ∂π O
∂π F
F
This means that (19.1) simplifies to
=
+π + β
. Additionally, since
∂β
∂β
∂β
β > 0 , this expression must equal zero for (19.2) to be satisfied.
Lastly, evaluate this problem when β = β A , the maximum level of allowable
ownership in the China model. In this case, (20.1) equals zero, meaning that λ5 ≥ 0 .
(21.1) is again positive with the precondition of profitability, meaning that λ 6 = 0 for
(21.2) to hold. With these results, (19.1) simplifies to

∂Λ 4 ∂π O
∂π F
=
+π F + β
− λ5 .
∂β
∂β
∂β

A positive level of β again means that this expression must hold with equality for (19.2)
to be satisfied (the complementary slackness condition).
Notice that the two expressions for

∂Λ 4
differ by the multiplier − λ5 , and this
∂β

multiplier is greater than or equal to zero. If the multiplier equals zero, then β < β A . If
the multiplier is positive, then β = β A . Since the optimal level of ownership is when
∂π O
∂π F
F
β > 0 , (19.1) holds with equality, and hence
+π + β
= λ5 . The left hand
∂β
∂β
side is simply

∂π D
, and is positive if λ5 is positive. Therefore, when β = β A , λ5 ≥ 0
∂β

meaning that

∂π D
≥ 0 . Thus at the maximum allowable ownership of the foreign firm,
∂β

the domestic profit function may be upward-sloping, meaning that domestic profit could
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be positively-correlated with ownership. At all levels of ownership below this point β A
then, the profit function lies below this point. This leads us to conclude that the domestic
firm will acquire ownership in the foreign firm up to the maximum level, β A .
It may surprise the reader that a global maximum is found where the profit
function is increasing. But recall this is a boundary solution. A global maximum of a
function is not found when a function is upward sloping and there is no constraint other
than non-negativity. In this problem, there is an additional constraint. Recall
0 ≤ β ≤ β A . Above, 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 was imposed. In both cases, a boundary solution was
obtained, with the domestic firm purchasing the maximum possible amount of ownership
in the foreign firm.
What if there are no antitrust considerations in the foreign (or domestic) nation?
Why might a level of non-controlling ownership be obtained versus the level that yields a
multiplant monopoly? The two nations in the modified version of the Brander-Krugman
reciprocal dumping model are trading partners. What if the foreign nation were to
become protectionist when the domestic firm obtains a certain level of ownership?
Suppose that in the model above, some level of ownership is obtained by the domestic
firm that is above the level of managerial control. Recall that with a controlling interest,
the domestic firm increases its exports to the foreign nation while at the same time
directing the foreign firm to reduce its total output. If the foreign government fears
further invasion of its market by the domestic firm, it may levy heavy tariffs on domestic
exports. Ceteris paribus, this adversely affects domestic profit. Similar intuition holds if
the protectionism stems from a certain level of non-controlling interest being acquired.
Tariffs imposed on domestic exports will lower π O (as will the increased level of
ownership). In other words, these conclusions can be reached in an endogenous
protection setting as well.
Presenting the next proposition:
Proposition 4.2: In an antitrust or nationalist setting where managerial control or
monopolies are not allowed, the optimal level of ownership is that in which the domestic
firm obtains as much of the foreign firm as allowed by the foreign government.
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4.4. Welfare:
In analyzing welfare, Brander-Krugman welfare functions are used to illustrate
changes in both domestic and foreign welfare with changes in asset ownership. Allowing
W D to denote domestic country welfare, and W F to denote welfare of the foreign nation,
present the functions as:
W D = u ( X ) − cx − cx * − tx * + βπ F ,

(22)
(23)

W F = u * ( X * ) − cy * − cy − ty .

Given that the optimal merger is one in which the acquiring firm has absolute and total
ownership, it is necessary to differentiate (22) and (23) with this setting in mind.
Differentiating these two expressions with respect to β reveals:
∂W D
∂X
∂x ∂x *
∂π F
= p( X )
−c
−
(c + t ) + π F + β
,
∂β
∂β
∂β ∂β
∂β

(24)

(25)

∂W F
∂X *
∂y * ∂y
= p* ( X * )
−c
−
(c + t ) .
∂β
∂β
∂β ∂β

Let us analyze (25) first. Assume that u ( X ) and u * ( X * ) are quasi-linear utility
functions for the home country and the foreign country, respectively. Keeping in mind
that the derivatives of these functions with respect to output will simply yield the output
price, the first expressions of the right-hand sides of (24) and (25) are negative. Since
∂y
∂y *
and
are both negative in the controlling interest situation, the last two
∂β
∂β
expressions on the right are both positive. Thus, foreign welfare likely falls as the
domestic firm acquires total ownership in the foreign firm. The intuition for this result,
although ambiguous, is as follows. Recall that the foreign firm is decreasing its output
and hence its profit in response to the higher total domestic output. The foreign firm
decreases its share in both the domestic and the foreign markets. Additionally, since

∂X
∂β

∂X *
and
are both negative, price will increase in both markets with this output
∂β
restriction. This price increase adversely affects consumers. Consumer utility falls with
higher output prices.
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With respect to (24), the result is ambiguous, but appears to most likely be
negative. Only the fourth term on the right-hand side is positive, while the remaining
terms are negative. Again, there is a negative effect on welfare from the higher output
prices in the domestic market, which harms consumers. The domestic firm’s total profit
has been optimized in the majority ownership situation. If the positive welfare effects
from the domestic firm’s activities are outweighed by the negative effects of higher
prices on domestic consumers, then total welfare in the home nation will decrease with
respect to increased and absolute foreign asset ownership. Welfare in the domestic
country likely falls upon the attainment of managerial control by the domestic firm due to
the world economy moving from a duopoly to a multiplant monopoly. This high
monopoly distortion (restricted output and higher prices) leads to welfare reduction in the
domestic country.
Summarizing these findings into the next proposition:
Proposition 4.3: As ownership of the foreign firm increases in a managerial control
setting, the welfare of both the foreign and domestic country most likely falls. This is
due to the monopoly distortion caused by the movement of the domestic firm to a world
multiplant monopoly.
Before leaving this section and concluding, revisit the welfare functions above
with respect to the antitrust considerations. Some rather odd and difficult to explain
conclusions were found. With respect to domestic welfare changes in (24), the only
negative term is the first one, with the remaining four terms being positive. Thus
domestic welfare likely increases with an increase in ownership, given that the ownership
is a non-controlling interest. Prices are increasing, which harms consumers. However,
the domestic firm is selling less in both markets. But at the same time, the domestic firm
is receiving profit from its share of foreign activities.
The change in foreign welfare with a change in ownership in the China model is
very difficult to explain. In (25), all terms will be negative, meaning that as the domestic
firm increases its ownership in the foreign firm up to the maximum allowable level,
foreign welfare unambiguously declines. Higher prices of output harm consumers once
again, hence consumer utility falls. However, the foreign firm is selling more in both
markets, facing less competition from the domestic firm.
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4.5. Conclusion:
Horizontal integration, or mergers and acquisitions to use the business vernacular,
have been widespread in the mid- to late-1990s. There is no evidence that this trend will
subside in the near future. It has been shown that in an international duopoly framework,
an acquiring firm should invest wholly into a competitor if those two firms are essentially
identical.
In the third chapter of this dissertation, it was shown that in a Brander-Krugman
world duopoly with an exogenous ownership variable, called β , horizontal acquisition
may or may not be profitable. Given this problem, it was necessary to endogenize the
ownership variable, which was done in this essay. Specifically, a one-shot two-stage
game where two firms compete Cournot was assumed. In the first stage, the domestic
firm chooses its optimal level of ownership of the foreign firm, and then competes
Cournot with that firm in the second stage. Using backward induction, it was shown that
the Cournot-Nash equilibrium that would result is one in which the domestic firm
acquires managerial control and total ownership of the foreign firm ( β = 1) . This level
of ownership yields the highest total domestic profit. This result was illustrated in Figure
4.1. In the new equilibrium, the domestic firm increases its output in both markets,
despite the presence of transportation costs. The foreign firm meanwhile decreases its
total output, selling less in both markets.
In some cases, total ownership of the foreign firm may not be allowed. This
possibility was discussed above. Total ownership of a competitor may not be allowed
due to antitrust considerations. Alternatively, there may be a level of ownership in which
attainment yields high (perhaps even prohibitive) protectionist pressures. As a result, the
firm itself decides against absolute ownership. In either scenario, the domestic firm
should acquire as much of its competitor as allowed. This is more profitable for the
domestic firm than zero ownership.
With respect to national welfare, the results are not as clear. Foreign welfare
likely falls with increased foreign investment by the domestic firm. National welfare
changes from the standpoint of the domestic nation are somewhat less ambiguous. There
is no clear end result, although it appears that domestic welfare falls with increased
foreign asset acquisition by the domestic firm.
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CHAPTER FIVE
VERTICAL INTEGRATION
5.1. Introduction:
This chapter views vertical integration from the standpoint of protection and
foreign direct investment. It is concluded that market foreclosure in a three downstream,
two upstream world will occur upon vertical integration by one of the downstream firms.
Furthermore the integrated firm’s dominant strategy will be to supply the input to
competitors on the open market and assume the role of input price leader, which assists in
leading the remaining downstream firms to consider countering with integration of their
own. At input prices above the marginal cost of input production, counterintegration will
not occur, and firms will proceed toward a collusive profit equilibrium. Specifically, a
foreign firm will engage in protection-building trade, then vertically integrate with a
supplier of key input to cause all firms to move toward a collusive equilibrium.
There are several reasons that international trade may occur between two nations.
Climate, resource availability, and of course comparative advantage can each be a
motive.14 This essay considers the profit-maximizing anticompetitive strategy of a
vertically integrated firm when one nation has the world market cornered with respect to
resource availability. This chapter looks at a situation in which the contested market has
a downstream firm, and two lone existing upstream firms. Additionally, two more
countries are assumed, each housing a downstream firm that is competing with the firm
in the contested market. This essay will illustrate two situations that may arise when a
foreign downstream firm vertically integrates with an upstream firm in the domestic
market. Price leadership is nothing new in oligopolistic models. However, price
leadership tends to be written about in the context of final output, or downstream
products. While approaching leadership from an upstream standpoint is not necessarily
unique, it is not common in the literature in this situation of leadership after integration.
The act of the vertically integrated firm operating with residual demand ultimately leads
to higher input prices and restricted output than before integration. However, the newly

14

Paul Krugman and Maurice Obstfeld, International Economics: Theory and Policy 5th ed., (Addison
Wesley Longman, 2000), 4,5.
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integrated firm may very well decide to supply the input to competitors, but not
necessarily obtain the inputs it receives at the marginal cost of input production.
Strategic vertical integration where there are no close substitutes to the input to
production is very likely to increase input prices and lead to foreclosure. Two examples
provided by the Federal Trade Commission are Time Warner with Turner Broadcasting
and PacifiCorp and The Energy Group. The first deals with programming for distribution
on cable television. Time Warner also has a stake in cable systems. To protect
consumers from being adversely affected in either market, the FTC issued a consent
order, prohibiting Time Warner from discriminating in either segment of the market,
programming or cable systems. The second example deals with electric power.
PacifiCorp is an electricity generating company in the western United States. This
company wanted to purchase coal mines, which were significant inputs to production for
electricity generating competitors.15 This is the typical anticompetitive behavior that is
investigated by the FTC with respect to vertical mergers.
The second alternative comes from the standpoint of the remaining unintegrated
upstream supplier. It will be seen that this firm is the one that has a plethora of viable
alternatives to consider. First of all if it decides to follow, this firm can basically act as a
perfectly competitive firm, selling all it wants at the previously determined integrated
input price. Conversely, this firm could attempt to integrate with one of the two
remaining downstream firms. Lastly, if the integrated firm decides not to supply the
input to competitors, then the unintegrated upstream firm can assume a monopoly
position in the input market.
Game theory and integration have become widely researched avenues of
international trade literature. Several papers have been devoted to identifying the effects
of vertical mergers, and the impact they have on competition. Specifically, core papers in
the field of vertical integration include Ordover, Saloner, and Salop (1990), where they
present an equilibrium model of vertical integration, including rival behavior and
counterstrategies, in which they find that vertical foreclosure can indeed emerge in
equilibrium in a downstream and upstream duopoly framework. To the point, vertical
15

Robert Pitofsky, “Statement of the Federal Trade Commission: Mergers and Corporate Consolidation in
the New Economy,” presented before the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate, 16 June
1998, <http://www.ftc.gov/os/1998/9806/merger98.tes.htm>, (16 March 2002).
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integration is a motive in achieving foreclosure of downstream firms from a source of key
input supply, but only because an integrated firm obtains inputs at marginal cost.
With respect to situations in which both the upstream and downstream stages are
oligopolistic and vertically integrated and unintegrated producers coexist, Salinger (1988)
finds that a vertical merger may not necessarily lead to market foreclosure of
unintegrated downstream firms. In his model, a vertical merger will lower the number of
suppliers of the intermediate good, hence driving the intermediate good’s price upward.
However, the integrated firm produces more of the downstream product than the
previously unintegrated downstream firm. The increase in final output causes the
residual demand curve that the other remaining unintegrated downstream firms face to
shift back, as well as the downstream firms’ derived demand for the intermediate
upstream good. With the assumption of linear demand curves, this causes a reduction in
the price of the upstream good. If the effect on the derived demand curve outweighs the
result of fewer suppliers in the upstream market, the intermediate good’s price will fall.
Thus when no foreclosure takes place, Salinger finds that a vertical merger
unambiguously causes the price of the downstream good to fall.
Take note that other core works in vertical integration and anticompetitive
behavior have been pursued in Salop and Scheffman (1983) and Hart and Tirole (1990).
Other notable works in vertical integration include Riordan (1998), Lin (1988), and
Spencer and Jones (1991). In fact, Spencer and Jones pursue vertical relationships with
respect to international trading partners, and the optimal policy that may result.
Hamilton and Mqasqas (1997) devote attention to some flaws of previous work.
Specifically, the aforementioned notion that vertically integrated firms always obtain the
input at the marginal cost of input production. They find this assumption restrictive, and
note that strategic internal transfer pricing may occur. This means that the manufacturing
and retailing division are not necessarily combined. The two divisions are in fact related
through integration, but internal transfer pricing helps to ensure that the upstream firm
will relinquish control to the downstream firm. If an upstream firm knows up front that it
will only receive an input price equal to the marginal cost of production, the downstream
firm would have to provide a rather large lump sum payment to gain control of the
upstream firm. In other words, the upstream firm may not have much incentive to give
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up control. However, if the downstream firm increases the input price the upstream
supplier would receive, this would benefit the upstream firm, making it more likely that it
would relinquish control. This type of behavior is assumed in the model presented here,
in that this appears to be a more realistic method of buying out an upstream supplier.
This work goes beyond this normative analysis however. It will be shown below that
when the downstream firm integrates and supplies the input to its competitors, the input
price most definitely rises, without some explicit or implied promise to the upstream
firm.
What is interesting in this chapter is that this problem is approached from the
standpoint of strategic internal transfer pricing, much like Hamilton and Mqasqas. Not
only will the input price for competitors increase, but also the integrated firm cannot
obtain the input at marginal cost, which differs from Ordover, Saloner, and Salop’s (OSS)
previous work. Hence the integrated firm essentially pursues a policy that on the surface
harms the downstream division.
Regarding trade, Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1976) were among the first to consider
endogenous protection. Specifically, if an exporting nation realizes that its export
volume may influence the likelihood of protection, then it should perhaps decide on an
optimal trade policy. Standard endogenous protection theory suggests that increased
export levels from a foreign country may lead to a higher probability of increased
protection being levied against that country. Issues that emerged from this theory were
foreign direct investment (FDI) and tariff-jumping. Bhagwati (1987) and Bhagwati et al.
(1992) discuss quid pro quo FDI as a country’s attempt to reduce the likelihood of
protection being imposed, and hence prevent quantitative import restrictions.
On the other hand, tariff-induced FDI is when an import restriction such as a tariff
or quota is exogenously given, and tariff-jumping investment occurs. This type of FDI is
when a foreign country invests in the newly protected country and hence establishes a
presence in that country, despite the already levied protection. Quid pro quo FDI coupled
with a lower level of exports to a market lowers the probability of tariffs, yet allows the
investing country to obtain a presence in the export market through its investment.
Bhagwati (1987) further discusses FDI with respect to the ways in which it is perceived.
He notes that FDI is used by lobbies on behalf of the exporting country in that it saves
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jobs in the importing nation, while imports could possibly destroy jobs in that country.
Bhagwati further states that unions are more and more considering FDI by a foreign
exporter as a favorable alternative over protectionism.
Protection likely stems from lobbying by certain sectors in that country.
Grossman and Helpman (1994) develop a model to capture this type of behavior.
Specifically, they hypothesize that politicians set out to maximize their own welfare
function, which comprises contributions collected by special interest groups lobbying for
protection and the welfare of voters. These contributions of course are designed to
influence policy. Grossman and Helpman (1996) further extend Bhagwati’s work of quid
pro quo foreign investment, and combine it with their earlier research on political welfare
functions. They discuss the possibility of foreign investment and the opening of branch
plants in a domestic nation by a multinational firm. They conclude that protection is a
response by the incumbent government of the domestic nation, given campaign
contributions by the firms located in that country.
With respect to empirical work in this field, Blonigen and Feenstra (1997)
empirically pursue the hypotheses set forth concerning quid pro quo foreign direct
investment. Using data on Japanese manufacturing FDI into the United States, they find
support of the hypothesis that higher protectionist threats do indeed yield increased FDI.
Furthermore, they find evidence that non-acquisition FDI (greenfield, or construction of a
new plant) from Japan successfully defused protectionist threats, per quid pro quo theory.
Lastly, Blonigen and Ohno (1998) pursue FDI and endogenous protection in an
oligopolistic setting, and how this may result in a phenomenon they call protectionbuilding trade. In this instance, with two foreign countries competing for the home
market, one foreign firm actually increases exports to the home country in order to
increase protection and hence have barriers levied on itself and its foreign rival in the
future. The firm that purposely increases exports to the domestic nation is not harmed
however, given that it opens a plant in the domestic market. This is not too dissimilar
from work previously done by Anderson (1992) in which a firm, when faced with a
positive probability of a voluntary export restraint (VER) being levied, strategically
exports more to that market in an attempt to receive a greater share of the export licenses
to capture rents that accompany VERs.
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In the Blonigen-Ohno paper, their model of endogenous protection and FDI
allows for three equilibria. The first possible equilibrium is the usual endogenous
protection result. If faced with increased protectionist threats, all firms lower their
exports to the home country. The second solution is the tariff-jumping result, in which
both firms would locate to the home country in response to a protectionist threat. This
allows both firms to avoid the tariff, choosing to produce locally over exporting.
Producing locally would have a lower marginal cost. The third and final solution is the
most interesting protection-building trade equilibrium, which is somewhat concerned
with the firms’ relative costs of FDI. Specifically, a firm engages in FDI only if the cost
of doing so is less than the difference in profit from exporting with the tariff and
producing locally (hence avoiding the tariff).
It is this last equilibrium solution that is of importance. In this chapter, it is
assumed that a downstream firm vertically integrates with an upstream supplier. Before
that integration, the downstream firm engages in protection-building trade behavior,
increasing its exports to the nation in which the upstream suppliers are located. Upon
incurring the tariffs from this nation, the downstream firm tariff jumps by merging with
one of the two upstream suppliers. Notice the distinction between this essay and the
Blonigen-Ohno work. First of all, this chapter is using FDI in the form of vertical
integration. The Blonigen-Ohno paper can be thought of as a horizontal integration work
if and only if the FDI is the act of buying out a plant in the target nation. If the FDI
comes in the form of greenfield investment, which is the opening of a new plant in
another nation, then this is not integration of any form. The act of buying out an existing
firm may not come at a fixed cost. A firm’s share price will be positively correlated with
the increased purchasing of shares of ownership to acquire control. This presumably
cannot be assumed away as a fixed cost for the most part. Regardless, the FDI comes at a
different stage of the production process with respect to their work and this dissertation.
This chapter approaches the protection-building trade (PBT) result from the
standpoint of tariff-jumping vertically, and not horizontally. The PBT outcome is a
precondition to the model. When a nation imposes tariffs on imports from abroad,
domestic production tends to increase with the increase in price that accompanies a tariff.
The PBT behavior in the Blonigen-Ohno work allowed the tariff-jumping firm to gain a
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cost advantage over its rival. The firm’s cost advantage would presumably lead to higher
profits. What is interesting in this work is that the PBT behavior, coupled with input
price leadership, allows all downstream firms to move toward a collusive equilibrium in
the face of higher input prices. This occurs in the absence of even tacit collusion on
behalf of the downstream firms.
Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, it is interesting to note how U.S.
antitrust policy relates to firm ownership. Historically, U.S. antitrust policy focuses
much more on horizontal restraints than on vertical restraints to competition. When firms
obtain more than three-fourths of a market, then the government will likely not permit a
horizontal merger (deemed illegal per se). However, vertical restraints are subject to a
rule of reason test. Notice that this is a more subjective type of analysis with respect to
the impact on competition. Therefore, this vertical integration problem would likely be
more acceptable from a practical point of view than a horizontal situation, as may occur
under Blonigen and Ohno.
The model concerns price leadership in the input market. Again, this is not an
obvious impediment to competition. Tacit behavior such as price leadership is difficult to
prove, given that firms can change prices for a number of reasons, such as “changing
economic conditions.” It stands to reason that if one firm changes the price of its output,
then a firm in a related industry may change the price of its output for the same reason,
hence following suit. This work on vertical integration and tacit behavior is much more
subtle and prone to more extensive government analysis than possible outright rejection.
Where much foreign direct investment theory is concerned with downstream firm
construction or ownership, this chapter views this issue with respect to upstream firm
ownership. In Section 5.2, the theoretical framework is formally presented. In Section
5.3, the model is solved through backward-induction to find any subgame-perfect
equilibrium that results, while in Section 5.4 we seek robustness of the results by altering
the model. Concluding remarks are provided in Section 5.5.
5.2. Basic Model Setup:
Suppose there is the following world: there exist three countries, which are
labeled H (for the home country), F A (for foreign country A), and F B (for foreign
country B). Assume a foreign duopoly, in which one firm, labeled DFA (Firm A), is the
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downstream firm located in F A , and the other firm is DFB (Firm B), the downstream
firm located in F B . Firm A exports x A , while Firm B exports x B to the home country.
In the domestic country, there is a single domestic seller, DH (Firm H), which produces
downstream good x H for the home market. All three downstream firms produce the
homogeneous product using the same key input, which they obtain from the upstream
firms, U1 and U2, both located in the home market. The key input produced by U1 and
U2 is homogeneous, and one unit of input produces one unit of the output, which is
standard for all downstream firms. The foreign downstream firms then are dependent on
the home market for the key input. They use this input in production of the downstream
product, then sell these products back to the contested home market. The downstream
firms all compete in Cournot, quantity-setting fashion; in other words, a case of strategic
substitutes in the downstream product.
Assume prior to the game that Firm A, the downstream firm in F A , has increased
its exports to the home market to encourage protectionist pressures in that market.
According to Cournot competition and endogenous protection, Firm B at this same time
cuts its exports to the home country. The increased presence by Firm A in the output
market in the home nation leads to protectionist lobbying by the downstream
representatives in the home country, and hence tariffs to be levied to both foreign
countries. This behavior is somewhat analogous to the aforementioned protectionbuilding trade. Note that this assumption is not necessarily required for these results to
hold. This is assumed at the outset of the game in that policy implications will be
discussed later.
Given the levied tariff, Firm A then engages in anticipatory tariff-jumping, or
foreign direct investment. Suppose however given the makeup of this world, Firm A
chooses not to open a downstream plant in the home market, but to undergo backward
vertical integration, merging with one of the upstream firms. One question is why would
Firm A want to vertically-integrate, and not simply construct a downstream plant in the
home country in order to avoid the tariff? Krugman and Obstfeld specify reasons such as
supply disruption and conflicting profit maximizing goals of upstream and downstream
firms. However, if the investing firm vertically-integrates, then it takes a chance in
significantly affecting the profit of other firms through its manipulation of input supply.
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Thus by vertically-integrating, it can vigorously compete by not directly adjusting the
quantities available in the home market produced by Firm H and Firm B, but indirectly
by either choosing or not to sell the input to these two downstream rivals. If the
integrated Firm A chooses not to supply the input to its rivals, this would leave the two
remaining downstream parties at the monopoly mercy of U2, raising their costs of
production. Recall, the home downstream firm would wish to increase its production
with the increased protection that it lobbied from the home government. But its desire to
increase production will then be limited by facing a higher input cost.
The remaining questions are these which were first posed in the introduction: is
the input price going to be higher after the integrated firm is formed, if that firm decides
to supply the input? Would the integrated firm grant monopoly input-pricing power to
the remaining supplier? Given that Firm A and U1 have integrated, will Firm H or Firm
B attempt to vertically-integrate with the remaining upstream firm in the home market,
and if so, who will succeed and who will be foreclosed from that market? What about an
issue of input price leadership if the integrated firm supplies the input to competitors?
For the notation used here, Firm A will buy out and take over U1, and this merged
firm is called M1. The two foreign firms are essentially identical at the outset: each one
produces a homogeneous downstream product, with each firm incurring a tariff for
exporting that product to the home market. Of course, any initial symmetry is lost with
DFA’s integration.
Stage 1: Firm A tariff-jumps by vertically integrating with U1. At this stage,
the tariffs have already been levied. This stage specifically entails the vertical merger of
Firm A with U1 to form M1. This investment on behalf of Firm A is called foreign direct
investment (FDI), given the International Monetary Fund definition of FDI as “any
ownership or interest by a resident from one country higher than 10% of the controlling
shares in a company which is located in another country will be regarded as FDI, and it
gives the rise to a MNE <multinational enterprise> (Tang, 1997).” The downstream firm
in F A has taken control of the upstream firm in the home market by owning a controlling
interest, and has managerial decision-making ability of that firm. The vertically
integrated firm is thus still exporting. It should be mentioned that no increase in

96

efficiency is assumed from vertical integration. In other words, Firm A does not enjoy
any economies of scale from its behavior.
Stage 2: M1 makes its input availability decision to its rivals. For simplicity,
M1 can do one of two things:
i) M1 decides to supply the input along with U2, or
ii) M1 does not supply Firm H or Firm B at all.
Stage 3: Firm B and Firm H may bid for the remaining supplier U2. It is
possible that one of the other downstream firms could merge with U2 in response to the
action that M1 takes in Stage 2.
Stage 4: Downstream firms play Cournot. According to OSS, the remaining
unintegrated upstream and downstream firms will always counter a vertical merger with a
merger of their own when the downstream firms compete in Cournot fashion. This is the
stage where foreclosure from the home market will be analyzed.
5.3. Solving the Model:
In order to find the subgame-perfect equilibrium, it is necessary to solve this
model using backward induction.
5.3.A. Stage 4:
Allow τ to be the per unit tariff imposed at the beginning of the game. The
foreign downstream firms maximize profits, formally expressed for M1, as:
(1)
where:

π M = p( X ) x M − c( w, x M ) − τx M + w( X )[r H ( w) + r B ( w)] − m[r H ( w) + r B ( w)] ,
p( X ) = price of downstream output in the home market
X = xM + xH + xB
τ = exogenous per-unit tariff
c (..) = total cost function of producing x M
m = marginal cost of producing the input
r i ( w) = x i ( w) − S i ( w) ; where: i = H , B .

Take note of the expression r i in the profit function above. This denotes a residual
demand function. Given that x i (w) is the total downstream output produced by Firm H
or Firm B (and consequently, the total input demand), then S i (w) is the input demand
from U2. Hence, r i is the input demand from M1 if that firm decides to supply the input
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to production to downstream competitors. Therefore, the expression in (1) above is the
case where both M1 and U2 are supplying the input to downstream competitors. Given
that the foreign firm has not stopped exporting in this stage, it still incurs a tariff for
exporting to the home market. The first three terms in (1) are the obvious total revenue
net of total production costs for exporting. The latter two terms in the vertically
integrated firm’s profit function are the result of this firm supplying the input to its
competitors at some price w .
Assume that transportation costs are negligible, and technically are a small
fraction of the value of imported inputs and exported output. If we were to include some
expression for transportation costs, it would be something along the lines of

t
, where t
λ

would be the transportation cost per unit and λ would be a unit of output (or possibly a
unit of input). By assumption then, cost per unit would be very small, approaching zero.
Hence any term dealing with transportation costs, either in the importing or exporting
stage, would fall out of the profit expression above. Thus transportation costs will not
specifically be dealt with in this essay.
The question now is whether the input price is greater than or equal to the
marginal cost of input production. It is shown below that upon vertical integration and
input supply by M1, the input price will increase and hence be greater than the marginal
cost of input production. At the beginning however, the input price, w , is equal to the
marginal cost of input production. The reasoning is rather simple. If both unintegrated
U1 and U2 had to simultaneously choose the input price, given the homogeneous input
produced by both, they would both choose w = m . Without explicit collusion and given
the initial symmetry of the upstream firms, there would be an incentive by each to
continually undercut one another. Given that both firms would know this at the outset,
each would charge the marginal cost in order to best avoid losses. This result is formally
shown in Appendix A.
With the duopoly input price w in the cost function, this illustrates the situation
of internal transfer pricing, where Hamilton and Mqasqas present a situation in which a
firm manipulates input prices in an attempt to prevent counterintegration. This is also a
real-world type phenomenon. In many instances when a firm takes over a supplier, that

98

firm typically pays some markup over marginal cost. This activity also encourages the
downstream division of a vertically integrated firm to operate as efficiently as possible.
The incentive for U1 to relinquish control of its firm will be greater if Firm A offers to set
a higher input price.
The domestic downstream profit function is expressed as:
(2)

π H = p ( X ) x H − c( w, x H ) + j [int. profits]; j = 1 if Firm H counterintegrates
= 0 if not.

In Firm H’s profit function, if j equals one, then the bracketed term will remain. These
terms are to be interpreted in the same way as in (1). If j equals zero, then the domestic
downstream firm’s profit function is simply comprised of total revenue and total cost
from producing and selling just the downstream product to the domestic market.
If a downstream competitor merges with the remaining input supplier U2, then the
best responses come from the argmax of (1) and a similarly defined profit function. If it
∧M

∧i

is Firm H, then it is the argmax of (2). Thus the solution would be { x , x }; i = H, B.
These are the Cournot production levels: exports from M1, and home production from
Firm H (or DH-U2 if merging), and exports from Country B, respectively. The
derivation of the slopes of the best response functions of a representative downstream
firm and the vertically integrated firm are presented in Appendix B.
5.3.B. Stage 3:
If Firm B does not merge, then its profit function is:
(3)

π B = p ( X ) x B − c( w, x B ) − τx B .

Firm B will want to merge if and only if:
π B [c( w), ( w − m)(r H )] − π B [c( w)] > 0 ,
and will not make a bid for U2, which is denoted B B , greater than this difference in
profit from integrating and selling the input to Firm H, and not integrating. Similarly,
Firm H will want to merge if and only if:
π H [c( w), ( w − m)(r B )] − π H [c( w)] > 0 ,
and hence also will not make a bid B H greater than this difference in profit.
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Recall that in this stage, it is of importance to find out which remaining
unintegrated downstream firm, if any, will win the bidding for U2 if it so chooses to
engage. OSS approach this problem in the form of analyzing stand-alone profits, which
are the sum of unintegrated downstream profits and an unintegrated upstream firm’s
profits. Looking at the remaining unintegrated upstream supplier after Firm A’s initial
integration, U2’s profit function is:
π U 2 = w( X ) S i ( w* ) − mS i ( w* ) ; where i = H, B.
Recall that S i is the share of input sales that U2 receives from Firm H and Firm B. w* is
the input price that U2 accepts as a follower of the vertically integrated M1 if M1
supplies. Upon vertical integration taking place, M1 is a firm with considerable power.
Given M1’s presence in the home market in two forms, as an owner of key input supply
and as a supplier of downstream output, M1 can influence how its competitors behave.
Much integration literature deals with firms’ ability to commit to upstream prices. Even
with no explicit collusion, a commonly accepted model of oligopoly is price leadership.
With M1’s new makeup as a vertically integrated firm, it would not be unreasonable to
think that U2 would look to M1 for leadership. If M1 assumes an input price leadership
role, U2 would then take this input price as given, and sell all it wants at that price.
The obvious question is why would U2 want to follow? Recall that prior to the
game, if there were no integration, it would be selling the input at marginal cost along
with U1. If M1 assumes a leadership role, an increase in input price benefits U2. This
comes from the fact that U2 behaves as a perfect competitor when following. As a
follower, any increase in its input price above that of M1’s causes U2 to sell nothing,
while any decrease would not be efficient, given that U2 can sell as much as it wants at
the going input price set by M1. This is revisited in the next stage.
Intuitively, U2 will sell control of its firm if the bid it receives is higher than the
profit it could make by either, a) charging the monopoly input price to Firm B and Firm
H, or b) charging the duopoly input price w* , which prevails when M1 supplies the input
to competitors and acts as input price leader.
If a bid is to be made, the problem then is which downstream firm will make the
higher bid. Quite obviously, all other things equal, U2 will take the highest bid.
Remember that the bid will be no larger than the difference in downstream firm profit
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from integrating and not integrating. If U2 so decides to integrate, it will sell its
ownership and control unambiguously to Firm H because it will always offer the higher
bid. Firm H and Firm B would both face the same input price determined in Stage 2, thus
this provides the basis for the downstream firms in deciding whether or not to merge in
Stage 3. Even though Firm H has already used resources in lobbying the home
government for protection, these are sunk costs and are irrelevant to the firm’s current
decision-making. To see why Firm H would win the bidding for U2, note that:
π B [c( w, τ ), int. profits ] − π B [c( w,τ )] < π H [c( w), int. profits ] − π H [c( w)] , hence,
BB < BH .
The bid from Firm B will always be smaller than that of Firm H, given the presence of
tariffs in Firm B’s profit function. Tariff imposition causes Firm B’s profit to fall, since
∂π B
< 0.
∂τ
Given that Firm H will always win, it is necessary to analyze whether U2 would
be willing to relinquish managerial control of its firm and integrate with Firm H. This
answer is fairly straightforward in any assertion of price leadership. If U2 follows M1’s
lead, then U2 can sell all the inputs it wants at the input price that M1 sets. There is no
need for U2 to undercut M1 if it takes that price as given. Furthermore, U2 and M1 are
not symmetrical firms. U2 is an input-producing firm, while M1 is a vertically integrated
firm. U2 will choose to follow if M1 prefers to lead. Dowrick (1986) proposes that
given downward sloping (or upward sloping) reaction functions, if one firm takes the
lead, the other firm prefers to follow. This holds provided that there is no capacity
constraint and that the firms are not symmetrical.
But one can go beyond this normative conclusion. In fact, it is necessary. As
noted above, OSS present counterintegration decisions through its analysis of stand-alone
profits. Specifically, OSS observe the changes in stand-alone profits with a given change
in input prices. Using this framework, the stand-alone profits would be presented as
follows:
π U + D = w( X ) S i ( w) − mS i ( w) + p ( X ) x H − c( w, x H ) .
Differentiating the expression for stand-alone profits with respect to the input price
yields:
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(4)

∂π U + D ∂S i
∂x H
i
H ∂X
=
( w − m) − c w + S ( w) + p ' ( X ) x
+
( p( X ) − c x ) .
∂w
∂w
∂w ∂w

If this expression were evaluated when the input price equals the marginal cost of input
production, the first term in (4) drops out. Additionally, assuming that the downstream
firm operates at the optimal level of output expressed by its first-order condition, this
leaves:
(5)

∂X ∂x H
∂π U + D
].
−
= − c w + S i ( m) + p ' ( X ) x H [
∂w ∂w
∂w

Since an increase in input prices will increase total costs, the first expression in (5) is
negative. The latter two terms are positive. Admittedly, signing this expression is still
not straightforward. But it appears there are output and input levels high enough to
outweigh any negativity in (5). These high levels of course would be due to low input
prices. If (5) is positive at this low input price (in this case, zero economic profit
conditions for the upstream firms), then small increases above marginal cost will yield
increases in the stand-alone profits. This would provide an incentive for U2 and Firm H
to remain apart. If input prices increase and then stand-alone profits increase, U2 and
Firm H enjoy higher profits by staying apart. This conclusion falls in line with that
reached by OSS.
Why might the input price increase? It is shown in the next stage that if M1
supplies, the input price indeed increases. Let us now revisit expression (4). As the input
price significantly rises above the marginal cost of input production, then the term
∂S i
U +D
( w − m) reappears as in (4). This term is negative, and hence will lower π w
, in
∂w
fact making it negative. As a result, a motive for counterintegration would be present.
U2 and Firm H would not do better individually.
In concluding this stage then, the following proposition is presented:
Proposition 5.1: If M1 supplies the input in the open market and assumes an input price
leadership role with U2 following, then U2 does not integrate with Firm H at low input
prices (although still above marginal cost). If M1 does not supply the input, U2 assumes
a monopoly position in the input market, again not counterintegrating.

102

Notice the last part of Proposition 5.1. Recall what happens if M1 does not
supply. U2 would have a monopoly in the input market, increasing its input price to w m ,
which is of course above marginal cost, m . This is revisited in Stage 2. Using
conclusions reached by OSS and also shown here in this subsection, high input prices
promote counterintegration. This is due to stand-alone profits falling with very high
input prices. Therefore it is necessary to set out and prove this part of Proposition 5.1.
5.3.C. Stage 2:
In this stage, input decisions are considered. OSS actually presented three cases:
a situation where both an integrated firm (M1) and an unintegrated supplier
simultaneously decide the input price to charge the unintegrated downstream firm, a
situation where M1 decides not to supply, and lastly, a case in which M1 acts as firstmover. In a reply to Reiffen (1992), OSS (1992) admit that they implicitly introduced
dynamic concepts into the input-pricing stage of their original work. They claim that
upstream prices may indeed not be set in an instant, but that they may be negotiated
dynamically by the unintegrated downstream firm and the input suppliers. For any given
price that U2 would charge Firm H and Firm B, M1 has an incentive to undercut that
input price, and this undercutting would continue until input prices would be competed
toward the marginal cost of input production, provided there exists no collusion between
M1 and U2. Given this postulate, the incentive of vertically integrating to engage in
anticompetitive behavior against downstream rivals is lost.
Where OSS potentially go wrong is in their assumption of M1 acting as firstmover. They stipulate that M1 would manipulate input prices to an extent that would
prevent a countermerger by the remaining unintegrated supplier and downstream firm.
They state that M1 would obtain the input at marginal cost, while the remaining
unintegrated downstream firm would be charged a higher input price. While they
consider precommitment of the input price prior to U2’s input pricing decision, they
incorrectly assume M1 receives the input at marginal cost. In fact, Bork (1978) explains
that a firm obtaining its inputs at production cost while competitors pay a higher market
price simply will not occur.16 This problem is corrected in Hamilton and Mqasqas, where
they conclude that an integrated firm will supply nonintegrated competitors and the firm
16

Bork, 228.
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itself at an input price above marginal cost. In their open market trading strategy, the
integrated firm employs the quantity of the intermediate good and sets the transfer price,
w , to maximize profits. This chapter follows that procedure, along with the model of
price leadership, in evaluating Firm A’s response to the tariff imposition.
Consider two broad cases. In case i), M1 and U2 both choose to supply the input
to the two remaining unintegrated downstream firms, Firm H and Firm B. With respect
to case ii), M1 chooses not to supply the downstream firms at all. In this instance, U2
will obviously charge the monopoly input price, w m , and hence earns the monopoly
profit from being the sole input supplier to Firm H and Firm B. Salop and Scheffman
(1983) explain that firms could act strategically in competition with other firms by
attempting to raise those rivals’ costs. The motive of this action is to cause the rival firms
to reduce their output, while the other firm steps in and increases production to
compensate.
If M1 takes the lead, it is necessary to find out what the optimal input price will
be. If M1 supplies the input, then it will choose the input price which maximizes its
integrated profits. Thus, differentiate (1) with respect to input price and find:
∂π M
∂X
∂x M
∂r H ∂r B
= p' ( X ) x M
+ [ p( X ) − c x − τ ]
+ r H ( w) + r B ( w) + ( w − m)(
+
) − cw .
∂w
∂w
∂w
∂w
∂w
Setting this expression equal to zero, and solving for w leads to:

w* =

−

∂X
∂x M
∂r H ∂r B
p' ( X ) x M − [ p( X ) − c x − τ ]
) + cw
− r H ( w) − r B ( w) + m(
+
∂w
∂w
∂w
∂w
.
∂r H ∂r B
+
(
)
∂w
∂w

For a sensible input price, w* must be positive, which requires that:

[− r H ( w) − r B ( w) −

∂X
∂r H ∂r B
∂x M
( p ' ( X ) x M ) + m(
+
)] > [−
( p( X ) − c x − τ ) + c w ]
∂w
∂w
∂w
∂w

at the optimal price that maximizes integrated M1’s profits.
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Is this price greater than marginal cost? Subtracting m from this w* :

( w * − m) =

−

∂X
∂x M
p' ( X ) x M − [ p( X ) − c x − τ ]
− r H − r B + cw
∂w
∂w
.
∂r H ∂r B
(
)
+
∂w
∂w

For a sensible input price, the numerator must be negative, which means that:
[− r H ( w) − r B ( w) −

∂x M
∂X
( p' ( X ) x M )] > [−
( p( X ) − c x − τ ) + c w ] .
∂w
∂w

High values of r H and r B , as well as x M ensure that this is so. Of course, higher values
of these variables correspond with low input prices. This input price maximizes the
integrated firm’s total downstream and upstream profits, and U2 will follow this price.
However, the input price is not so high that it encourages U2 and DH to counterintegrate
(recall the stand-alone discussion above).
OSS discussed setting the input price at such a level as to forestall
counterintegration. They basically dealt with the integrated firm trying to take market
power away from U2. In this case, U2 is M1’s ally. Everyone is increasing the input
price on the open market. But M1 will most definitely not allow U2 to have too much
freedom.
With respect to this stage, it is helpful to illustrate M1’s situation by using best
response functions. Taking the first-order condition of (1):
∂π M
= p ' ( X ) x M + p( X ) − c x ( w, x M ) − τ + w' ( X )[r H ( w) + r B ( w)] = 0 .
∂x M
In deriving the effects on M1’s best response function with a change in input price, define
M1 exports as x M = φ ( x H , w) . This allows:

(6)

∂ 2π M
M
∂x M ∂φ
= − ∂x2 ∂Mw .
=
∂w
∂w
∂ π
∂x M

2

In (6), the denominator is negative by the second-order condition for profit maximization.
Accordingly, the sign of (6) will be the sign of

∂ 2π M
. Given the definition of
∂x M ∂w

x M , it is necessary to find the change in this variable given x H . This leads to
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∂ 2π M
= −c xw < 0 . An increase in input prices will increase marginal cost, leading this
∂x M ∂w
partial second derivative to be negative. Therefore, M1’s best response function shifts in
with an increase in input price at every level of x H . This means that exports from M1
will fall with an increase in input price at any given x H .
Turning now to Firm H’s best response, take the first-order condition of its profit
function with no integration profits. This is per Proposition 5.1. Formally,
∂π H
= p' ( X ) x H + p ( X ) − c x ( w, x H ) = 0 .
H
∂x
As above, define domestic downstream output now as x H = ψ ( x M , w) . A change in x H
with respect to a change in input price would be expressed as:
∂ 2π H
H
∂ψ
∂x
= − ∂x2 ∂Hw .
=
∂w
∂w
∂ π
H

(7)

∂x H

2

As before, given the negativity of the second-order condition for profit maximization in
the denominator of (7), the sign of
is seen, as above,

∂ψ
∂ 2π H
. Evaluating the latter it
equals the sign of
∂w
∂x H ∂w

∂ 2π H
= −c xw < 0 , and again with an increase in input price, Firm H’s
∂x H ∂w

best response function shifts in at every x M . Therefore, domestic downstream output
falls with an increase in input prices at any given x M .
Notice that these two impacts on the firms’ best response functions are essentially
the same in magnitude, and exactly the same in effect. In Figure 5.1, both of these effects
are placed together on the same diagram.
Notice the equilibrium that emerges. If M1 supplies the input and assumes price
leadership in the input market, the input price increases. But notice the odd result seen in
the diagram. The activity of M1 increasing the input price to both Firm H and itself
causes the two firms to move toward a collusive equilibrium, and for both firms to
operate on a higher isoprofit curve. Thus, M1 does not use U2 as an ally in “raising
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Figure 5.1—M1 Supplies
rivals’ costs,” in the general sense that M1 does not attempt to foreclose Firm H and then
increase exports to that market to compensate. M1 chooses to foreclose itself as well as
its rivals.
What about the presence of Firm B? Protection-building trade causes tariffs to be
levied on both Firms A and B. Thus, Firm B’s presence in the home market is lessened
by this action. Additionally, Firm B would not win in the bidding for U2 even if U2 saw
fit to integrate. Firm B faces the same higher input price that both M1 and Firm H
encounter, which also causes it to lower its exports to the home market. Most certainly,
there is not much difference between the downstream division of M1 and Firm B. In fact,
there is not any difference since the exports from both firms are tariffed. But recall the
key difference between these two firms. M1 has an upstream division, whose profits are
part of the total profit of the integrated firm. The higher input prices benefit the upstream
division, hence benefiting the entire integrated firm. Firm B of course does not have this
luxury, and thus is not as better off as M1, nor even Firm H (whose output is not tariffed
since that firm is located in the contested market).
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In concluding the discussion of this stage, consider the second option M1 has.
Perhaps it will not supply the input to competitors at all, granting U2 monopoly inputpricing power. Some of the vertical integration literature contends that an integrated firm
would receive the input at marginal cost. It was mentioned above that this is a bold and
rather incorrect supposition. If M1 does not supply but engages in strategic internal
transfer pricing, then the best response functions look much like Figure 5.1, with the
exception that Firm H’s will shift in further than M1’s (see Figure 5.2 below). U2 will
charge w m to both Firm H and Firm B, while the upstream division of M1 charges some
lower input price w u > m , set by M1. Thus, there will be an equilibrium that puts M1 on

Figure 5.2—M1 Does Not Supply
a higher isoprofit curve, but not necessarily Firm H. This would provide Firm H an
incentive to counterintegrate. If this were to occur, M1 would not be on as high an
isoprofit curve. Therefore, M1 should supply the input and lead, and incur additional
profits from the upstream division. This ends up benefiting Firm H as well, which is
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completely the opposite to any intuition supported by advocates of “raising rivals’ costs”
behavior.
Summarizing these findings into the second proposition:
Proposition 5.2: If M1 supplies the input to competitors in the open market, strategic
internal transfer pricing causes both Firm H and M1 to approach a collusive equilibrium
in their competition for the home market. This equilibrium results in the absence of
explicit or tacit collusion among the downstream firms.
What is interesting about all this is that M1 wants to forestall integration so that it
can attain its highest isoprofit curve, even if this comes at the expense of yielding some
market share and profit to Firm H in an attempt to appease that firm. Thus M1 supplying
the input and leading U2 in the input market appears to be a dominant strategy.
5.3.D. Stage 1:
In this stage, Firm A tariff-jumps by vertically integrating with U1. Recall that
the tariff has already been imposed upon Firm H’s foreign downstream rivals. In
response to this tariff, Firm A engages in FDI by taking over an upstream firm, and takes
command of that upstream firm’s decision-making. It is assumed that Firm A incurs a
fixed cost, k A , of vertically integrating with U1 (a lump sum payment). It should be
noted that Firm A will only undergo backward vertical integration if this k A is less than
the difference in firm profit from exporting after vertically-integrating, and simply
exporting. In other words, Firm A will vertically-integrate if and only if the following
condition holds:
k A < π M ( x M , w) − π A ( x A , m) .
Firm A’s profit maximization problem in this stage is expressed simply as:
(8)

π A = p ( X ) x A − c(m, x A ) − τx A .

The reader can think of k A as a type of cost-benefit or net present value analysis.
Firm A will undergo this analysis prior to its decision. If by maximizing the present
value of future cash flows, the fixed cost of integration is greater than the difference in
profit flows from integration and simply exporting, then this sequential stage game does
not begin in the first place. Therefore, it is assumed that the condition holds, Firm A
vertically-integrates with U1, and establishes an upstream presence in the home market.
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Of course, just as before in Stage 3, an upstream firm will not sell off control of its firm if
k A < π U 1 [ x i , m] ; where i = A, B, H.
Since k A is essentially Firm A’s bid for U1, if k A = π U 1 [ x i , m] , then U1 is
indifferent to relinquishing managerial control of its firm to Firm A. The obvious
question is what can drive this bid to a point where U1 would sell off control? U1 has to
be enticed to give up control of its firm. If M1 promises a higher input price to U1 upon
integration, then this would push the price above marginal cost. Thus U1 would be more
likely to sell. This is admittedly somewhat normative. But U1 would jump at the chance
of integrating if M1 promised to raise the input price. As has been illustrated above, the
strategy that occurs is M1 in a leadership role with higher input prices, allowing everyone
to benefit. Therefore, U1 sells to Firm A and M1 is indeed created as a response to tariff
imposition.
5.3.E. Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium Summarized:
Given that each stage of the game has been detailed in this section, it is perhaps
necessary to simply summarize the subgame-perfect equilibrium that arises. In Stage 4,
the downstream firms play Cournot, and the intersection of the best-response functions
detail the Nash equilibrium. The downstream firms are all foreclosed, including the
integrated firm. Each firm moves more toward a collusive equilibrium, with each one
operating on a higher isoprofit curve. Given the explanation of Stage 3, in which Firm B
and Firm H bid for the remaining unintegrated supplier, Firm H would ordinarily win any
bidding situation that develops for U2. Recall that it bases its merging decision and
hence its possible bid for U2 on the input price that arises from either U2 alone, or U2
and M1 together.
If M1 supplies and takes the lead in the input market, it chooses the input price
that maximizes integrated profits. This w* is greater than the marginal cost of input
production, m . U2, which was once charging the marginal cost, now will find it
beneficial to follow M1. Remember that if M1 prefers to lead, then U2 prefers to follow.
Strategic internal transfer pricing mandates that M1 also pay this higher price, and not
receive the input at marginal cost.
Will U2 counterintegrate? If the input price rises too much, then it is highly likely
given the analysis of stand-alone profits completed earlier. Therefore, M1 will most
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certainly supply and dilute U2’s market power as to prevent counterintegration and
potentially suffer a decrease in profit from that action by Firm H. Thus it appears that all
firms move toward the collusive equilibrium as long as M1 supplies and U2 follows.
Firm B potentially benefits and moves toward the collusive equilibrium as well,
but it has neither an upstream division like M1, nor the luxury of tariff-free exports to the
contested home market.
5.4. Robustness and Contesting Markets Elsewhere:
In this section, a few brief comments are made concerning the location of the
contested market. In other words, what if the three downstream firms in this model are
not competing for the home market, but for foreign country B, where Firm B is located?
Any significant volume of imports flowing into that nation could possibly lead to
increased protection. As above, suppose that Firm A initiates and merges with U1,
forming M1. Strategic internal transfer pricing or price leadership forces the input price
to rise. Any bidding for U2 would this time be won by Firm B, since it would be Firm
H’s exports that would be tariffed. With the same intuition applied before, U2 would
really find no incentive to sell control at low input prices, although still above marginal
cost. Best response functions would shift inward, and all firms would move closer to a
collusive equilibrium.
If the contested market is foreign country A, the end results are seemingly just as
clear. If Firm A is again the initiator and merges with U1, a tariffed Firm H and Firm B
would not be able to offer starkly different bids to capture U2. If again U2 does not
decide to integrate however, any price leadership or internal transfer pricing causes the
best response functions of all firms to shift in toward their collusive equilibrium once
again. Therefore no matter where the contested market is, the effects in this model are
essentially the same.
Additionally, what if the home market was not the sole location of the upstream
firms? What if they were located in country B? Again, nothing significantly changes the
Nash equilibrium. The reason for this has nothing to do with firm location, but with the
effect on input prices. As long as they increase, especially not to extremely high levels,
there will be no counterintegration. Thus the results remain the same: movement toward
collusive profits without explicit collusive behavior among downstream firms.
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Summarizing this conclusion in the final proposition for this chapter:
Proposition 5.3: Regardless of the location of the upstream firms or the contested
market, as long as integration raises the input prices slightly but not significantly above
marginal cost, then all downstream firms move toward a collusive equilibrium despite the
absence of collusion among the downstream firms.
5.5. Conclusion:
In a world where the home market is the sole location of the key input, a foreign
downstream firm has an incentive to undergo backward vertical integration in response to
a tariff levied by an importing country. In pursuing this strategy, the integrated firm does
not avoid the tariff, whereas it would if it pursued greenfield investment. However, upon
vertically integrating with an input supplier, the merged firm can further influence what
happens to the profitability of its competitors. This tariff-jumping through vertical
integration on behalf of the foreign downstream firm allows that firm to establish a
presence in the home market, and forces the remaining downstream firms to make a
decision of vertically-integrating or not with the remaining upstream supplier. It was
discovered that no matter if M1 restricted supply of the input or not on the open market,
input prices tend to rise.
With respect to possible counterintegration by either Firm H or Firm B, Firm H
would unambiguously win the bidding for the remaining upstream firm, U2. This is due
to the fact that Firm H’s profit should be higher because of tariffs incurred by Firm B.
However, this is a rather moot point given that U2 does not find it profitable to sell off
control of its firm to Firm H, especially at input prices slightly above marginal cost.
An integrated firm that assumes a price leadership role increases the input price
above marginal cost, with the remaining unintegrated firm following suit. This produces
a somewhat paradoxical result in that the best response functions of both firms producing
a downstream product will shift inward. The counterintuitive result is that because of
strategic internal transfer pricing, M1 doesn’t simply raise rivals’ costs to force them to
reduce output, wherein M1 will then step in and compensate. Instead M1 also incurs a
higher input price, either through taking the lead and setting an input price that
maximizes total integrated profits, or yielding the open market to U2, allowing it to
charge a monopoly input price. Despite the fact that these input-producing firms, if
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having to set prices in an instant, sell the input for marginal cost, M1 will probably not
enjoy this luxury after integration. An incentive for U1 to sell control would be the
promise of a higher input price to the upstream division. This would undoubtedly occur
if M1 maximizes its profits with respect to input prices, in hopes of deriving the optimal
input price for its upstream division to charge not only to the downstream division of M1,
but also to competitors.
Obviously, several questions abound with respect to this type of analysis, but the
key result is that when a downstream firm faces a tariff, the optimal response is to
vertically-integrate with a supplier, given the impact of input prices on downstream best
response functions. Notice that integration does not simply “raise rivals’ costs” as in
previous research. The integrated firm incurs higher costs as well through internal
transfer pricing in order to increase integrated profits, provided U2 follows suit. Higher
output prices which result from higher input prices would tend to cause firm profits to
rise if the price effect outweighs any reduction in downstream quantity demanded. This
is apparently what transpires. As illustrated in Figure 5.1, best response functions of
downstream firms shift inward. Since both shift inward, the firms are moving in the
direction of a collusive equilibrium, even though production costs increase.
Foreclosure is a topic often associated with vertical integration papers. That was
not so much the focus here, but it is apparent that some degree of foreclosure exists
among all firms. Not only will unintegrated downstream firms see reductions in output to
the contested market, but so will also the integrated firm.
In conclusion then, FDI (tariff-jumping) in the form of vertical integration may
result in anticompetitive behavior through foreclosure. But in tapping a related market
and hence controlling the key input available to competitors, all downstream firms are
actually made better off than before, at the expense of domestic consumers. Given
protection-building trade, a domestic firm would want to increase its output after its
government levies protection. With backward vertical integration however, the
integrated firm potentially controls a significant portion of the input market, preventing
the domestic firm from increasing its output in the presence of higher input costs. The
vertically integrated firm captures input market share if it supplies to competitors. These
gains outweigh the negative effects of lower quantities consumed in the domestic market.
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CHAPTER SIX
BAYESIAN FORECASTING
6.1. Introduction:
Cost functions lie at the heart of basic economic theory. The properties of these
functions are taken as given in theoretical work. Theory implies that cost functions
satisfy the properties of monotonicity, concavity, and homogeneity. Modern econometric
tools provide a means to impose these conditions in empirical studies. However, a close
look at the empirical literature reveals that few studies impose these conditions and that
many estimated cost functions violate monotonicity and concavity properties. Using data
from electric utilities, this study compares the forecasting accuracy of the translog with
and without theoretic restrictions imposed. Such a comparison will assist in answering a
fundamental question of whether theory matters in empirical work. The estimates will
also provide further insight into the cost structure of electric power generation as the
industry continues down an uncertain road to privatization.
Empirical applications using cost functions begin by choosing a functional form.
Over time, economists have used more and more complex functional forms. Initially, the
Cobb-Douglas (1928) function was widely used, given its simplicity. However, the
Cobb-Douglas function is rather restrictive (i.e., inflexible), in that it assumes constant
shares of inputs, and input price elasticities of unity.
By “flexible,” it is meant the degree to which a functional form fits the data. In
the empirical literature, those who do not impose regularity conditions sometimes attempt
to “overfit” an equation to the data. In so doing, economists sometimes arrive at a
functional form in which the estimated input shares violate economic theory. To be more
specific, overfitted regressions may result in input demand functions that do not obey the
law of demand. Therein lies the quest for a flexible form that estimates a cost function in
accordance with economic theory.
As an alternative to the inflexibility of the Cobb-Douglas, the constant elasticity
of substitution (CES) functional form was developed by Arrow, Chenery, Minhas, and
Solow (1961).17 The proposed CES technology is much more flexible than the Cobb-

17

Work concerning the elasticity of substitution began with J. Hicks, Theory of Wages, (London:
Macmillan, 1932).
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Douglas due to the fact that this functional form may take a variety of other forms
depending on the value of the exponent parameter, ρ . Differing values of this parameter
describe how substitutable inputs to production can be. The Cobb-Douglas is but one of
these possibilities. However, the CES technology is still restricted, forcing all elasticities
of substitution to be equal to ρ , or –1.
Later, researchers moved to the use of the transcendental logarithmic production
frontier (the translog) functional form, put forth by Christensen, Jorgenson, and Lau
(1973). This functional form was supported empirically, with tests falling in line with
production theory. Their empirical tests of the CES production function revealed that this
functional form was inappropriate in the presence of several outputs and several inputs;
hence their movement toward the translog. The translog satisfies Diewert’s (1974)
definition of a flexible functional form.18 Additional functional forms researched beyond
the translog have been the Fourier (Gallant, 1981) and the Asymptotically Ideal Model
(AIM) (Barnett and Yue, 1988). However, neither the Fourier nor the AIM has garnered
nearly the level of acceptance as the translog. This lack of acceptance stems from the
complexity of these two functional forms.
Wales (1977) uses a Monte Carlo study to investigate the ability to approximate
constant elasticity of substitution utility functions with two goods. One goal of his work
is to find if the regularity conditions, those being quasiconcavity and monotonicity, are
satisfied with different functional forms. Wales finds that the two flexible forms (the
translog and the generalized Leontief) yield a good local approximation (at the mean
values of each good) while not always providing a good approximation over a range of
observations. This approximation is measured by the ability of the flexible forms in
satisfying conditions needed for utility maximization, such as the existence of a positive
estimated elasticity of substitution between two goods for the property of quasiconcavity.
Despite the violation of regularity conditions in empirical work, Wales specifically states
that these violations do not prevent a researcher from obtaining good estimates of price
and income elasticities. It is interesting to note, however, that the same work footnotes

18

Specifically, Diewert defines a flexible functional form as a function that yields a second order
differential approximation to any cost function that is twice differentiable, and satisfies linear homogeneity
at any price.
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the fact that in this situation it would be impossible to find whether these estimates were
close to the true values.
Given the violations of theoretical properties in translog applications, Jorgenson
and Fraumeni (1981) propose using the Cholesky factorization approach to impose
concavity on the translog. With the imposition of concavity restrictions, Jorgenson and
Fraumeni find that estimates are indeed more precise, as long as input share is
nonincreasing in own-input price.
It is important at this point to make a distinction between local and global
concavity. Given that concavity is the property of conditional inputs obeying the law of
demand, global concavity occurs at all positive input prices. Local concavity implies that
this property holds at a single price, and not at all positive input prices.
Given this empirical evidence, the literature then turned to the idea of imposing
certain conditions on flexible forms to satisfy the regularity conditions of cost functions.
This idea has not come without controversy, principally because some researchers feel
that imposing conditions restricts the flexibility of functional forms. This concern is
certainly prevalent when the issue is imposing conditions globally rather than locally.
With restrictions of global concavity, estimates of various elasticities are adversely
affected. Global concavity implies that the impact of price on input use will have a
negative relationship at all positive prices. The imposition of constraints and their
subsequent effects on flexibility has been shown by Lau (1978), Jorgensen and Fraumeni
(1981), and Diewert and Wales (1987).
Specifically, Diewert and Wales (1987) show that imposing concavity and
monotonicity globally restricts flexibility of the translog. Given that concavity tends to
be violated more than monotonicity, the notion has been to impose restrictions that satisfy
global concavity but not monotonicity. But even these restrictions remove the flexibility
of previously used flexible forms, making them “semiflexible.” Diewert and Wales find
that the constraints imposed by Jorgenson and Fraumeni bias own-price elasticities
toward one. Additionally, for inputs with small shares, the constraints bias cross-price
elasticities to zero.
Gagne and Ouellette (1998) pursue Monte Carlo tests on the translog, the
symmetric McFadden, and the symmetric generalized Barnett. Their results indicated to
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them that the imposition of global concavity was inadvisable. Convergence was not
achieved in over a third of the cases they investigated. When Gagne and Ouellette
imposed curvature properties on functional forms, monotonicity was rejected much of the
time. They found that when curvature conditions were not imposed, results were
considerably much improved. Terrell (1995) also found that imposing global concavity
on the Asymptotically Ideal Model (AIM) restricts the flexibility of that model. Gagne
and Ouellette use this conclusion, along with their own investigation, to conclude that
global imposition of concavity is a mistake.
Clearly, a functional form satisfying global concavity would be ideal. Despite the
best efforts of prior research however, global concavity remains elusive in empirical
work. Further attempts at obtaining a functional form in which global concavity is
satisfied usually result in functional forms that are increasingly complex.19
In response, the literature has turned to the imposition of local concavity.
Imposition of local concavity is defined as constraining a single input price, multiple
input price combinations, or a range of input prices, to obey economic theory. It follows
that by guaranteeing concavity at one data point, other points in a surrounding region
may also satisfy concavity if that reference point is a “judicious choice.”20 In fact, Ryan
and Wales (1998, 2000) find that imposing concavity at the mean yields satisfaction of
concavity at all points in their data set (1947-1971 data on output of U.S. manufacturing
industries, using four inputs: capital, labor, energy, and materials). The primary
advantage of imposing concavity locally rather than globally is that functional forms tend
to retain their flexibility in the presence of local constraints.
Given these positive findings regarding the imposition of local concavity, a
significant number of researchers have pursued empirical work along these lines. Among
those in favor of imposing conditions are Pitt and Millimet (2000), who impose the
necessary conditions for coherency (probabilities of demand regimes summing to one)
locally at each data point using Gibbs sampling and rejection sampling. In so doing, they
use simulated demand systems from the translog utility function and household
19

In fact, Tishler and Lipovetsky (1996) attempt to develop a cost function which is not only flexible, but
also globally concave and monotonic.
20
David Ryan and Terence Wales, “Imposing Local Concavity in the Translog and Generalized Leontief
Cost Functions,” Economics Letters, 2000, 67:3, 254.
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expenditure data from Indonesia. They find that imposing local coherency is better than
imposing global coherency, in that the acceptable parameter space is significantly
restricted upon the imposition of global coherency conditions. Therein lies another
reason for the imposition of local versus global constraints.
Terrell (1996) goes beyond the practice of imposing regularity conditions on
individual points by imposing the conditions over ranges of points, such as prices. He
avoids the problem of global approximations mentioned above by using a flexible
functional form as a local approximation of a cost function. Terrell’s approach has
gained increasing acceptance in the literature, fostering several extensions. His approach
of constraining a functional form can almost be thought of as imposing “regional
concavity,” in that he constrains the functional form over more than one data point.
Kleit and Terrell (2001) extend this practice further in their study of electricity
deregulation. Using a data set which contains plant level cost information from various
electricity generating power plants, Kleit and Terrell use the Bayesian cost frontier and
the Gibbs sampling technique to concentrate only on a range of prices where inferences
were to be drawn. In other words, they imposed regularity conditions over a small range
of relative input prices. Specifically, they ignored prices that violated concavity and
monotonicity outside their relevant range. Their analysis found that power plants using
natural gas as the primary fuel could reduce costs by thirteen percent on average by
becoming more efficient. They focus on the electricity industry given the present move
toward the deregulation of that industry. It stands to reason that deregulation should
force firms to become more efficient, in line with economic theory.
Dorfman and McIntosh (2001) claim that no empirical evidence exists with
respect to improved statistical efficiency from imposing inequality restrictions. They use
a Monte Carlo experiment that imposes curvature conditions and find that mean square
errors of estimated elasticities are greatly improved. This result is seen in both small and
somewhat large samples.
This essay uses the translog flexible functional form along with data from the
electric utilities industry to estimate a cost function. The interest is to gauge the
forecasting accuracy of the translog with and without the imposition of regularity
conditions. One of these conditions is concavity, which has been described in detail
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above. This chapter follows Terrell’s method of imposing restrictions over a range of
data points. The primary objective is to determine if forecasting is improved upon the
imposition of regularity conditions. If indeed it is, then this implies that economic theory
matters in empirical analysis. In other words, imposing economic theory improves
empirical analysis. Interestingly, each measure of forecasting accuracy shows that the
translog with the constraints imposed performs better than the unconstrained model.
Standard deviations are reduced with the restrictions, and the mean square error and mean
absolute error are also reduced with the imposition of regularity conditions. This is an
important finding that may influence the way economists perform economic forecasting
in the future.
Data from the utilities industry is used for a variety of reasons. Electricity is
currently an important topic in both national and state political debate. Rolling blackouts
in California have caused some residents and pundits to question the effectiveness of
electricity deregulation. While regulated firms are provided a guaranteed profit for
operation, deregulation makes no such promise. Deregulation encourages cost
effectiveness and optimal capital allocation for firms wishing to remain in the industry in
the long run. Regulated firms once received profit as a function of capital investment,
leading those firms to over-invest in capital. Deregulation would reverse this trend.
Additionally, the process of electricity generation has often been thought of as
being that of a natural monopoly. A natural monopoly usually has the characteristic of
economies of scale over the entire relevant range of output. Given this, possible new
entrants are prohibited from entering the market due to this significant barrier to entry.
As a result, the firm can achieve an above reasonable rate of return. Government
regulation typically stems from this occurrence.
There are problems with regulation however. One point to address is the proper
measure of regulation. That is to say, what price should the government regulate that the
power plants may charge? Regulatory authorities must allow for a price of output which
provides zero economic profit at the very least. Failure to do so results in exit from the
industry. Regulation as a function of capital expenditures only serves to add to the
allocative inefficiency which already exists with firms with market power. The second,
more normative point to consider when discussing regulation is the political aspect. The
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measure of government regulation is the outcome of competing consumer interests and
lobby groups operating on behalf of the electrical industry.
With innovations in the transmission of electricity, it is now believed that perhaps
electricity generation is not a natural monopoly after all. As a result, there has been a
significant movement in several U.S. states toward electricity deregulation. Economic
theory suggests that deregulation of the electrical industry would force firms to pursue
more cost efficient methods in order to maximize profits in a market setting.
Deregulation invites another problem however. If there are too few plants
servicing a given location, then the possibility of collusion presents itself to the firms in
the region. Accordingly, prices to consumers could actually become higher under
deregulation. This has been a common accusation with respect to the California energy
problem of 2000-01. Many pundits have accused oil companies of price gouging
consumers in California. Conversely, it is interesting to note that deregulation could
possibly lead to output expansion due to economies of scale. Increased output may lead
to lower average production costs, hence benefiting consumers.
Section 6.2 of this chapter provides the theoretical requirements of the cost
function. The translog functional form mentioned above is presented, as well as its
restrictions. Section 6.3 details the data used for the analysis. Section 6.4 provides an
outlook on the statistical methodology used, while Section 6.5 presents the empirical
findings of the forecasting results. Concluding remarks are provided in Section 6.6.
6.2. The Cost Function:
The importance of cost functions in both basic and advanced economic theory
cannot be overstated. The properties of cost functions are a basic tenet in understanding
the nuances of production theory. Given that this essay deals with the forecasting
accuracy of the translog, it is necessary to provide a brief overview of the theoretical
requirements of the cost function.
Allow cost to be a function of output (q) and input price ( p ) , expressed in
functional form as c(q, p ) . Total cost must increase with input price, meaning that
∂c
> 0 . This is the property of monotonicity. When a function is monotonically
∂p
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increasing, at no time can increases in production result in a reduction in total cost.
Hence equivalently for monotonicity,

∂c
> 0.
∂q

The second fundamental property of the cost function is concavity in input prices.
Mathematically, concavity requires that

∂ 2c
< 0 . This second order condition of the cost
∂p 2

function provides the law of conditional input demand. Concavity implies that the
underlying demand function is decreasing in input price, resulting in downward-sloping
input demand curves. It is this property that is most often violated in the empirical
literature.
The third property is homogeneity of degree one in the input price. If the cost
function is homogeneous of degree one, then the first derivative of the cost function
(which is the conditional input demand) must be homogeneous of degree zero.
Homogeneity of degree one requires that c(tp ) = tc( p) , where t > 0 . Taking the
derivative of this expression with respect to the input price, we have t

∂c
∂c
=t
, which is
∂p
∂p

the desired result.
It is of interest to assess the potential benefits of imposing regularity conditions
locally rather than globally for approximations of the true cost function. This chapter
will focus on imposing these conditions on a widely used flexible form: the translog.
The model will be estimated using results from a data set generated from Kleit and
Terrell’s previous work. Using these results, we will forecast with a new data set. Using
Bayesian inference, both the constrained and unconstrained models will be estimated as a
stochastic frontier. The mean square error, mean absolute error, and mean standard
deviation for both the constrained and unconstrained models will then be computed.
Despite the sole focus on the translog, the methods used in this essay can easily be
extended to other functional forms.
Both the translog and the generalized Leontief approximations often fail to satisfy
concavity, even over observed prices in a given sample. For ease of exposition and to
emphasize the problem of primary interest, we focus on the verification and imposition of
regularity conditions over sets of prices, with monotonicity constraints tested and
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imposed at a fixed time period and output level (described below). The reader can think
of this as imposing “regional” concavity.
Consider first the translog cost function. With three inputs and two outputs as in
this application, the translog cost function is:
3

2

i =1

i =1

ln c( p, q ) = α 0 + ∑ α i ln pi + ∑ bi ln qi +
(1)

where:

1 3 3
∑∑α ij ln pi ln p j
2 i =1 j =1

2

1
+ ∑ γ i (ln qi ) 2
2 i =1

,

α ij = α ji for all i, j = 1,2,3 , and
3

∑α i = 1,
i =1

3

∑α
j =1

ij

= 0 ( i, j = 1,2,3).

The translog cost function imposes homogeneity of degree one with respect to input
prices under these conditions. As a second order approximation to an arbitrary cost
function, the translog also fulfills Diewert’s minimum flexibility requirement for flexible
forms. In terms of this work, it is necessary to take the first derivative of the log cost
function with respect to the log input price to find the share equations associated with a
respective input:
(2)

3

s i ( p, q) = α i + ∑ α ij ln p j .
j =1

For any given price, the regularity conditions can be verified from restrictions
derived from the translog cost function. Monotonicity in the input prices is ensured by
nonnegative values of (2). For concavity, the Hessian matrix ∇ 2 f (where f is the cost
frontier described below) must be negative semidefinite. Allow s to be a vector of n
∧

share equations. Additionally, let s be an n x n diagonal matrix with the shares making
up the main diagonal. Finally, allow A to be an n x n symmetric matrix of the
parameters α ij . Diewert and Wales (1987) show that the translog cost function satisfies
∧

concavity if and only if A − s + ss T is a negative semidefinite matrix.
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As stated above, monotonicity in output requires that cost increase with output.
Given the translog frontier, monotonicity is equivalent to the restriction:
(3)

bi + γ i ln q i > 0 .

Jorgenson and Fraumeni (1981) imposed concavity on the translog by forcing the
symmetric matrix A to be negative semi-definite (the Cholesky factorization approach
mentioned above, with matrices associated with price effects subject to the condition of
being negative semidefinite). As stated earlier, the main problem with imposing
restrictions on functional forms to satisfy regularity conditions is that elasticities are
adversely affected. The own-price elasticities tend to be overestimated, while cross-price
elasticities tend to be biased when A is restricted to be negative semidefinite.21 In using a
prior to impose regularity conditions over a certain range of input prices where
inferences are to be drawn, Terrell’s (1996) method is followed. He found little bias over
small ranges, but significant bias as the region was lengthened. This was due to the loss
in flexibility as the range of prices in which restrictions were imposed increased. Hence
the model became too restrictive.
6.3. Data:
This work uses a data set from the Utility Data Institute (UDI) that includes plant
level information concerning total costs, fuel prices, and two measures of output for
electricity generating plants for the year 1999. Two measures of output are required to
take into account the fact that some power plants exist solely to provide output during
periods of peak demand. This data set also provides information on plant location and
the average price of natural gas burned at each plant.
The second data source is the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), which provides
county level data on manufacturing wages for 1999. The wage rate in this data set is the
average annual manufacturing wage for workers in the county where the power
generating plant is located.
For the third data source, Hilt (1996) supplies plant level measures of the capital
stock, taxes, overhead, depreciation, and operating and management expenses.

21

Theorized by Ryan and Wales (1998) using aggregated annual Canadian data on food, clothing, and
miscellaneous nondurable commodities from 1947 to 1993.
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Allocating firm level data to each plant derives all these variables. Hall and Jorgenson’s
(1971) method is used to calculate the price of capital using this data set.
Table 6.1 shows the summary statistics of the Kleit-Terrell (2001) data set using
1996 data.
Table 6.1
Summary Statistics for the 1996 Data
N = 78
Variable
Mean
Std. Dev.
===============================================================
Cost ( C )
50,653,645.79
51,246,491.93
Annual Output ( q1 )
1,537,843.24
1,741,523.54
Peak Output ( q 2 )
649.32
548.47
Wage
45,342.54
7,196.22
Price of Fuel
2.71
0.46
Price of Capital
1.02
0.39
Log Relative Wage
3.85
0.16
Log Relative Fuel Price
1.03
0.40
Table 6.2 below presents the summary statistics for the 1999 data used in this project.
Table 6.2
Summary Statistics for the 1999 Data
N = 80
Variable
Mean
Std. Dev.
===============================================================
Cost (C )
58,475,601.66
88,083,689.22
Annual Output (q1 )
1,666,551.19
2,003,655.62
Peak Output (q 2 )
588.10
554.17
Wage
38,806.66
11,499.69
Price of Fuel
2.70
0.34
Price of Capital
0.91
0.28
Log Relative Wage
19.52
2.24
Log Relative Fuel Price
0.99
0.11
6.4. Methodology:
In this chapter, the Bayesian approach to cost frontier analysis is used. By using
Bayesian analysis, one can combine a subjective probability distribution summarizing
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what one knows about a parameter, with any available sample information, to obtain a
more reflective posterior distribution. This chapter uses the prior distribution from Kleit
and Terrell’s previous work as the prior for the current sample in this project. In using
the prior distribution from the earlier work, current sample information is used to form
the posterior. When comparing the predicted results for both the constrained and
unconstrained models to the true log cost, it can be seen if forecasting accuracy is
improved upon the imposition of regularity conditions.
Allow an efficient firm to be represented by the cost frontier, which yields the
cost that an efficient plant faces given a vector of prices ( pi ) for inputs used to produce a
given level of outputs (qi ) . The cost frontier for the efficient plant is represented by
f ( pi , qi ) . If a plant’s observed cost exceeds that which would be provided by the
frontier, then that deviation is partly attributable to inefficiency. Therefore, any
deviations from the frontier can be used to measure plant inefficiency.
As in Kleit and Terrell’s earlier work, express the log total cost for the plant as:
(5)

ln(ci ) = f ( pi , qi ) + u i + vi .

Notice the two error terms. The deviation of plant i ' s cost from the frontier is comprised
of two parts: inefficiency (vi ) and measurement error (u i ) . Allow u i ~ IIDN (0, σ 2 ) .
The inefficiency error term follows an exponential distribution with a scale parameter λ .
The exponential distribution is used because this distribution is more robust with regard
to prior assumptions about parameters, moreso than other distributions (as shown in van
den Broek, Koop, Osiewalski, and Steel (1994)). Additionally, van den Broek et al.
report that the exponential distribution is least affected by the choice of prior median
efficiency than other distributions, especially the truncated normal. The truncated normal
is the most sensitive to the choice of prior median efficiency; therefore, it is the least
desirable choice of inefficiency error distributions.
Combining the cost function above with the translog cost frontier, this yields a
linear model which can be expressed as:
y i = X i β + u i + vi
u i ~ N (0, σ 2 )
vi ~ EXP(λ ).
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In this model, y i is the log cost for plant i , X i is a row vector of independent variables
used in order to create the translog frontier, and β is a column vector representing the
coefficients of the translog. u i is a two-sided error term accounting for measurement
error, and vi is a one-sided (non-negative) error term measuring plant inefficiency. This
linear error model that combines the cost function with the translog functional form is
consistent with the prior information in Kleit and Terrell’s previous work.
Recall that we are only concerned with an implicit demand curve with a limited
range of prices. Terrell (1996, 2001) uses a prior to impose monotonicity and concavity
restrictions. In so following, define the indicator function h( β ) = 1 if the cost frontier
satisfies monotonicity and concavity for all price combinations over some region ψ , and
zero otherwise. This prior allows us to disregard that portion of the posterior density that
violates economic theory in terms of the cost function. This region is defined in terms of
relative prices since concavity and monotonicity depend only on relative prices. The
prior density is presented as:
(6)

π ( β , σ 2 , λ−1 ) ∝ σ −2 f G (λ−1 | 1,− ln(r * ))h( β ).

Thus, the probability of parameter values will be zero at those prices which violate
economic theory (in terms of the cost function, stated as monotonicity and concavity
above).
The forecast exercise pursued here was first introduced by van den Broeck et al.
(1994), in which they highlighted differences between Bayesian and sampling theory
estimation. Their work was a considerable contribution, in that it first pointed out
potential advantages of the Bayesian approach over traditional frequentist maximum
likelihood methods. van den Broeck et al. presented the basic Gibbs sampling algorithm
and derived the required conditional densities. Additionally, they specified four different
assumptions about the distribution of the inefficiency error term: the exponential, the
half-Normal, the truncated Normal, and a gamma distribution. The van den Broeck et al.
results generally favor the exponential distribution, but also provide a method of using a
mixture of densities. For purposes here, allow the one-sided error term to be distributed
exponentially with scale parameter λ , as shown above.
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6.5. Results:
Table 6.3 presents the posterior moments for the model parameters for the 1999
data set. This table also presents the moments for σ 2 and λ as well. The moments for
the cost frontier do not reveal much information in and of themselves.
Table 6.4 presents the estimates of shares and elasticities evaluated at the means
of the 1999 data. Notice the elasticities in the unconstrained section of Table 6.4. Even
if the elasticities of labor and fuel did not seem rather high, the upper band of the
confidence interval for the price elasticity of labor is positive. All own-price elasticities
are required to be negative in order to obey the law of demand. Additionally, notice how
wide the ranges of the confidence intervals appear to be in the unconstrained model.
Now take note of the elasticity estimates in Table 6.4 when regularity conditions
are imposed. The own-price elasticities are much lower, and all the confidence intervals
are in the negative range (as well as smaller than the unconstrained confidence interval
bands).
Furthermore, take note of the estimates of input shares in Table 6.4. In the
constrained model, the sum of the input shares is exactly one. As with the Kleit-Terrell
1996 data set, the fuel input has the largest share of total expenditure with 66.5 percent in
the 1999 data. Notice that fuel is relatively less responsive when compared with labor
and capital. This is true in both the unconstrained and constrained models. Additionally,
the positive cross-price elasticities reveal that all the inputs are substitutes. The higher
responsiveness of labor and fuel in the constrained model implies that with high fuel
prices, there is a relatively larger increase in the hiring of labor. This is especially not
surprising given the high prices of natural gas seen over the past two years. The reader
should also notice that there is a decline in the size of the confidence intervals with
respect to the input shares as well. This suggests that imposing regularity conditions
perhaps has some degree of merit for this result alone (at least in finite samples).
Table 6.5 presents the true log cost, constrained and unconstrained predictions of
log cost, the constrained and unconstrained standard deviations, and confidence intervals
for each of the 80 plants used in the data set. Notice that with 72 of the 80 plants in this
data set, standard deviations of the predicted log cost are smaller in the constrained model
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Table 6.3
Posterior Moments for Model Parameters (1999 Data)
Unconstrained
===========
Parameter
Mean
Std. Dev.
(90% Confidence)
===============================================================
α0
8.268847
2.807612
3.533909
12.740180
α1
1.400004
1.432968
-0.876390
3.812679
α2
0.266979
0.945223
-1.280890
1.768683
α 11
-0.402520
0.430186
-1.114620
0.277646
α 12
-0.608980
0.393311
-1.240110
0.053400
α 22
0.279915
0.335776
-0.265490
0.830269
b1
-0.409440
0.183658
-0.703580
-0.102460
γ1
0.042398
0.007125
0.030477
0.053707
b2
0.886982
0.238961
0.493512
1.277616
γ2
-0.059530
0.019650
-0.091920
-0.027040
2
σ
0.006493
0.002462
0.003049
0.010962
λ
0.142963
0.024579
0.106544
0.186545
Constrained
=========
Parameter
Mean
Std. Dev.
(90% Confidence)
===============================================================
α0
9.946819
1.099542
8.117065
11.768950
α1
0.613998
0.349389
0.090865
1.233522
α2
0.404890
0.341738
-0.215720
0.895062
α 11
-0.139850
0.109720
-0.327160
0.026074
α 12
-0.146750
0.136441
-0.385700
0.063880
α 22
0.113562
0.116176
-0.060460
0.320443
b1
-0.442410
0.194860
-0.759200
-0.111860
γ1
0.043697
0.007581
0.031012
0.056133
b2
0.844671
0.259985
0.419408
1.278064
γ2
-0.056530
0.021662
-0.091950
-0.020930
2
σ
0.009723
0.002623
0.006064
0.014493
λ
0.131658
0.021943
0.099385
0.170702
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Table 6.4
Shares and Elasticities (1999 Data)
Unconstrained
================
Shares:
Share
Mean
Std. Dev.
(90% Confidence)
===============================================================
Labor
0.202096
0.085385
0.065012
0.348750
Fuel
0.624670
0.092594
0.471888
0.774241
Capital
0.173235
0.070182
0.057513
0.287073
Elasticities:
Elasticity
Mean
Std. Dev.
(90% Confidence)
===============================================================
ε LL
-3.636450
74.585480
-6.636680
1.621731
ε FF
-1.428460
0.833771
-2.899350
-0.202350
ε KK
-3.804160
13.420550
-9.211660
-1.384390
ε LF
2.759033
55.065170
-1.485860
5.051082
ε LK
0.877418
20.393990
-2.507230
3.950150
ε FL
0.695619
0.644188
-0.249390
1.829564
ε FK
0.732840
0.447578
0.064756
1.505893
ε KL
1.419183
12.457810
-1.709040
7.581804
ε KF
2.384977
3.883839
0.652193
3.925281
Constrained
================
Shares:
Share
Mean
Std. Dev.
(90% Confidence)
===============================================================
Labor
0.216521
0.071929
0.105998
0.341752
Fuel
0.665102
0.076544
0.534755
0.786324
Capital
0.118377
0.041631
0.053989
0.189734
Elasticities:
Elasticity
Mean
Std. Dev.
(90% Confidence)
===============================================================
ε LL
-1.406000
0.413301
-1.984020
-0.648810
ε FF
-0.572660
0.294157
-1.111980
-0.182350
ε KK
-1.364170
0.351752
-1.933020
-0.734750
ε LF
1.142737
0.441603
0.331669
1.768726
ε LK
0.263264
0.317361
-0.167830
0.868225
ε FL
0.401014
0.255328
0.068740
0.886014
ε FK
0.171648
0.114489
0.005629
0.376330
ε KL
0.477225
0.556796
-0.319970
1.481717
ε KF
0.886947
0.437835
0.053394
1.470465
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than in the unconstrained model. Put another way, imposing regularity conditions
reduces the standard deviations of the forecast results for 90 percent of the plants used in
this data set. Of course, reductions in standard deviations will occur when restrictions are
imposed (even if the restrictions are wrong). However, economic theory tells us that the
restrictions imposed are correct. Additionally, imposed restrictions will usually lead to
biased estimates of parameters. While this is a concern, it is unavoidable in analyzing
whether these restrictions lead to an improvement in forecasting accuracy. Perhaps this
bias is acceptable given that forecasting accuracy is improved with the regularity
conditions imposed.
Table 6.5
Forecasting Results
Constrained
===========
Plant Name
Log Cost
Pred. Cost
Std. Dev. (90% Confidence)
===============================================================
Arsenal Hill
16.252922
16.333833
0.0441 16.260586 16.405796
Atkinson
15.703305
15.770759
0.0319 15.718153 15.823023
Barney Davis
18.535292
18.609303
0.0398 18.544666 18.676263
Baxter Wilson
18.297704
18.363957
0.0446 18.291043 18.437161
Cedar Bayou
19.226843
19.321863
0.0556 19.228021 19.413042
Collins
18.681795
18.440619
0.0750 18.317869 18.560118
Cunningham
17.630857
17.613905
0.0514 17.528946 17.696877
Cutler (FL)
16.674875
16.610974
0.0471 16.529827 16.685505
Decordova
18.978303
18.959113
0.0610 18.859951 19.057524
Deepwater (TX)
16.239577
16.243894
0.0333 16.190048 16.299311
Delta
16.089156
16.049646
0.0515 15.962628 16.132706
Eagle Mountain
17.871886
17.811063
0.0332 17.756339 17.865047
East River
17.620557
16.666136
0.0382 16.601161 16.727517
Eaton
16.320850
16.017825
0.0656 15.909103 16.122666
Edgewater (OH)
16.225093
15.949425
0.0452 15.874472 16.021779
Fort Phantom
17.622623
17.519589
0.0663 17.403660 17.622982
Gadsby
16.737175
16.634196
0.0307 16.583509 16.684424
Gordon Evans
17.412603
17.540953
0.0255 17.499820 17.583167
Graham
18.399801
18.406898
0.0465 18.331330 18.482097
Greens Bayou
17.440212
17.435214
0.0272 17.391228 17.481251
Greenwood (MI)
18.128143
18.109868
0.0375 18.048875 18.170827
Handley
18.773510
18.686296
0.0386 18.622181 18.748588
Harvey Couch
16.117652
15.966181
0.0612 15.860304 16.062034
Hunters Point
17.106716
16.679505
0.0298 16.630966 16.729328
Hutchinson
16.351173
16.214795
0.0305 16.164720 16.265414
Table continued
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Plant Name
Lcost
Pred. Cost
Std. Dev. (90% Confidence)
===============================================================
Jones
18.162219
18.184393
0.0376 18.123063 18.244946
Knox Lee
17.849076
17.865350
0.0353 17.808295 17.922503
La Palma
16.997574
16.852698
0.0573 16.755962 16.944475
Lake Catherine
17.748058
17.804342
0.0399 17.736967 17.868163
Lake Creek (TX)
17.595882
17.538011
0.0387 17.475329 17.601751
Lake Hubbard
18.618691
18.695177
0.0341 18.638677 18.750961
Lake Pauline
14.804306
14.936307
0.0995 14.767814 15.093371
Laredo
17.108643
16.873494
0.0629 16.765175 16.973516
Lewis Creek
17.474282
17.625303
0.0414 17.560017 17.694201
Lieberman
17.016263
16.921479
0.0287 16.875196 16.970343
Little Gypsy
18.191476
18.325237
0.0304 18.277054 18.375866
Lon Hill
17.947839
17.982295
0.0286 17.935019 18.030204
Lone Star
15.200722
15.486335
0.0748 15.360633 15.607599
Maddox
17.050344
16.893954
0.0637 16.787406 16.996079
Michoud
18.373599
18.473847
0.0329 18.420430 18.528097
Morgan Creek
18.351543
18.428861
0.0318 18.377294 18.480693
Murray Gill
17.101479
17.189551
0.0320 17.137711 17.243545
Mustang
17.599911
17.710851
0.0335 17.655226 17.766372
Nichols
17.790458
17.816847
0.0368 17.757718 17.876525
Ninemile Point
19.324209
19.270541
0.0495 19.188045 19.351478
North Lake
17.920638
17.950378
0.0231 17.912456 17.988500
Northeastern 1 and 2 18.016216
18.117896
0.0282 18.071768 18.164894
Nueces Bay
18.256798
18.369141
0.0382 18.307112 18.433011
Oak Creek (TX)
16.420163
16.196346
0.1016 16.021051 16.356597
Ocotillo
17.457186
16.985248
0.0309 16.935243 17.036595
Paint Creek
16.976115
16.699477
0.1353 16.452905 16.900692
Permian Basin
18.591339
18.546248
0.0571 18.450886 18.638014
PH Robinson
19.483929
19.548209
0.0574 19.452410 19.640452
RE Ritchie
17.262534
16.838355
0.0459 16.764982 16.915811
Reeves
15.816473
15.815101
0.0405 15.746601 15.881408
Rex Brown
16.615228
16.375703
0.0337 16.320363 16.431663
Riverside (GA)
15.643988
15.230608
0.0600 15.130347 15.328308
Riverside (MD)
15.982008
15.523064
0.0618 15.420387 15.623219
Riverside (OK)
15.946740
15.492867
0.0613 15.390470 15.592654
Sabine
19.295722
19.430308
0.0542 19.341983 19.517304
Saguaro
17.006794
16.747423
0.0531 16.659473 16.834008
Sam Bertron
17.916518
17.896727
0.0254 17.856155 17.938418
Seminole (OK)
18.974392
18.905659
0.0442 18.831880 18.976670
Sewaren
16.931109
16.572584
0.0357 16.513302 16.631691
Southwestern
17.352056
17.353920
0.0336 17.297993 17.408230
Starlington
17.356003
17.515005
0.0251 17.474484 17.556764
Stryker Creek
18.376017
18.452166
0.0355 18.394234 18.510413
Sweatt
16.166326
16.005662
0.0575 15.909349 16.096730
Table continued
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Plant Name
Lcost
Pred. Cost
Std. Dev. (90% Confidence)
===============================================================
TH Wharton
17.050828
16.702459
0.0568 16.603973 16.792534
Tradinghouse Creek 19.292814
19.304122
0.0477 19.225355 19.382143
Tulsa
17.279701
17.241717
0.0322 17.188908 17.294695
Turkey Point 1 and 2 18.588415
18.650254
0.0540 18.559802 18.737638
Valley (CA)
16.635837
15.397986
0.0759 15.272624 15.520209
Victoria (TX)
17.413635
17.544047
0.0250 17.503293 17.585868
Waterford 1 and 2
18.125560
18.219819
0.0282 18.175559 18.267139
Waterside (NY)
17.374463
16.896688
0.0386 16.832290 16.959512
West Springfield
16.458346
15.348194
0.0395 15.284693 15.414397
Wilkes
18.096972
18.128897
0.0505 18.043439 18.208330
Willow Glen
18.780305
18.746638
0.0460 18.670470 18.822747
Zuni
14.601351
14.591436
0.0679 14.475400 14.701229
Unconstrained
============
Plant Name
Lcost
Pred. Cost
Std. Dev. (90% Confidence)
===============================================================
Arsenal Hill
16.252922
16.338825
0.0444 16.266665 16.412239
Atkinson
15.703305
15.805465
0.0373 15.743622 15.865759
Barney Davis
18.535292
18.630451
0.0399 18.565876 18.696453
Baxter Wilson
18.297704
18.365313
0.0862 18.218214 18.499490
Cedar Bayou
19.226843
19.319804
0.0613 19.217032 19.417019
Collins
18.681795
18.448003
0.0695 18.331482 18.561327
Cunningham
17.630857
17.641848
0.0525 17.554599 17.727421
Cutler (FL)
16.674875
16.639695
0.0579 16.542918 16.731779
Decordova
18.978303
18.958116
0.0675 18.847343 19.067949
Deepwater (TX)
16.239577
16.241884
0.0392 16.177198 16.305699
Delta
16.089156
16.052789
0.1030 15.881629 16.211532
Eagle Mountain
17.871886
17.799803
0.0402 17.732911 17.864009
East River
17.620557
16.621171
0.0504 16.535539 16.699490
Eaton
16.320850
16.033404
0.0650 15.927669 16.142057
Edgewater (OH)
16.225093
15.963902
0.0481 15.886262 16.044610
Fort Phantom
17.622623
17.531127
0.0923 17.370946 17.678423
Gadsby
16.737175
16.672900
0.0329 16.619359 16.726802
Gordon Evans
17.412603
17.563680
0.0270 17.520076 17.608155
Graham
18.399801
18.427162
0.0477 18.348712 18.505821
Greens Bayou
17.440212
17.448221
0.0285 17.401737 17.494403
Greenwood (MI)
18.128143
18.093611
0.0482 18.014246 18.173361
Handley
18.773510
18.679042
0.0432 18.607121 18.749393
Harvey Couch
16.117652
15.970983
0.0865 15.824994 16.107925
Hunters Point
17.106716
16.693977
0.0340 16.640028 16.751111
Hutchinson
16.351173
16.251211
0.0327 16.197588 16.305822
Jones
18.162219
18.221282
0.0368 18.161922 18.281889
Table continued

132

Plant Name
Lcost
Pred. Cost
Std. Dev. (90% Confidence)
===============================================================
Knox Lee
17.849076
17.897349
0.0355 17.839919 17.957795
La Palma
16.997574
16.858205
0.1062 16.682731 17.025414
Lake Catherine
17.748058
17.839485
0.0546 17.746596 17.926636
Lake Creek (TX)
17.595882
17.540659
0.0438 17.470219 17.614165
Lake Hubbard
18.618691
18.679348
0.0435 18.606685 18.750331
Lake Pauline
14.804306
14.840388
0.1124 14.658441 15.028222
Laredo
17.108643
16.886629
0.0924 16.732150 17.034898
Lewis Creek
17.474282
17.542902
0.0830 17.399177 17.669151
Lieberman
17.016263
16.931925
0.0315 16.880784 16.984065
Little Gypsy
18.191476
18.337140
0.0394 18.272827 18.401381
Lon Hill
17.947839
18.007485
0.0300 17.959326 18.057766
Lone Star
15.200722
15.427062
0.0744 15.306332 15.550851
Maddox
17.050344
16.903050
0.0655 16.795183 17.011667
Michoud
18.373599
18.513728
0.0339 18.459052 18.570055
Morgan Creek
18.351543
18.469522
0.0329 18.416135 18.523542
Murray Gill
17.101479
17.171525
0.0386 17.107877 17.233292
Mustang
17.599911
17.734711
0.0381 17.673050 17.798164
Nichols
17.790458
17.842810
0.0376 17.782707 17.906462
Ninemile Point
19.324209
19.304705
0.0500 19.219498 19.385551
North Lake
17.920638
17.984052
0.0261 17.941748 18.027147
Northeastern 1 and 2 18.016216
18.155706
0.0296 18.108209 18.204201
Nueces Bay
18.256798
18.389823
0.0384 18.327695 18.453503
Oak Creek (TX)
16.420163
16.158384
0.1772 15.861135 16.440222
Ocotillo
17.457186
16.996610
0.0315 16.945197 17.047879
Paint Creek
16.976115
16.601997
0.2628 16.153056 17.026028
Permian Basin
18.591339
18.569090
0.0626 18.463621 18.669585
PH Robinson
19.483929
19.546285
0.0622 19.440911 19.644722
RE Ritchie
17.262534
16.743667
0.1371 16.509859 16.951569
Reeves
15.816473
15.843404
0.0477 15.764674 15.919666
Rex Brown
16.615228
16.369741
0.0506 16.283296 16.448321
Riverside (GA)
15.643988
15.238554
0.0595 15.141471 15.337377
Riverside (MD)
15.982008
15.478594
0.0612 15.380509 15.578784
Riverside (OK)
15.946740
15.455960
0.0601 15.358924 15.555070
Sabine
19.295722
19.446738
0.0538 19.356663 19.534843
Saguaro
17.006794
16.747872
0.0551 16.659919 16.839853
Sam Bertron
17.916518
17.921031
0.0272 17.877407 17.965226
Seminole (OK)
18.974392
18.922173
0.0471 18.845588 19.000370
Sewaren
16.931109
16.591810
0.0378 16.529668 16.652769
Southwestern
17.352056
17.397632
0.0353 17.339366 17.454695
Starlington
17.356003
17.544546
0.0283 17.499287 17.592304
Stryker Creek
18.376017
18.482608
0.0370 18.422778 18.544379
Sweatt
16.166326
16.026432
0.0603 15.928618 16.125258
TH Wharton
17.050828
16.703647
0.0664 16.594307 16.810623
Table continued
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Plant Name
Lcost
Pred. Cost
Std. Dev. (90% Confidence)
===============================================================
Tradinghouse Creek 19.292814
19.319886
0.0485 19.239873 19.399193
Tulsa
17.279701
17.247654
0.0380 17.186153 17.310762
Turkey Point 1 and 2 18.588415
18.672877
0.0581 18.576382 18.768091
Valley (CA)
16.635837
15.421978
0.0770 15.291125 15.541299
Victoria (TX)
17.413635
17.583278
0.0285 17.537282 17.630846
Waterford 1 and 2
18.125560
18.231735
0.0362 18.171454 18.290637
Waterside (NY)
17.374463
16.924264
0.0401 16.858697 16.989954
West Springfield
16.458346
15.342683
0.0548 15.250360 15.428192
Wilkes
18.096972
18.157329
0.0652 18.044088 18.261728
Willow Glen
18.780305
18.747759
0.0545 18.657049 18.835232
Zuni
14.601351
14.609290
0.0686 14.491636 14.711711
Looking at a couple of plants more closely, the benefits of imposing regularity
conditions on the translog can more fully be illustrated. For example, the true 1999 log
cost of the Paint Creek plant is 16.976. By imposing constraints, observe that the
standard deviation falls from 0.2628 in the unconstrained model to 0.1353 in the
constrained model. Now notice the RE Ritchie plant. It has a true log cost of 17.263.
When imposing constraints, the standard deviation falls from 0.1371 in the unconstrained
model to 0.0459 in the constrained model.
Lastly, notice Table 6.6. This table presents the measures of forecasting accuracy.
Specifically, this table shows the mean square error (MSE), the mean absolute error
(MAE), and the mean standard deviation (SD). Notice that the constrained model
outperforms the unconstrained model in every measure. The MSE, MAE, and mean SD
are each smaller in the model with regularity conditions imposed than in the
Table 6.6
Measures of Forecasting Accuracy
Model
MSE
MAE
Mean SD
===============================================================
Constrained
0.079726
0.171554
0.046285
Unconstrained
0.082342
0.176922
0.056743
unconstrained model. However, when estimating a two-tailed t-test with a 0.05 level of
significance, the absolute value of the t-statistic is 1.2006, with a two-tailed critical value
of 1.9905. Since the absolute value of the t-statistic is not greater than the critical value,
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one cannot conclude that there is a statistically significant improvement in forecasting
accuracy. Additionally, an ANOVA table was constructed, and with respect to the source
of variation between the constrained and unconstrained models, the F-statistic was found
to be 0.0047, with an F critical value of 3.901. There is a small improvement in
forecasting accuracy, and these restrictions should be imposed if they are correct. Since
economic theory tells us that these restrictions are correct, therein lies the motivation for
their imposition. Using Bayesian analysis is a much simpler method than frequentist
studies when imposing restrictions, and the issue of loss of flexibility is not as prevalent.
To further note the benefits of imposing regularity conditions, marginal density
plots were generated for the input shares and own-price elasticities from both the
unconstrained and the constrained models. The density plots for the unconstrained model
can be found in Figure 6.1. Regarding the input shares, notice that the plots for the labor

Figure 6.1—Unconstrained Plots
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and capital shares may be less than zero. This is an odd result in that a firm cannot
employ a negative share of input. With respect to the elasticity histogram plots, the price
elasticity plot for fuel suggests that the own-price elasticity for this input can be greater
than zero. This violates demand theory. The same can be said for the histogram plots of
labor and capital elasticities. These diagrams also illustrate violations of economic
theory. Histogram plots were constructed in this case because of a few data points that
existed so far outside the others. These few points are compressed in the outside bars of
the histogram plots, hence their size. Posterior density plots would have been flat in this
case, and therefore uninteresting to present.
The marginal density plots for shares and elasticities from the constrained model
are presented in Figure 6.2. Notice that with respect to the input shares for capital and

Figure 6.2—Constrained Plots

labor, the input shares are constrained to be at least positive. The input share for fuel is
also positive, and constrained to be less than one. Regarding the own-price elasticities,
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notice that each input elasticity is constrained to be less than zero. This is in accordance
with economic theory and the law of demand. Notice that these constrained density plots
illustrate a direct link to the theoretic restrictions that were imposed. Specifically, the
negativity of input demand elasticities which are crucial in economic theory.
6.6. Conclusion:
In the introduction above, it was noted how some of the previous literature of
estimating cost functions led to biased and inaccurate estimates of elasticities. In this
essay it was shown that, when imposing regularity conditions on a flexible form in
estimating a cost function, elasticities were well behaved, and the standard deviations of
predicted cost were reduced. Combining the Bayesian cost frontier with a flexible form
such as the translog, concavity was imposed over a range of input prices that did not
violate economic theory. This constrained model yielded more accurate forecasts than
the unconstrained model. Using the mean square error, the mean absolute error, and the
mean standard deviation as measures of forecasting accuracy, all three statistics were
smaller with the imposition of regularity conditions. This suggests that forecasting is
improved when imposing constraints on a cost function. This key result, as well as the
results presented above in the corresponding tables and figures, provides an important
conclusion for economists: economic theory matters.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSION TO THE DISSERTATION
This dissertation has presented a thorough analysis of issues in theoretical and
applied microeconomics. The second chapter provided a comprehensive review of the
literature concerning integration issues in international trade. This review showed the
tremendous research that has been devoted to furthering the understanding of horizontal
and vertical integration in the context of international trade theory. The selected research
and the subsequent review provided a background that might suggest the proper
placement for the integration essays which followed. The final essay was an analysis of
cost theory and the translog flexible functional form. This essay first presented a review
of the literature concerning the estimation of cost functions. Empirically, economic
theory is sometimes violated when attempting to estimate cost functions. These
violations of theory will lead to inaccurate parameter estimates, and biased own-price and
cross-price elasticities. As a result, regularity conditions (monotonicity, concavity, and
first-degree homogeneity) are sometimes imposed on a functional form to correct these
errors. This essay concludes with an analysis of forecasting accuracy. Specifically, the
motivation is to find if forecasting is improved with the imposition of regularity
conditions. If so, then this may provide a significant contribution to the literature
regarding the future estimation of cost functions.
The essay presented in Chapter Three provided an analysis of horizontal
integration in international trade. The Brander-Krugman reciprocal dumping model was
used given its simplicity and wide acceptance in the international trade literature. It
assumes a world duopoly. The extension described in this essay provided for a variable
that represented a degree of ownership. It was seen that in a situation of non-controlling
interest, as the domestic (acquiring) firm increased its degree of ownership in the foreign
firm, the domestic firm increased both its exports and production for domestic
consumption. Conversely, the foreign firm decreased its exports and production for
foreign consumption. Intuitively, the domestic firm reduces its total output in favor of its
acquisition. The degree of ownership variable also represents the fraction of foreign firm
profit that accrues to the domestic firm. In this situation, foreign firm profit increases as
the domestic firm increases its acquisition of the foreign firm. This is due to the fact that
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the foreign firm sees an increase in market share in both the domestic and foreign
markets.
Somewhat counterintuitive results abound when the domestic firm acquires
enough of the foreign firm to obtain managerial control (a majority ownership setting).
In this situation, it is the domestic firm that increases its total output (exports plus output
for indigenous consumption), while the foreign firm reduces its total output. The
paradoxical result is that even in the presence of transportation costs, the domestic firm
chooses to increase its exports. The high elasticity of domestic output in the foreign
market is the likely rationale for this result. But more importantly, it is due to the fact
that the domestic firm has become a multiplant monopoly, with the foreign firm
becoming a subsidiary. Foreign firm profit falls with increased ownership by the
domestic firm. This is due to the fact that the foreign firm loses market share in both
markets with this ownership setting. Domestic firm profit must increase in the
managerial control situation. Monopoly profits must be greater than symmetric duopoly
profits.
The first essay does not evaluate the optimal level of domestic firm ownership of
the foreign firm. In fact, the essay implicitly does not allow for the provision of corner
solutions. This is the motivation for the second essay presented in Chapter Four.
Given the comparative statics results from the third chapter, an evaluation of
optimal asset ownership is presented in Chapter Four. Specifically, this chapter provides
an analysis of horizontal integration in the presence of external constraints (such as
antitrust or nationalist constraints). Given these constraints, Kuhn-Tucker programming
is used to find the optimal level of ownership that the domestic firm should acquire.
Whereas the third chapter illustrated ownership exogenously, the fourth chapter
endogenizes the degree of ownership variable. It was found that the optimal level of
ownership occurs when the domestic firm obtains complete and absolute ownership of
the foreign firm. With the assumption of antitrust constraints, it was found that the
optimal level of ownership is the maximum level of ownership that is allowed by the
nation’s government. If the constraint on ownership is due to nationalism (hence a
foreign government constraint), then the optimal level of ownership is again the
maximum level that is allowed (by the foreign government).
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The essay presented in the fifth chapter provided a study of vertical integration
effects in international trade. In this chapter, an upstream duopoly is assumed to be
located in a home market. The downstream market is a three-firm oligopoly, with one
firm located in the home market, and one firm located in two foreign countries. A fourstage Cournot-Nash game was presented, and backward induction was used to find the
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. In the presence of tariffs, when a foreign downstream
firm vertically integrates backward with one of the upstream firms in the home market,
this newly integrated firm finds it necessary to prevent counterintegration. The integrated
firm assumes a price leadership role in the input market. With the assumption of strategic
internal transfer pricing, any increase in the input price above marginal cost (yet below
the monopoly input price) will forestall potential counterintegration by the home
downstream firm.
When the home nation’s government imposes tariffs on downstream imports,
firms located in that country wish to increase production with the increase in price. With
strategic internal transfer pricing and input price leadership, any increase in input price
prevents these downstream firms from pursuing this type of behavior. The increase in
input price will increase the cost of production. As a result, downstream rivals may wish
to merge with the remaining unintegrated upstream firm. By choosing to sell the input to
its downstream rivals, the vertically integrated firm can prevent the input price from
reaching such a level that might provoke counterintegration. As a result,
counterintegration is prevented. With strategic internal transfer pricing, the vertically
integrated firm not only forecloses its downstream rivals from the contested home
market, but forecloses itself as well. With all downstream firms reducing their output
levels in the home market, the firms approach a collusive equilibrium. This occurs in the
absence of even tacit collusion among the downstream rivals.
The final essay presented in Chapter Six views a key issue in applied
microeconomics. Cost theory is of fundamental importance in economics. As mentioned
above, empirical research in estimating cost functions sometimes leads researchers down
misleading paths due to inaccurate and biased estimates. As a result, many economists
have chosen to impose regularity conditions on flexible functional forms in order to
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estimate a cost function. This “constrained” model allows for the satisfaction of key
properties such as monotonicity and concavity.
Chapter Six is devoted to estimating the forecasting accuracy of the translog with
and without the imposition of these regularity conditions. Cost and output data from 80
electricity generating firms using natural gas as the primary fuel are used in conjunction
with Bayesian cost frontier analysis. The mean square error, mean absolute error, and
mean standard deviation are all computed as the measures of forecasting accuracy. When
comparing the true log cost figures to both the constrained and unconstrained predicted
values, it was found that each measure of forecasting accuracy showed improvements
when using the constrained model. This important result is one that may fundamentally
influence empirical analysis in future research.
In conclusion, there are a variety of possible avenues to future research that are
suggested by this dissertation. Regarding international trade theory and integration, a
further analysis of asset ownership in an oligopolistic setting could be pursued. An
interesting motive of research would be to study the effects of asset ownership in a
managerial control setting with the assumption of more than two firms. A comprehensive
study of welfare analysis could also provide valuable insight into the effects of horizontal
and vertical integration. Additionally, changing the number of upstream and/or
downstream firms in the vertical integration study may be an interesting course of
research. Further manipulation of the input market may provide some direction for future
study. Lastly, the empirical essay in this dissertation indicates a variety of possibilities
for future papers. A similar study could be conducted with respect to electricity
generating plants burning coal as the primary fuel. Also, the imposition of regularity
conditions on flexible functional forms is not sector-specific. Using other industries
would provide for an interesting exercise to see if the results in this dissertation are
consistent.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF INPUT PRICE EQUALLING MARGINAL COST
Allow the profit function from an upstream supplier to be denoted as:
π

Uj

= w( x i ) x i − mx i ; j =1,2; i =A,B,H,

where:
w( x i ) is the input price, where one unit of input produces one unit of output
x i is total input demanded by downstream firms
m is the marginal cost of input production.
Differentiating:
U

∂π j
= w' ( x i ) x i + w( x i ) − m = 0
i
∂x
Rearranging:
w( x i ) + w' ( x i ) x i = m
Factoring out the input price:
w( x i )[1 +

dw x i
] = m.
dx i w( x i )

If si is allowed to be the share of input business by an upstream supplier, then
si =

xi
, which means then that x i = si X , where X equals total input demand by all
X

firms. Substituting this expression into the above equation yields:
w( x i )[1 +

dw X
si ] = m .
dx i w( x i )

The second term in brackets is simply the input share multiplied by the reciprocal of the
elasticity of market input demand, resulting in:
w( x i )[1 +

si
] = m ; where ε = elasticity of market input demand.
ε

Since there is an input duopoly, each upstream firm has a significant share of the market;
therefore, si is not small. However, given that ε is equal to infinity since the inputs are
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perfect substitutes for one another,

si
approaches zero, meaning that the bracketed term
ε

equals one. This implies then that w( x i ) = m .
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APPENDIX B
DERIVATION OF BEST RESPONSE FUNCTIONS
π M = p( X ) x M − c( w, x M ) − τx M + w( X )[r H ( w) + r B ( w)] − m[r H ( w) + r B ( w)]
∂π M
= p ' ( X ) x M + p ( X ) − c x − τ + w' ( X )[r H ( w) + r B ( w)]
M
∂x
∂ 2π M
∂x

M2

= p' ' ( X ) x M + 2 p' ( X ) −

∂ 2c
∂x

M2

+ w' ' ( X )[r H ( w) + r B ( w)] < 0

provided that p ' ' ( X ) and w' ' ( X ) are both negative.

∂ 2π M
= p' ' ( X ) x M + p ' ( X ) + w' ' ( X )[r H ( w) + r B ( w)] < 0
M
H
∂x ∂x
Using the implicit function theorem in finding the slopes of the best response functions, it
is seen that:
dx H
=−
dx M

p ' ' ( X ) x M + p' ( X ) + w' ' ( X )[r H ( w) + r B ( w)]
< 0.
∂ 2c
M
H
B
p' ' ( X ) x + 2 p' ( X ) − M 2 + w' ' ( X )[r ( w) + r ( w)]
∂x

dx H
Given that
< 0 , the best response functions slope downward in ( x M − x H ) space.
M
dx
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